Posted by ForumUser  10/30/2017 7:03 am | #1 |
I am trying to read through Ed Feser's Aquinas, but I am hitting numerous obstacles on each page. I think I should get answers to these questions before proceeding with this book. As for my background, I have a Bachelor of Science in Physics, a Master of Medical Physics, and am pursuing a PhD in the Biomedical Sciences. I've read through the Bible, Catechism of the Catholic Church, Quran, and many Christian apologetics (Kreeft, Kreeft & Tacelli, CS Lewis, Michael Waldstein, papal documents, etc) and watched numerous YouTube debates.
I originally wrote these comments, objections, and questions originally posed to Dr. Feser while reading (referencing page numbers); I think you can understand without reference to the book, however.
"Act and potency"
1. Comment: You claim redness is an aspect of the ball's being (p. 10), but rather color is a function of the radiation bouncing off of it. I can make sense of your argument if I think instead of the frequencies of radiation it absorbs: That (as we currently understand) /is/ an aspect of its being.
2. Objection (p 10): Why believe this metaphysical model [about actualization and potentiality, and change being the actualization of potential rather than the breaking of atomic bonds; rather than leftover pizza absorbing radiation from the microwave, "the microwave actualizes the pizza's warmth"?] instead of our modern physical models? In other words, "How can change occur?" seems like a meaningless question, and to give it meaning, one must invent or presuppose this system of "metaphysics". Instead of saying "Change occurs when potency is reduced to act," one can instead be satisfied with, "Change occurs when atoms interact": Why do we need this metaphysics at all?
3. Objection: You say potentiality is "rooted in a thing's nature" (11), but is it not rather rooted in our own minds? Does aluminium have the potential to spark regardless of whether the microwave has been invented? It appears if a set of objects gain a potentiality depending on what we can invent to interact with it, then potentiality is not rooted in the object itself (rather, it is a function of their nature and everything they can interact with). Or, does every physical object have every logically possible potentiality? Yet you appear to reject this resolution to the objection.
4. Question (12): How do you know where such a 'chain of actualization' ends? It would appear to end at the level of the universe, that the animal moves in response to stimuli caused by the stimulus caused by the universe's conditions caused by the universe's preceding moment in time. People today insist on the kalam argument that such a chain must be finite, but I don't see the basis for this -- if the universe is infinitely old, then each moment in time was brought about by the previous moment, and cause-and-effect is satisfied, i.e. a cause is indentified for each observed effect. (The kalam argument only succeeds by a kind of "begging the question", namely introducing the contradiction it tries to associate with infinity, by wrongly claiming to identify (and hence count forward from) the 'first' moment of a sequence with an infinite number of prior elements, thereby contradicting the definition of 'infinity'.)
"Hylomorphism"
5. Objection (13): You say there is "some kind of composition to be found in everything" that can change, but isn't this simply false? It's false because the "composition" is imagined by us, a model we hold in our mind to describe the phenomenon we observe: It is not something that is seen to exist in the object itself, which is, apparently, only atoms moving around.
6. Question: You say objects have form, but again, isn't this rather a product of our minds? If I take off my glasses, the form of an object changes.
7. Objection: Isn't form itself a euphemism for matter? If what actually exists is a configuration of atoms, then form and matter here are both referring to the same thing; form merely specifies the configuration of the matter. Hence you observe that we "can't bounce redness, roundness, or bounciness", because these are not entities that actually exist. We only know that the ball's physical pieces exist.
8. Objection: It still is not clear to me why it is necessary to 'explain how objects are capable of undergoing change'. It seems to be an unnecessary question, or a meaningless combination of words (nonsense) that you must invent mental ideas to make sense of. Perhaps to put it another way, if asked, "How is this object able to change?" One could respond, "What do you mean? Why would it not be able to change?" You seem to be assuming some problem that needs answering, as if the default state of affairs is for objects to not change, whereas the opposite is apparently true -- we should be puzzled only if we see something incapable of change.
