Posted by Miguel  5/16/2018 7:07 pm | #1 |
What do you guys think of the modal problem of evil, and how would you respond to it?
Basically, the modal problem of evil is based around the following thesis: (P) it is possible for there to be gratuitous evil. In other words, gratuitous evil exists in at least one possible world. But if that is the case then there can be no good necessary being, because in that possible world with gratuitous evil the good necessary being would be tolerating completely gratuitous evil; then by s5 it follows that there is no good necessary being in any world.
This argument seems stronger than evidential problems of evil because all that it requires is the possibility of gratuitous evil.
How would you respond?
One could, of course, say that we have even better reasons to believe in God (by a cosmological argument from PSR, or any other argument from natural theology, just insert your favorite here), therefore we can reject P. This is a standard move against all problems of evil; the modal problem may be stronger, but it's not enough to outweigh arguments from natural theology.
How can we specifically weaken P, however? Perhaps we could adopt some quasi-leibnizian distinction between logical and moral possibilities and argue that we only accept P by taking it as a logical possibility that nevertheless would never be actualized by God (because it is morally impossible for God to create such a possible world). Or perhaps we can use a similar principle, like that it's possible for there to be a theodicy for every world with evil in it.
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Posted by Mysterious Brony 5/16/2018 11:37 pm | #2 |
Hi Miguel,
I thought about this argument. Do you really think it all comes down to the PSR?
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Posted by Miguel 5/17/2018 2:23 am | #3 |
Mysterious Brony wrote:
Hi Miguel,
I thought about this argument. Do you really think it all comes down to the PSR?
To me it kind of does, because I regard cosmological arguments to be the best arguments for the existence of God. Technically however one could accept the existence of a necessary cause of the universe that just so happens to not be good or personal. But then there are different arguments for moving from necessary being to theism, and we could use that as well.
In principle, however, one could use other arguments. If someone prefers an ontological or a teleological argument, they could use those as well. But the main point is that one can reject P if they find independent arguments for theism to be more convincing, since theism would imply P is false.
To weaken P itself one could try the somewhat "leibnizian" view I proposed. Another thing is that P crucially depends on the evil being gratuitous, and it may not really be that clear that we can have an intuitive grasp of the possibility of *gratuitous* evil, as that would require us to conceive of not just a world with evil or even a lot of evil, but a world in which nothing, nothing whatsoever can outweigh the evil in question. Maybe it can be done, but it is not so clear as it might seem at first.
Last edited by Miguel (5/17/2018 2:25 am)
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Posted by DanielCC 5/17/2018 3:07 am | #4 |
Just to chip in some back reference srtuff: the modal problem of evil and a powerful supplementary argument for it given by Richard Gale were discussed here:
http://classicaltheism.boardhost.com/viewtopic.php?id=893
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Posted by Greg 5/17/2018 2:49 pm | #5 |
The modal problem of evil was also discussed here. Didn't get many replies though.
At least in the standard modal problem of evil, I think the possibility claim should be regarded as on an epistemic par with "it is possible that the clouds should spell out 'God does not exist' every day, with no evident natural explanation".
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Posted by Miguel 5/17/2018 4:15 pm | #6 |
Just to chip in some back reference srtuff: the modal problem of evil and a powerful supplementary argument for it given by Richard Gale were discussed here:
http://classicaltheism.boardhost.com/viewtopic.php?id=893
I think I agree with TomD's answer there. And I think the same difficulty with conceiving of "gratuitous" evil could also plague attempts at imagining PWE; maybe the very possibility of free choice there or perhaps the mere possibility of virtue and soul-building (even if wasted) would be good enough to offset the evil. Or as he said perhaps PWE really is impossible and this need not contradict libertarian free will. The modal argument from evil, while stronger than other versions, is not really as clear-cut as it might seem at first, and is not strong enough to the point where no theist can bite the bullet. In fact I think it's more reasonable to bite the bullet here than to think the universe exists because of magic (i.e. Brute fact).
I wonder if what I said about the leibnizian view couldn't be of any help here, though. If you talk to some common man (and not someone acquainted with contemporary modal logic) and ask what he thinks of this argument, I think he probably won't care much "well, it would be possible, but what matters is that it's NOT the actual case, and this is why God is good. He didn't create a world like that!". And I don't think this reply would be just out of ignorance. It could be expressing something close to Leibniz's distinction between logical and moral necessity; in a way Leibniz's issue with the "best possible world" was already close to the modal argument from evil, because Leibniz thought he had to insist that God could not create a world worse than the actual one, but he also wanted to hold that other worlds were possible and thus avoid Spinozism. The discussion is very close.
