Posted by Charlemagne  9/21/2016 8:20 pm | #1 |
It has come to my attention that some people find a problem with Christ being material and Him also being eternal. How is Christ eternally both human and Divine? And how is that reconcilable with simplicity?
It seems we would need to cash out what it means for something to be a composite being. Since the doctrine of simplicity differs from the East and West. Both accept the doctrine of simplicity, but they understand it in very different ways. See Radde-Gallwitz' book on "The Transformation of Divine Simplicity" in the Cappadocian Fathers. Perl's "Theophany" goes into it as well. Christ is metaphysically ultimate, he's God, he doesn't change. How then can Christ acquire a human nature? Is Christ a material being in Heaven, and thus eternally in flesh?
Last edited by Charlemagne (9/21/2016 8:31 pm)
|
Posted by iwpoe 9/21/2016 10:36 pm | #2 |
You got rid of all the rest of your argument. 😞
In any case, problems with the humanity of Christ and its relation to God are a lot of why I'm not a Christian. Nietzsche says it rather sussinctly as:
"*God* on the cross!?"
I'm sure it can be rationalized- the idea that God could die in some sense or have flesh and humanity -and Aquinas, for instance, does his best to try to make sense of the idea. But the basic metaphor/symbology of it is, as Kierkegaard wants to point out all the time, absurd.
The usual move is, as far as I've seen, to deny that any change in Christ is a change to the godhead. God didn't cease to be while Jesus was bodily dead, for instance.
I'm also not sure that it's held universally that Jesus *acquired* Humanity, since he is to be both God and man with no division, but my christology is not as strong as it could be.
Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
My Books
It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
|
Posted by Jason 9/22/2016 11:59 am | #3 |
iwpoe wrote:
In any case, problems with the humanity of Christ and its relation to God are a lot of why I'm not a Christian. Nietzsche says it rather sussinctly as:
"*God* on the cross!?"
I'm sure it can be rationalized- the idea that God could die in some sense or have flesh and humanity -and Aquinas, for instance, does his best to try to make sense of the idea. But the basic metaphor/symbology of it is, as Kierkegaard wants to point out all the time, absurd.
Yeah it is absurd but that is exactly the point, since it raises a very important and interesting question as to why is God on the cross? Why would a metaphysically Ultimate Being be on a cross? Why such a drastic step? The answer to these questions I think are the core of Christianity.
The usual move is, as far as I've seen, to deny that any change in Christ is a change to the godhead. God didn't cease to be while Jesus was bodily dead, for instance.
Yeah I agree, here is Aquinas’s take on it http://www.newadvent.org/summa/4050.htm#article2
|
Posted by iwpoe 9/22/2016 12:34 pm | #4 |
Sure, at the core of Christianity sits an aparent paradox.
My problem was that I'm not sure the Paradox can actually be rationalized without losing the whole idea.
After all, if God is in fact inpassive and metaphysically ultimate, in what sense can I transgress it or owe him a debt or be in need of redemption with respect to him? In what sense can the metaphysically ultimate actually pay a penalty for me? Why in the form of death? Why can we not simply miraculously pay the penalty? Why can he not make it such that the penalty was never a penalty in the first place? The usual rationalizations of what's going on make it at the very least extremely queer that these are the mechanics of the celestial world. I mean, I would be interested in talking this over with a Miamonadan since, as a mere virtuous pagan, I could use a abrahamic voice here.
Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
My Books
It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
|
Posted by Jeremy Taylor 9/22/2016 7:21 pm | #5 |
From my Platonic-Hermetic perspective I can understand the notion of the incarnation and resurrection, though perhaps not in a way an orthodox Christian would be entirely comfortable with. It seems to me that it is a great way to symbolise that no matter how far we fall away from him, God is there and will bring us back to him. I think Frithjof Schuon put it well:
Christ’s victory over the world and over death retraces or anticipates the victory—as such timeless—of Good over Evil, or of Ohrmazd over Ahriman; a victory that is ontologically necessary because it results from the nature of Being itself, despite initial appearances to the contrary. Darkness, even in winning, loses; and light, even in losing, wins; Passion, Resurrection, Redemption.
Interestingly, Henry Corbin did not accept material incarnation (he was a Docetist) because he thought of it as too literalist - by reducing Christ's incarnation to one time and place, it reduces our personal relationship with God and with the resurrection. I don't think this need be the case. I think that the literal resurrection can be seen as a material reflection of a cosmic relationship of God to creation.
|
Posted by Jeremy Taylor 9/22/2016 7:40 pm | #6 |
Sure, at the core of Christianity sits an aparent paradox.
My problem was that I'm not sure the Paradox can actually be rationalized without losing the whole idea.
