Posted by seigneur  7/16/2016 3:17 am | #11 |
nojoum wrote:
"So, sex exists in animals for the sake of procreation and sexual pleasure exists for the sake of getting then to indulge in sex, so that they will procreate. And were built in such a way that sexual arousal is hard to resist and occurs very frequently and such that it is very difficult to avoided pregnancies resulting from indulgence of that arousal. The obvious conclusion is that the natural end of sex is (in part) not just procreation but procreation in large numbers."
I disagree with the final conclusion because it’s limited in its vision. It does not take into account that large number of children is favorable as long as they can be raised properly and benefit humanity. Therefore, for example in cases where large number of children hinders raising them, having more children is not beneficial and so on. Therefore, reproduction must be limited.
Now, I have not read the article/book by Feser, but if by "animals" he really meant animals here (and not human beings), then your objection does not apply. Is it reasonable to ask animals to consider the consequences of overpopulation?
Feser says, as reported by you, "And were built in such a way that sexual arousal is hard to resist and occurs very frequently and such that it is very difficult to avoided pregnancies resulting from indulgence of that arousal." So it would follow that indulgence in sex is natural or close enough to natural. But it's not so with human beings. Once the end has been accomplished, then there shall be no more indulgence. It may be hard to resist, but human beings are supposed to be able to act or restrain action after due consideration of ends and motives. That it's hard to resist does not mean it's impossible or unnatural to resist. The ability to resist makes a difference between animal and human.
Dr. Feser also adds that the key to understanding sexual faculties is that they have unitive and procreative end. Considering this statement and the last paragraph, Can't we say that in a family with enough number of children, protected sex between parents is beneficial and therefore morally right as long as it strengthens the bonds between them?
What if Feser means "unitive and procreative" together as a single end, not two separate and separable ends?
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Posted by Greg 7/17/2016 2:51 pm | #12 |
I am convinced that Feser's arguments in sexual ethics are seriously underdeveloped. It's become apparent, on the one hand, that the distinction between a use contrary to a faculty's end and a use (merely) other than a faculty's end, is rather hard to draw; while the distinction is deployed in "In Defense of the Perverted Faculty Argument," it is not developed as much as it needs to be. There is a further generality problem (which seems to be that which occasioned this thread) about natural ends (which compounds the problem with the contrary-to/other-than distinction): is the end of this faculty procreation or procreation in large numbers? It isn't too clear to me that the latter hypothesis follows from or is better supported by the evidence; the end of my locomotive faculty, presumably, is just walking, not walking throughout my life when I need to. But what is the principled ground for ascribing one end rather than another?
Feser also seems to be unaware of the particularity required for arguments in applied sexual ethics. For instance, he writes:
What has been said so far clearly supports a general commendation of confining sexual activity to marriage and the having of large families, and a general condemnation of fornication, adultery, contraception, homoseuxal acts, bestiality, masturbation, pornography, and the like. For fornication threatens to bring children into the world outside of the marital context they need for their well-being; adultery undermines the stability of that context; contraceptive acts directly frustrate the procreative end of sex altogether; homosexual acts and bestiality have no tendency toward procreation at all, and the emotions associated with them direct the unitive drive, which can by nature be fulfilled only by a human being of the opposite sex, toward an improper object; and masturbation and pornography are also contrary to the inherently other-directed unitive drive insofar as they turn it inward toward a fantasy world rather than outward toward another human being, like an arrow pointed back at the archer. (Neo-Scholastic Essays, 396)
I think this range of claims, and each of the particular cases, requires independent argumentation. First, as occasioned Humanae vitae and Anscombe's "Contraception and Chastity," one will need an account of intention and of the moral species of an action to make these arguments. For consider two women: one takes an anovulent pill because she does not want a child, the other takes an anovulent pill for health reasons. What is the difference? Well, what makes one action an act of contraception has to do with the fact that one woman is aiming to contracept, while the other is not. But why should we not say that the latter is acting contrary to a natural faculty? Feser has not recognized that this is a crucial question, and there is no answer to it in any of his work.