So it could be that the intuition supportive of P is not enough to establish a modal problem of evil. Gratuitous evil could be possible but this would only be a problem for God if it were morally possible for God to make use of his creative power in such a way as to create the world with gratuitous evil. A world with gratuitous evil could be possible without being morally possible for God. Of course one could then say such a world would therefore not be possible, but Leibniz's point would be precisely that there is a distinction here and our intuitions in favor of P could turn out to be harmless to theism after all. Would require us to revise our use of possible worlds a bit and to take into consideration Leibniz's idea of moral necessity. And I think that's a live option.
Last edited by Miguel (5/17/2018 4:16 pm)
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Posted by DanielCC 5/17/2018 5:07 pm | #7 |
The modal problem of evil is probably one of the most interesting objections to theism (along with Smith's divine freedom variant on the LPOE and the intrisic property objection to divine simplicity).
I agree about our capacity to conceive such worlds being far more difficult than first appears. Note also that Gale's ingenious argument for the possibility of such a world drawing on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities is not strong enough to justify that conclusion. If for every good (as opposed to bad) choice an individual makes there is a world where they make the bad choice (as opposed to the good choice) it need not follow that there is a world in which individuals make only bad choices - a whole life of bad choices need not be possible.
I am not convinced the idea of moral necessity adds anything here though. If it is morally impossible for God to do something then either God's being omnibenevolent is contingent (and if we are grounding possibilities in God this will probably lead to a denial of S5 as possibilities will vary from world cluster to world cluster depending on God's character in those clusters meaning some worlds are not accessible to each other) or it is impossible in toto
Last edited by DanielCC (5/17/2018 5:08 pm)
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Posted by Mysterious Brony 5/18/2018 1:30 am | #8 |
@ Miguel
Interesting thoughts, nevertheless, I will pitch in my two cents.
I think if one denies the PSR then such notion of gratuitous evil arises (Unsurprisingly, the atheist who denies the PSR comes up with this notion). Thus, I think that if one accepts a strong form of the PSR* then this notion of gratuitous evil is weakened or gone.
*Of course, the non-believer can attack a strong form of the PSR by appealing to say modal collapse. However, personally, I'm not really convinced by such move because then we are bringing in brute facts into the picture or might as well give up philosophy and our basic rational intuitions.
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Posted by aftermathemat 5/18/2018 11:57 am | #9 |
This argument seems stronger than evidential problems of evil because all that it requires is the possibility of gratuitous evil.
How would you respond?
This argument based on the sheer possibility of gratuitous evil is similar to appealing to the sheer possibility of brute facts as a reason to think they are actually metaphysically possible. If PSR is true, then no gratuitous evil can exist, since we would have something happening for no reason whatsoever. Thus, the PSR also implies that no evil is truly gratuitous and without reason. The only reason we cannot see the direct analogy between appeal to possibility for brute facts and appeal to possibility for gratuitous evil is that one is metaphysical, while the other is moral and ethical, and our moral and ethical compasses simply aren't as sharp as our metaphysical ones.
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Posted by seigneur 5/18/2018 2:24 pm | #10 |
If PSR is true, then no gratuitous evil can exist, since we would have something happening for no reason whatsoever.
Yes. All sorts of problems of evil, modal or otherwise, always seemed deeply problematic for me.
If the problem of evil is supposed to refute God, then my question is: Without God, what is evil in the first place so that it could be there to refute God? What does a system of (moral) good and evil look like when there is no God? Does that good/evil have any scope beyond subjective sentiment?
And when someone brings up gratuitous evil, which is the more emphatic form of evil, then my question simply becomes more emphatic.
The only sort of problem of evil that I acknowledge is a theist's puzzle, If God is good, then why is there so much evil in this world? But this is an emotional puzzle, not an intellectual or metaphysical one. When the theist truly comprehends that death is release from evil (as e.g. first-century Christians very well understood and were happy to be martyred), there is really no problem of evil at all.
So, let's start with the basics: Can someone point out an instance of gratuitous evil?
