9. Post-Chalcedon problem B: why is it that Jesus' objective, concrete, really existing human nature is not a hypostasis?

Strictly speaking, this problem is Post-Ephesus, since that Council had already defined the doctrine of the one hypostasis of Christ, although in a way less explicit than that of Chalcedon. Quoting from the Third letter of Cyril to Nestorius, read at the council of Ephesus and included in its proceedings [1] [2]:

St. Cyril of Alexandria, in his Third letter to Nestorius, wrote:

"For we do not divide up the words of our Saviour in the gospels among two hypostases or persons."

"All the expressions, therefore, that occur in the gospels are to be referred to one person, the one enfleshed hypostasis of the Word. For there is one Lord Jesus Christ, according to the scriptures."

"II. If anyone does not confess that the Logos Who is from God the Father has been united to flesh according to hypostasis, [...] let him be anathema."

"IV. If anyone distributes between two persons or hypostases the expressions used either in the gospels or in the apostolic writings, whether they have been said by the holy writers of Christ, or by Him of Himself, [...] let him be anathema."

The question of why Jesus' human nature is not a hypostasis could be just left as a theological mystery, as in fact Cyril did in his Second letter to Nestorius, also read at the council of Ephesus and included in its proceedings [2]:

"the Logos became man by uniting to Himself according to Hypostasis, in an ineffable and incomprehensible manner, flesh ensouled with rational soul."

Still, it is wholly legitimate to try to understand [3] how the two natures subsist in one hypostasis. As detailed by Pavouris (2001) [2], the first steps to such an understanding were made by John of Caesarea aka John the Grammarian (fl 510-520) and by Leontius of Jerusalem (fl. probably between 538-550). Quoting from [2]:

On John the Grammarian, Pavouris (2001) wrote:

the Grammarian teaches that the union in Christ was effected 'according to synthesis'. [...] This union 'according to synthesis' is also called 'enhypostatic'. This christology of the 'enhypostaton' is the major contribution of the neo-Chalcedonians to christological doctrine. The primary meaning of the term is 'union of two or more ousiai in one hypostasis'. Yet, like Leontius of Jerusalem, the Grammarian allows for a second meaning, that of true existence. Thus, he accepts the axiom that all ousiai are 'enhypostatic' as long as this means that they really exist. Only in this sense does he agree to call Christ's human ousia 'enhypostatic': in so far as it subsists in the Logos' one Hypostasis and therefore truly exists.

On Leontius of Jerusalem, Pavouris (2001) wrote:

"Leontius makes absolutely clear that only the divine nature has always had its own hypostasis. The human nature, however, has never had a hypostasis of its own. An obvious question is raised by the 'Nestorian': [...] if having a hypostasis primarily means being real - an assumption that Leontius accepts - will a human nature without a hypostasis not be 'anhypostatic', i.e. non existing? Leontius replies that one should distinguish between

a) 'anhypostaton', i.e. something that does not have a hypostasis at all,
b) 'idiohypostaton', i.e. something that exists in its own hypostasis, and
c) 'enhypostaton', i.e. something that subsists in somebody else's hypostasis on account of their union.

Christ's human nature is neither 'anhypostatic' nor 'idiohypostatic'; it is 'enhypostatic', that is, it exists in the pre-existent hypostasis of the Logos. [...] It is not true, says Leontius, that the 'specific human nature' of Christ preceded its hypostasis. [...] As soon it came into being the human nature was enhypostasised, not in a hypostasis of itw own but in the pre-existent hypostasis of the Logos."

This is as close as one can get to understanding the hypostatic union without assuming the real distinction between essence and act of being or existence. To note, even within Thomism the real distinction is always a postulate, an axiom. Twetten [4], in the best treatment of this subject that I am aware of, concludes that "All nine of Aquinas' arguments for the Real Distinction that we have reviewed seem vulnerable to the Question-Begging Objection. Aquinas seems never to have been aware of the objection." (p. 80). He then proposes an argument of his own, based on hylemorphic theory (pp. 85ff). That argument is of no use to me, first because I hold that hylemorphism is a valid description of entities only when the form in question is spiritual, such as the human soul, and secondly because I also hold that the human soul after death is the same person it was with the body, even though in a diminished state, so that his argument would not work for me even in the case of human natures.

Assuming the real distinction between essence and act of being, we can make a general definition of hypostasis that applies to both divine Persons and contingent entities and can be used to formulate the dogmas of trinitarian and christological orthodoxy.

Recalling that hypostasis meant the individual, particular, concrete, really existing subject or "hypokeimenon", and adopting the particular sense of ousía (M1):

ousía = essence or form in a particular sense
 
hypostasis = act of being in a particular mode + ousía

act of being = {Subsistent Act of Being (one), contingent act of being (many)}

modes of the Subsistent Act of Being = {fontal plenitude and paternity, filiation, passive spiration or procession}

modes of a contingent act of being = {created}  -- or none at all

divine Ousía (one) = Subsistent Act of Being (one)  -- per absolute divine simplicity

God the Father = Subsistent Act of Being in fontal plenitude and paternity mode

God the Son before the Incarnation = Subsistent Act of Being in filiation mode

God the Son after the Incarnation = Subsistent Act of Being in filiation mode + Jesus' human ousía

Holy Spirit = Subsistent Act of Being in passive spiration or procession mode

In contrast:

Peter = Peter's contingent act of being + Peter's human ousía

Thus:

- Jesus is not a human person because his human ousía exists by the Subsistent Act of Being in filiation mode, the Hypostasis of the Son.
- Peter is a human person because his ousía exists by Peter's contingent act of being.

Summarizing:

- In creatures, there is a one-to-one correspondence between created hypostasis and created ousía in the particular sense (M1).

- In the Godhead, three Hypostases are one and the same Ousía (in a numerical identity sense), Each in a different mode.

- After the Incarnation, God the Son is one Hypostasis in two ousíai.
 

Last edited by Johannes (3/24/2018 5:50 pm)