The "new natural lawyers," while I disagree with them on a few issues, have IMO much clearer thinking on this subject. I'd also say that the name "new natural law" is unfortunate; I don't think there is a unified group of "old natural lawyers." Feser and the manualists, perhaps; Hittinger coined the term but I don't even think his views are that close to Feser's. Then there are a lot of thinkers who are in some ways closer to the new natural lawyers than to Feser, though the terminology sometimes gives the opposite impression (Pilsner, Flannery, Jensen, maybe even Oderberg).
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Posted by ML 7/19/2016 10:25 am | #13 |
Greg,
Couldn't acting contrary to a faculty's end simply mean preventing that faculty from fulfilling its end? I think the problem lies in specifying that faculty's end. I'm not sure of this, but it might help to notice that the ends of some faculties are, in a sense, time specific, while others aren't. For example, the end of our locomotive faculty is walking in general, not walking at this or that particular time, and the end of our visual faculty is seeing in general, but not seeing at this or that particular time. In contrast, the end of our digestive faculty is the absorption of nutrients, not just at any time, but soon after we ingest food, and the end of our reproductive faculty is the emission of semen into the vagina, not just at any time, but at the climax of sexual arousal.
Given these different kinds of ends, there will be different ways of acting contrary to each end. So acting contrary to our locomotive faculty's end would involve preventing ourselves from walking, not just at this or that particular time, but in general - e.g. by breaking our legs. Likewise, acting contrary to our visual faculty's end would involve preventing ourselves from seeing in general - e.g. by blinding ourselves. In contrast, acting contrary to our digestive faculty's end would involve preventing digestion soon (I don't know the range of time here) after ingesting food - e.g. by forcing ourselves to vomit. Likewise, acting contrary to our reproductive faculty's end would involve preventing the emission of semen into the vagina at the climax of sexual arousal.
I'm not completely satisfied by this though, but I believe the correct account of acting contrary to a faculty's end will be something close to this.
Last edited by ML (7/19/2016 10:30 am)
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Posted by ML 7/19/2016 10:38 am | #14 |
Another way to see the distinction between time specific ends and other ends: If John is sitting down and thus, not walking, we don't take this to be a sign that his locomotive faculty is defective. The time isn't relevant - if he's not walking at time t, or t+1, or t+2, etc., we still wouldn't conclude that he's lame. In contrast, if John's digestive faculty isn't absorbing nutrients, the timing does matter - if he hasn't eaten in a long time, then we don't conclude that his digestive faculty is defective, but if he *has* eaten something recently, then this is a sign that his digestive faculty isn't working properly.
Again, I'm not completely satisfied by this - after all, if we find that John isn't walking at a time when he's trying hard to walk, then something's probably wrong with his legs - but I hope the comparison highlights the distinction I'm trying to get at, however that distinction is best articulated.
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Posted by Greg 7/19/2016 3:29 pm | #15 |
Couldn't acting contrary to a faculty's end simply mean preventing that faculty from fulfilling its end?
Well, "preventing" is ambiguous between intentionally preventing and any preventing that is a (foreseeable?) consequence of one's action. If the latter, then both the woman who takes an anovulent pill because she does not want to have a child and the woman who takes the same pill for health reasons will be acting contrary to a faculty's end.
I think the problem lies in specifying that faculty's end. I'm not sure of this, but it might help to notice that the ends of some faculties are, in a sense, time specific, while others aren't. For example, the end of our locomotive faculty is walking in general, not walking at this or that particular time, and the end of our visual faculty is seeing in general, but not seeing at this or that particular time. In contrast, the end of our digestive faculty is the absorption of nutrients, not just at any time, but soon after we ingest food, and the end of our reproductive faculty is the emission of semen into the vagina, not just at any time, but at the climax of sexual arousal.
I think that this is part of a response. It seems to me that an account of intention is also necessary. Of course, stipulating the time specificity of some faculties but not others answers a formal question of how a collection of positions in ethics can be simultaneously held, but one also needs a principled way of figuring out whether a given faculty has a time-specific end or not. (I realize you are trying to do this.) Some would be rather content with saying that the reproductive faculty's purpose is like the locomotive faculty's: it is reproducing in general, not in any particular sexual act. This is the approach to contraception that some Protestants take; using contraception is fine at times, as long as one does not rule out children over the entirety of one's marriage. But until those sorts of distinctions have been made, it isn't clear that Feser's perverted faculty argument can capture the "malum in se".