9. Objection (13-14): You continue building up this mental model of reality, declaring that 'substantial form' and 'accidental form' are categories of form that objects "have" in an intrinsic sense, but I still haven't been given reason why we ought to think it's anything more than a model of reality that has been replaced by mathematical, physical models of reality. Our current models indicate there is no 'form', substantial or accidental, but only atoms whose bonds can be broken, etc.
10. Objection (14): It's not clear that Aquinas' "prime matter" exists, or even can exist. You appear to confirm this observation, saying that "what is purely potential does not exist at all" -- but then why call this non-existent being "matter"?
11. Question (15): Given your statement, "there is no form of the ball apart from the matter that has that form, and ..." Doesn't it follow that every ball has its own unique 'form', e.g. specified by the balls' size? In this case it seems not useful to conceptualize 'form' at all ...
12. Objection: I don't see the basis for your declaration that triangularity etc. are "grounded in real natures": 'Triangularity' is simply a word we've created to summarize the idea of a triangle, which itself is a shape we've observed in matter (i.e. a particular set of atomic configurations in the universe) and consequently defined for our own mental models. "Triangles" are not real things that exist (you cannot pick up a triangle) -- we've only seen that atoms exist. In other words, we make mental models of reality, and we've seen items arranged in a certain way enough times that we decide to give it a name ('triangle'). For configurations we don't see often enough, we don't choose a particular name for it and hence just call it 'random'.
13. Question (15-16): What is meant by your closing Aquinas quotation? It looks as if he is saying that human fetuses develop into the shape of human adults ("matter proceeds to form"). I'm guessing not, that he rather means something more abstract, i.e. that 'matter' is logically prior to 'form' -- in which case I don't understand, because it's not clear Aquinas's 'matter' or 'form' even exist.
I am frustrated because so far it appears Dr. Feser is introducing an unnecessary and obsolete mental model of reality, rather than talking about reality as it actually exists. I suspect that his argument to prove God's existence requires this metaphysical framework to be necessary, but so far I see no basis for holding it. If quarks, electrons, etc. and the previous moment in spacetime exist as brute facts, then we do not need to ask "how is change possible", and indeed it is not clear even what is meant by the question.
Would you please clarify these problems and help me to understand?
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Posted by ficino 10/30/2017 8:18 pm | #2 |
ForumUser, I've been hanging around on various boards for a few years now, and I share your frustration. People with a background in science, esp. the hard sciences, explain why the Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics is either wrong or irrelevant or both. Then defenders of Thomism (ain't many pure Aristotelians out there) reply: 1) you fail to understand A-T metaphysics; 2) Aristotle's antiquated science can be safely dropped, leaving A-T metaphysics, which is totally the truth and superior to any other system; 3) you are promoting "scientism," which is self-refuting; 4) without A-T metaphysics, you can provide no rational account of anything worthwhile; 5) without A-T metaphysics, science cannot get off the ground; and so on.
I don't have a scientific background, so I don't see how I can adjudicate between these sorts of stances.
Arthur F. Holmes of Wheaton College is featured in a useful series of YouTube videos on the history of philosophy; easy to Google so I don't link. Of Aquinas' "proofs," Holmes said they are "system-dependent." I.e. they depend on Aristotelian metaphysics with some doses of Neo-Platonism. I think he is right. But why should we adopt Aristotelian metaphysics? I get the suspicion that for some folks, at least, it's because Aristotelian metaphysics is required in order for Thomism to work, and they like Thomism because it backs up confessional commitments that they make for other reasons. [ETA: I do not endorse any view that claims that Aquinas adopts Aristotle's thought to the exclusion of other perspectives from ancient philosophy, nor do I claim that Aquinas is always faithful to Aristotle in metaphysics.] That's why I liked Thomism years ago.
Now, like you, I don't see an obvious way of establishing that Aristotle just gives us the truth about metaphysics and later thinkers and researchers are just myopic.
