Immanent existence of universals within physical reality?

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Posted by RomanJoe
5/28/2018 2:57 pm
#1

I know that contra the conceptualist and nominalist position the moderate realist will sometimes claims (a la Feser and Oderberg) that universals exist within physical reality in an immanent way--unabstracted but nonetheless able to be abstracted from the concrete into the universal. This strikes me as odd--what exactly does it mean for a universal be immanent within a physical instance?

 
Posted by DanielCC
5/28/2018 3:10 pm
#2

Conceptualism is either a form of
Nominalism or of Realism e.g. that universals exist as intentional objects.

‘Moderate realism’ is actually a combination of two theses:

1. Universals are an actual constituent or part of their particulars, they do not simpley stand in an exemplification relation to them. This is the thesis of Constituent Ontology.

2. There are no uninstiated universals.

The or an actual Thomist position is that universals only have existence as objects of the mind yet have a basis in reality due to the common nature, which is neither one nor many. As I pointed out somewhere Ed and the other Analytical Thomists friendly with the powers movement do not push this thesis.

Last edited by DanielCC (5/28/2018 3:13 pm)

 
Posted by Greg
5/28/2018 6:33 pm
#3

DanielCC wrote:

The or an actual Thomist position is that universals only have existence as objects of the mind yet have a basis in reality due to the common nature, which is neither one nor many. As I pointed out somewhere Ed and the other Analytical Thomists friendly with the powers movement do not push this thesis.

As I understand Aquinas, the common natures which give universals their basis in reality are singulars. (Aquinas thinks nothing real is not singular.) The nature "absolutely considered" is neither one nor many, but that is what results from abstraction and is predicated of individuals. It cannot give anything a basis in reality as it is not itself real.

 
Posted by RomanJoe
5/31/2018 12:29 pm
#4

DanielCC wrote:

Conceptualism is either a form of
Nominalism or of Realism e.g. that universals exist as intentional objects.

‘Moderate realism’ is actually a combination of two theses:

1. Universals are an actual constituent or part of their particulars, they do not simpley stand in an exemplification relation to them. This is the thesis of Constituent Ontology.

2. There are no uninstiated universals.

The or an actual Thomist position is that universals only have existence as objects of the mind yet have a basis in reality due to the common nature, which is neither one nor many. As I pointed out somewhere Ed and the other Analytical Thomists friendly with the powers movement do not push this thesis.

Perhaps you could help me out here. How does the conceptualist typically explain the forming of universals in the human mind without introducing notions of abstracting them from extra-mental reality? It's my understanding that the conceptualist believes universals are purely mental and that they are imposed rather than abstracted from the extra-mental reality.

 


 
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