There's something to be said for the view that, like unintended infertility, intended infertility involves a failure of the reproductive faculty. Someone who takes an anovulent pill is destroying the proper function of their reproductive faculty. But that's true whether they are taking the pill "contraceptively" or not.
But then, we also would probably not want to say that someone practicing natural family planning has a defective reproductive faculty. It is not strange that someone who only has sex during her infertile periods does not conceive a child. But it also is not strange that someone who only has sex when in a certain chemical state does not conceive a child.
There are obviously distinctions that can and have been made here. I'd like to see a systematic way of making them, though. I suspect this will have to wait for a systematic treatment of ethics, which I hope Feser will work on someday.
Last edited by Greg (7/19/2016 3:35 pm)
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Posted by nojoum 7/19/2016 6:24 pm | #16 |
I think the point is that contraceptives and homosexual acts are contrary to the nature of the sex organs - they are perverting a faculty. In Thomistic natural law, if I understand it correctly, you are not permitted to use a faculty against its natural ends (teleology) even for some higher, good purpose. You might be able to not use a faculty - for example, to be celibate; but you can't misuse that faculty - for example, homosexual acts for unitive purposes. If understand it correctly, and I may be wrong, there is more or less an holistic nature to natural law. You can't misuse bodily faculties to achieve spiritual or psychological ends.
I believe the problem is rooted in the fact that we cannot establish that the main purpose of sex is procreation in large numbers. If we can establish that then rest of argument seems to be acceptable,
Adding to your comment on disregard of intention by natural law, I would like to say that it actually shows that natural law is incomplete. Because, for sure the intention of our actions are important and especially if you consider how God judges people. I would say God might even consider the intention more important (e.g. if you donate money so that people praise you, God will not approve your deeds as much as he would when you donate in secret)
Now, I have not read the article/book by Feser, but if by "animals" he really meant animals here (and not human beings), then your objection does not apply. Is it reasonable to ask animals to consider the consequences of overpopulation?
Actually the way that Feser argues is that for understanding the final cause of an organ, we first look at the animals having that organ. That will determine the main final cause of that organ. Now since we are rational humans, the rationality will improve or add to the function of the organ. For example, while the eyes in animals are for seeing, for us it also helps us not only to see but also to perceive (in that you are able to understand that oak belongs to the group of trees and so on and so forth, but a dog cannot make such reasoning from its vision, it is not able to form concepts of what he sees). He takes this reasoning with sex itself; saying that the main function of sex is procreation in large numbers (as in the case of animals) and since we are human beings unity can also follow from sex. But, Unity is not the purpose of sex.
However, I think that it is not right to think that way. For animals, nature would balance somehow the large numbers of certain species (because you always have some kind of prey and predator case which balances the population). So in the case of animals even if you reproduce in large numbers, it will fixed. However, in the case of humans, you cannot simply reproduce in large numbers and say that ok, some of them will die because of diseases (no money to pay for hospitals), some of them will not get good education because The father and mother dont have time and so on. The case is very different for the life of human beings and you cannot look at it the way you see animals.
What if Feser means "unitive and procreative" together as a single end, not two separate and separable ends?
Actually for Feser the procreative end is the main final cause of sex (the unitive one is not). But he also adds that having the unitive side is good because it holds the family together and so the children will be raised better.
I am convinced that Feser's arguments in sexual ethics are seriously underdeveloped. It's become apparent, on the one hand, that the distinction between a use contrary to a faculty's end and a use (merely) other than a faculty's end, is rather hard to draw; while the distinction is deployed in "In Defense of the Perverted Faculty Argument," it is not developed as much as it needs to be.
I totally agree with you. The case of Sex is much different than for example, amputation. If amputate your leg, you cannot ever use it so it is definitely bad. But having protected sex in family in which there are enough number of children is much different.
I also agree that any account of morality should address the intention of the person which is not seen in the natural presented by Feser.
