Posted by Callum  10/19/2017 7:56 pm | #1 |
From wiki;
In epistemology, the Münchhausen trilemmais a thought experiment used to demonstrate the impossibility of proving any truth, even in the fields of logic and mathematics. If it is asked how any knowledge is known to be true, proof may be provided. Yet that same question can be asked of the proof, and any subsequent proof. The Münchhausen trilemma is that there are only three options when providing proof in this situation:
The circular argument, in which theory and proof support each otherThe regressive argument, in which each proof requires a further proof, ad infinitumThe axiomatic argument, which rests on accepted precepts
The trilemma, then, is the decision among the three equally unsatisfying options.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%BCnchhausen_trilemma
I saw the following argument over at Strange notions and it seems strong.
" Given the trilemma, I don't see how that's possible. There must always necessarily be a fact that cannot be explained why it is the way it is and not be logically necessary. Even god (as I've argued at length on this blog) doesn't get you out of the trilemma
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If something is a fact, it will of course be obviously true, but you will be forced to have some non-necessary facts that cannot be explained at all (which is different from being described) and that will necessarily be a brute fact. There's just no way around it.
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I think when it comes to the universe, it's a brute fact, but in a certain sense we can get a sort of explanation for it. The universe has the property of eternality, and something eternal cannot not exist (it's impossible for something eternal to not exist), and that's why the universe exists, while still not being logically necessary. This will not satisfy the Thomist, but the Thomist cannot satisfy the PSR because a god with a particular eternal will that is not logically necessary is also not logically necessary. For this it shows the whole PSR logic is false".
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Posted by Callum 10/19/2017 8:15 pm | #2 |
I was in a bit of a rush. In fact, the guy who I saw arguing this has a blogpost where he outlines it in detail;
The Münchhausen trilemma, along with this dilemma, show that brute facts not only make sense, they're unavoidable even if we posit god. Thus we could argue more formally:
The traditional notion of god in classical theism is that of a timeless, changeless, immaterial mind, who also must be infinitely good, infinitely wise, and can do anything logically possible.
All of god's will and desires must exist timelessly and eternally in an unchanging, frozen state.
That would mean that god timelessly and eternally had the desire to create our particular universe, and not some other universe, or no universe.
Our universe is not logically necessary; it didn't have to exist, and god didn't have to create it.
The theist would have to show that it was logically necessary for god to create our particular universe in order to avoid eventually coming to a brute fact.
There is no way to answer this question, even in principle, with something logically necessary.Thus at least one brute fact must exist even if god exists.
http://www.atheismandthecity.com/2016/11/why-brute-facts-are-unavoidable.html?m=1
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Posted by Callum 10/19/2017 9:15 pm | #3 |
Although the last six paragraphs of this post seem relevant as a reply:
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.co.uk/2014/11/voluntarism-and-psr.html?m=1
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Posted by UGADawg 10/19/2017 10:15 pm | #4 |
I'm not sure I understand his argument completely, because frankly he's not a very good writer and he seems to conflate a several issues.
But one big problem with this is that he's simply ignoring different conceptions of modality, e.g. following Leibniz we may distinguish between hypothetical necessity and absolute necessity. The universe, for the reasons Feser lays out in Five Proofs, cannot possibly be absolutely necessary, because it exhibits characteristics, such as change or composition, that imply it is dependent (if you accept his causal premises, at least).
However, the universe can still be hypothetically necessary, i.e. if God exists and if it's in his nature to create the world, then it follows of logical necessity that the universe exists.
It's entirely consistent to hold the universe is hypothetically necessary yet metaphysically contingent, and in fact many classical theists have held precisely this view, e.g. Leibniz and Lloyd Gerson (who Feser cites regarding the Neo-Platonic argument).
Last edited by UGADawg (10/19/2017 10:18 pm)
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Posted by Camoden 10/19/2017 10:30 pm | #5 |
As someone who is sympathetic with the principle of the best, I do not see this as an issue. God could have done otherwise considered just in His power, but virtually distinct from this power is His wisdom, which might entail that God only picks the world that fulfills His eternal glory. Most of the arguments against a BoaPW seem to be bad. Augustine for example held that creation has a perfect ratio of a certain amount of good things, the Atonement and Christ's subsequent resurrection being just a few. Simply using the Plantingan objection seems to miss the point. Augustine, Leibniz, and Anselm gave a strict criterion for why this might be the case. Secondly, logical necessitarianism does not follow because these other worlds are real imitations of His essence. They still can be talked about meaningfully. There are basically 3 issues for the theist on this front 1. The PSR 2. God's Pure Actuality 3. Divine Timelessness. All 3 make freedom hard to gage, which is why I think we need to take this negatively. God's freedom simply consists in Him being utterly uncoerced in His being. This is mysterious. I am not convinced God could not help create the best of all possible worlds, but it seems reasonable given His wisdom, and it does not contradict omnipotence. Here is a good example why it would not contradict His power: http://www.leibniz-translations.com/choosingthebest.htm
More importantly, just accepting this principle as being a way to ground it makes atheism false. Simply saying necesitarianism does not help. What other theory does the atheist have of modality that cannot be grounded on the theistic model? Exemplary causality is important here, as this is preserved even if necessitarianism is true. The theist needs to stress this.