After all, if God is in fact inpassive and metaphysically ultimate, in what sense can I transgress it or owe him a debt or be in need of redemption with respect to him? In what sense can the metaphysically ultimate actually pay a penalty for me? Why in the form of death? Why can we not simply miraculously pay the penalty? Why can he not make it such that the penalty was never a penalty in the first place? The usual rationalizations of what's going on make it at the very least extremely queer that these are the mechanics of the celestial world. I mean, I would be interested in talking this over with a Miamonadan since, as a mere virtuous pagan, I could use a abrahamic voice here.
Are you understanding the crucifixion and resurrection as a matter of substituionary atonement? This has been the standard understanding in Western Christianity since St. Anselm. It has its place, but I would argue that the Patristic understanding of Christus Victor. Here the understanding is metaphysical.
|
Posted by iwpoe 9/22/2016 8:48 pm | #7 |
I mean to suggest both the patristic and the Latin views- though when I think of the patristic view I usually think of the ransom theory in particular rather than Christus Victor, which is modestly different. How can beings ever be in a state of *peril* relative to Being from which Being has to rescue them? How can God owe anyone anything- be it the devil, death, or himself? These are both anthropomorphism: idolatry as my Jewish friends would have it. Being is the source of all beings. Everything that is, whether it's the devil's ransom or evil's dominion or anything whatsoever has its being by virtue of God. He need not pay anything nor do anything nor rescue anything; if it be not in his will, then he just needs to no longer give the thing being, but if it be not in his will why does it have being in the first place? Why does the devil have ransom-taking power? Why does evil have dominion-power? Etc. The view looks a lot like proclaiming that God sets up hoops so that he might jump through them.
Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
My Books
It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
|
Posted by Jeremy Taylor 9/22/2016 9:03 pm | #8 |
I don't think that the literal ransom theory is the fullest expression of the Patristic theory of the incarnation and resurrection, certainly not for (in my view) the most profound of the Fathers, such as the Alexandrine and Cappadocian Fathers. The deeper meaning, I would say, is that the devil here represents privation and evil. The incarnation and the resurrection, as I understand them, shows that God is present in all creation - which never ceases to reflect him, even at its most privative. As low as we may sink in sin and ignorance, God is there. And he redeems creation, because he brings it back to him - he always triumphs over evil.
|
Posted by iwpoe 9/22/2016 9:16 pm | #9 |
Interestingly, Henry Corbin did not accept material incarnation (he was a Docetist) because he thought of it as too literalist - by reducing Christ's incarnation to one time and place, it reduces our personal relationship with God and with the resurrection. I don't think this need be the case. I think that the literal resurrection can be seen as a material reflection of a cosmic relationship of God to creation.
I tend to think docetism is one step too short. If God is metaphysically ultimate all natures participate in him in some respect: anything that *is* in any respect has its being in him. Our relationship to God is even more intimate than that of a fish in water. To say that God has within himself human nature in order to affect a reconciliation seems both unnecessary (there is no gap between God and I that requires that kind of bridging) and arguably incoherent. God is metaphysically ultimate: he can't have mundane properties like human nature as if he were an ordinary being. It's especially dubious when you consider divine simplicity.
That said, I'm not sure the material incarnation implies the incarnation is *merely* temporal. Christ is eternal and he's eternally and fully man and God with no division or distortion. His time on earth as a man walking about a location is, of course, limited, but I think the meaning of the material incarnation is in orthodoxy not meant to be temporally and spatially limited. His eternal nature *always* has that material relation just as the souls of the dead do, even though they aren't always living.
Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
My Books
It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
|
Posted by Jeremy Taylor 9/22/2016 10:24 pm | #10 |
[
I tend to think docetism is one step too short. If God is metaphysically ultimate all natures participate in him in some respect: anything that *is* in any respect has its being in him. Our relationship to God is even more intimate than that of a fish in water. To say that God has within himself human nature in order to affect a reconciliation seems both unnecessary (there is no gap between God and I that requires that kind of bridging) and arguably incoherent. God is metaphysically ultimate: he can't have mundane properties like human nature as if he were an ordinary being. It's especially dubious when you consider divine simplicity.
Well, all natures participate in him, but surely we do not all participate in him to the same degree (obviously, I'm putting very complex issues in very simplistic terms). This is why there is privation and evil and suffering. It is very complex metaphysics, but I would say, as a Platonist, that creation in some sense participates in the divine, though this doesn't conflict with divine simplicity.
That said, I'm not sure the material incarnation implies the incarnation is *merely* temporal. Christ is eternal and he's eternally and fully man and God with no division or distortion. His time on earth as a man walking about a location is, of course, limited, but I think the meaning of the material incarnation is in orthodoxy not meant to be temporally and spatially limited. His eternal nature *always* has that material relation just as the souls of the dead do, even though they aren't always living.
Well, Corbin's problem was about our relationship to the divine, and his view of a deeply personal, mystical relationship we all have to develop. He saw the incarnation as downgrading that in favour of a dogmatic, public, and spatially and temporally limited relationship.
