Posted by Calhoun  11/22/2018 8:22 am | #11 |
And Yes, it seems you are right that rejecting Utilitarianism opens up possibility of other responses to POE.
Very recently I was reading a Paper on grammer of goodness, The author argued against POE based on Geach's work on goodness. Interestingly, he also argued that same also refutes Ontological argument.
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Posted by Greg 11/22/2018 10:21 am | #12 |
Calhoun wrote:
Good points, but still responses to POE might not essentially depend on Utiltitarianism but some of them seem to take notion of "greater good" along the same lines.
Partly I think theists responding to POE take on some of the assumptions involved in the problem itself. There are good reasons to do that, as it is best to reject as little as possible of the argument one is disputing. But it seems to me that some replies to POE presuppose utilitarianism because POE does. That is, POE claims that even if some goods are only possible because evil is possible (i.e., goods associated with free choice or salvation), the evil in the world seems to outweigh the good, or else that as much good could be produced without the evil. But that is a pretty utilitarian way of setting up the problem.
There was also an article named "God is a consequentialist" by an Atheist Philosopher/blogger I read a while ago.
I just quickly skimmed it. I don't think it is very good. The examples he adduces (the flood in Genesis and the 2004 tsunami) simply don't force a theist to hold that "God employs a consequentialist moral system". (Even setting aside the defects of his readings of those cases, he immediately adds the qualification: "God employs a consequentialist moral system with at least a great deal of actions". A "consequentialist moral system" is not a moral system in which some actions depend on consequences, it is a moral system in which all of them are. Even Kant holds that the consequences determine what one should do in a great deal of cases.)
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Posted by Greg 11/22/2018 10:31 am | #13 |
2) It's fairly clear that the good isn't pleasure in any standard way. I can always ask, "Is this pleasure I am receiving good?" Me asking that question demonstrates that, at least at a conceptual/linguistic level, we differentiate between pleasure and goodness.
This is G.E. Moore's argument, but I think it hangs on an intuitive but ultimately unsustainable understanding of meaning. One would think that if you know what "good" means and know what "pleasure" means, then you must know that they mean the same thing, if indeed they do mean the same thing. So then it would not make sense to ask the question of whether this pleasure I am receiving is good, because anyone who could understand this question (knew what the terms mean) would know that this is not an open question.
But I can intelligibly ask "Is Mark Twain Samuel Clemens?" and "Is this water H2O?" That an identity statement holds can be something I learn. It holds necessarily if both terms are rigid designators, but it is intelligible to ask whether it holds because I can use the terms knowledgeably without knowing that they rigidly designate the same thing.
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Posted by Calhoun 11/22/2018 1:05 pm | #14 |
Good points, but still responses to POE might not essentially depend on Utiltitarianism but some of them seem to take notion of "greater good" along the same lines.
Partly I think theists responding to POE take on some of the assumptions involved in the problem itself. There are good reasons to do that, as it is best to reject as little as possible of the argument one is disputing. But it seems to me that some replies to POE presuppose utilitarianism because POE does. That is, POE claims that even if some goods are only possible because evil is possible (i.e., goods associated with free choice or salvation), the evil in the world seems to outweigh the good, or else that as much good could be produced without the evil. But that is a pretty utilitarian way of setting up the problem.
Correct, most versions do seem to do that, Just to make a note here though there are some which seem to be based on deontological premises , what some philosophers of religion call commonsense POE and as I understand , which basically takes evidence on non-inferential basis, based on a seeming. I think Trent Dougherty has argued that justification of premise that there is gratuitous evil can be based on Phenomenal conservatism.
IF this is correct then these are some ways to setup non Utilitarian POE I think.
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Posted by Calhoun 11/22/2018 1:08 pm | #15 |
But my discussion seem to be getting a little off topic here. I should discontinue it.
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Posted by John West 11/23/2018 8:54 am | #16 |
But my discussion seem to be getting a little off topic here. I should discontinue it.
The new forum has a function that lets us split threads in such situations. 
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