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Posted by Jeremy Taylor 7/19/2016 7:12 pm | #17 |
I believe the problem is rooted in the fact that we cannot establish that the main purpose of sex is procreation in large numbers. If we can establish that then rest of argument seems to be acceptable,
I don't quite understand you. One important purpose of the sex organs is clearly to procreate. I believe Feser's point is therefore that each time sex takes place we need to be open to procreation. I don't see where procreation in large numbers comes into it. Feser argues that whenever we have sex we cannot pervert the ends of our sexual organs, which means we cannot artificially prevent procreation. This end is very much based in biological - it is about the basic biological telos of our sexual faculties.
Adding to your comment on disregard of intention by natural law, I would like to say that it actually shows that natural law is incomplete. Because, for sure the intention of our actions are important and especially if you consider how God judges people. I would say God might even consider the intention more important (e.g. if you donate money so that people praise you, God will not approve your deeds as much as he would when you donate in secret)
human beings and you cannot look at it the way you see animals.
Sorry, I spoke much too loosely. What I meant is that it is not necessary, according to Feser, to have procreation as an explicit, conscious intention each time one has sex. All that is needed is an openness to procreation. The sterile couple should be open to possible procreation, if the unlikely should occur. I do think the issue of natural family planning raises problems - are there any means, aside from just not having sex - that we can legitimately use to not lessen the likelihood of procreation any particular time we have sex?
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Posted by iwpoe 7/19/2016 7:24 pm | #18 |
Sorry, I spoke much too loosely. What I meant is that it is not necessary, according to Feser, to have procreation as an explicit, conscious intention each time one has sex. All that is needed is an openness to procreation. The sterile couple should be open to possible procreation, if the unlikely should occur. I do think the issue of natural family planning raises problems - are there any means, aside from just not having sex - that we can legitimately use to not lessen the likelihood of procreation any particular time we have sex?
I'm interested in the difference between tacit and explicit intention, but for the sake of discussion, what is the exact difference between explicit conscious intention to X and oppenness to X, since if the latter goes into the tacit there are a lot of questions about will.
As an illustration: when I am enraged one might say I have a tacit intention to harm someone, and only conscious explicit intention restrains it. If oppenness to procreation is like the former, it's not clear I can be asked to control that directly.
You can, if course, deny that account of intention, but that will still require more detail on the the matter.
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It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
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Posted by Greg 7/19/2016 8:10 pm | #19 |
Sorry, I spoke much too loosely. What I meant is that it is not necessary, according to Feser, to have procreation as an explicit, conscious intention each time one has sex. All that is needed is an openness to procreation. The sterile couple should be open to possible procreation, if the unlikely should occur. I do think the issue of natural family planning raises problems - are there any means, aside from just not having sex - that we can legitimately use to not lessen the likelihood of procreation any particular time we have sex?
I'm interested in the difference between tacit and explicit intention, but for the sake of discussion, what is the exact difference between explicit conscious intention to X and oppenness to X, since if the latter goes into the tacit there are a lot of questions about will.
As an illustration: when I am enraged one might say I have a tacit intention to harm someone, and only conscious explicit intention restrains it. If oppenness to procreation is like the former, it's not clear I can be asked to control that directly.
You can, if course, deny that account of intention, but that will still require more detail on the the matter.
I think openness to X-ing is the same as not intending not to X.
One can be enraged at a certain person without intending to harm them; one can desire to X without intending to X.
I would not draw a distinction between tacit and explicit intentions, at least not to deploy it in that way. There are, of course, cases where people explicitly and consciously deliberate about what to do, in which case they have explicit intentions; in other cases, they just act, either by habit or in a way that seems obvious to them. There are still things that we can say about intention in such cases; I am with Anscombe in thinking the person's intention is (ideally, assuming they are honest) elicited by asking them "Why did you X?", which reveals the structure of their deliberation and the practical syllogisms they accepted in acting.
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Posted by ML 7/19/2016 8:37 pm | #20 |
Just throwing this out there: wouldn't the use of antiperspirants be a counterexample here? It seems perfectly permissible to use them, but such usage also seems clearly contrary to the sweat gland's end, which is to produce sweat at the skin's surface given a certain range of temperature.