Last edited by Camoden (10/19/2017 10:33 pm)
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Posted by Callum 10/20/2017 5:20 am | #6 |
Thanks for the replies, gents. I appreciate it.
Later today I'll be able to comment more fully but for the moment I have some questions.
Camoden, could you expand what you mean in your last paragraph? And I guess that your main point is that there would be no brute fact with God because his choice (will) is grounded in his intellect which grasps the b.o.a.p.w? Would you then be in the same broad camp as Feser in the post I linked on voluntarism? In essence, that intellect is prior to will (that God is Supreme Intelligence itself) which means that God's choice to create this world is explained by his grasping of what He takes to be good, but that this ends up meaning that He would choose to create the b.o.a.p.w?
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Posted by Callum 10/20/2017 5:27 am | #7 |
UGAdawg,
Again, thanks for the reply.
First I take his argument to have two elements; appeal to the Münchhausen trilemma in demomstrating that the terminus of our explanation is a brute fact (or in otherwords axiomatic) by ruling out the circular and infinite regress problems.
Now im not sure that it does entail a brute fact, rather than a terminus of explanation. Could you have a neccessary explanation as that third option? It wouldn't depend on anything else but it wouldn't be true by defintion or a logical impossibility to deny, rather, flow from it's own nature. But could that be the terminus of explanation?
The second part of the argument claims to show that even positing God doesn't get rid of a brute fact (I think I agree wity your points. Ill reread Feser's writing in his new book and write it up here to see if I see what you are saying.
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Posted by Callum 10/20/2017 5:57 am | #8 |
Thoughts on this passage from Pruss' Blackwell Companion article?
" For the cosmological argument, the most important case of libertarian choice is God’s choice what world to create. In this case, I actually think it is a necessary truth that God is impressed by the reasons S on account of which he created the actual world, just as it is a necessary truth that God was impressed by a different set of reasons on account of which he might have created another world. After all, necessarily, an omniscient and morally perfect God is impressed by all and only the good reasons. What the reasons on the basis of which God created this world are is something largely beyond my ken, though we can say a few standard things about the value of beings that participate in God’s life.
As a modification of my hypothesis, I should note that it might be that what matters explanatorily is not only the fact of the agent’s being impressed by the reasons, but also the degree to which the agent is impressed by them. It is easy to modify the account to take this into account, by explaining not just in terms of a set of reasons but in terms of a set of reason-weight pairs.
There is, still, something uncomfortable about the proposed explanation of libertarian action. I think a reader is likely to have the sense that while it is correct to say that the choice of graduate school might be explained by what is better for a spouse, even though this factor would have equally been present had a different choice been made, this kind of explanation is explanatorily inferior to, say, deterministic causal explanation or explanation in terms of a necessitating metaphysical principle. That may be. But there is no need to take the PSR to say that there is always the best kind of explanation—the PSR I am defending merely says that there is an explanation of every contingent proposition. And that is all I need for the cosmological argument."
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Posted by Callum 10/20/2017 6:02 am | #9 |
Thoughts on this passage from Pruss' Blackwell Companion article?
" For the cosmological argument, the most important case of libertarian choice is God’s choice what world to create. In this case, I actually think it is a necessary truth that God is impressed by the reasons S on account of which he created the actual world, just as it is a necessary truth that God was impressed by a different set of reasons on account of which he might have created another world. After all, necessarily, an omniscient and morally perfect God is impressed by all and only the good reasons. What the reasons on the basis of which God created this world are is something largely beyond my ken, though we can say a few standard things about the value of beings that participate in God’s life.
As a modification of my hypothesis, I should note that it might be that what matters explanatorily is not only the fact of the agent’s being impressed by the reasons, but also the degree to which the agent is impressed by them. It is easy to modify the account to take this into account, by explaining not just in terms of a set of reasons but in terms of a set of reason-weight pairs.
There is, still, something uncomfortable about the proposed explanation of libertarian action. I think a reader is likely to have the sense that while it is correct to say that the choice of graduate school might be explained by what is better for a spouse, even though this factor would have equally been present had a different choice been made, this kind of explanation is explanatorily inferior to, say, deterministic causal explanation or explanation in terms of a necessitating metaphysical principle. That may be. But there is no need to take the PSR to say that there is always the best kind of explanation—the PSR I am defending merely says that there is an explanation of every contingent proposition. And that is all I need for the cosmological argument."
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Posted by Camoden 10/20/2017 8:51 am | #10 |
Callum wrote:
Thanks for the replies, gents. I appreciate it.
Later today I'll be able to comment more fully but for the moment I have some questions.
Camoden, could you expand what you mean in your last paragraph? And I guess that your main point is that there would be no brute fact with God because his choice (will) is grounded in his intellect which grasps the b.o.a.p.w? Would you then be in the same broad camp as Feser in the post I linked on voluntarism? In essence, that intellect is prior to will (that God is Supreme Intelligence itself) which means that God's choice to create this world is explained by his grasping of what He takes to be good, but that this ends up meaning that He would choose to create the b.o.a.p.w?
Essentially yes.