Last edited by ficino (10/30/2017 8:29 pm)
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Posted by Jeremy Taylor 10/30/2017 9:15 pm | #3 |
Ficino,
I think you are conflating different things. Many of those who bang on about scientific issues with A-T are either giving basic objections that have been dealt with many times before or they are peddling some kind of radical empiricism without arguing for it. There are grades in this kind of stuff, ranging from the combox trolls who pop up on Feser's blog periodically to more thoughtful questioners, but it is still fairly thin gruel. This is different to genuinely interesting science based objections. Genuine science based objections do things like respect the distinction between philosophy and natural science, and, of course, understand what A-T claims and doesn't and what is and isn't a problem for it. I don't see that one needs to be a scientist to understand things like Aristotle's philosophical views, mostly, don't rely on his scientific views. All you'd need is a knowledge of the views in question and some basic philosophical capability.
I'm afraid it is just the truth that a lot of critics on the internet make misunderstandings of or show ignorance of basic concepts in A-T thought. Similarly, it is just the case scientism is self-refuting: the claim natural science is the sole means of human knowledge is not a scientific claim (unless we make science trivially inclusive).
I'm not an Aristotelian, but I find the claim they don't argue for their metaphysics strange. Feser, Oderberg, et al. spend a lot of time doing just that.
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Posted by ficino 10/31/2017 4:57 am | #4 |
"I find the claim they don't argue for their metaphysics strange."
? By "they," do you mean Feser and other academic Thomists? Who has claimed that they don't argue for A-T?
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Posted by FZM 10/31/2017 5:05 am | #5 |
ficino wrote:
People with a background in science, esp. the hard sciences, explain why the Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics is either wrong or irrelevant or both. Then defenders of Thomism (ain't many pure Aristotelians out there) reply: 1) you fail to understand A-T metaphysics; 2) Aristotle's antiquated science can be safely dropped, leaving A-T metaphysics, which is totally the truth and superior to any other system; 3) you are promoting "scientism," which is self-refuting; 4) without A-T metaphysics, you can provide no rational account of anything worthwhile; 5) without A-T metaphysics, science cannot get off the ground; and so on.
Jeremy Taylor has already pointed this out but arguments from people with a background in the natural sciences against Thomistic metaphysics will vary in quality, depending on the background knowledge of philosophy and metaphysics the individuals have. It can happen that the arguments being made against the A-T metaphysical system are bound up with a generic 'anti-metaphysical' approach rooted in some taken for granted, unexamined set of metaphysical/philosophical assumptions. (Arguments of the kind 1) There is nothing to understand about metaphysics because all that talk is meaningless, 2) The natural sciences are our only source of knowledge of reality and they are an exhaustive source of knowledge 3) The natural sciences have no need or place for any kind of metaphysical assumptions etc. etc.)
I get the suspicion that for some folks, at least, it's because Aristotelian metaphysics is required in order for Thomism to work, and they like Thomism because it backs up confessional commitments that they make for other reasons. [ETA: I do not endorse any view that claims that Aquinas adopts Aristotle's thought to the exclusion of other perspectives from ancient philosophy, nor do I claim that Aquinas is always faithful to Aristotle in metaphysics.] That's why I liked Thomism years ago.
The opposite argument is equally possible: people reject the confessional commitments Thomism is connected to for other reasons, Thomism therefore has to be rejected, Thomism is based on Aristotelian metaphysics, Aristotelian metaphysics also has to be rejected.
Now, like you, I don't see an obvious way of establishing that Aristotle just gives us the truth about metaphysics and later thinkers and researchers are just myopic.
It's not clear to me that Forumuser is judging whether Aristotle gives us the truth about metaphysics by comparing it to other metaphysical options instead of just saying: It's not part of Physics, therefore devoid of truth and unnecessary.
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Posted by ForumUser 10/31/2017 6:47 am | #6 |
I am disappointed that instead of answering my questions, people are dismissing me with, "He's just another one of those guys," especially since I had the expectation that there were many theists here who would want me to come to see and know God, etc.
> It's not clear to me that Forumuser is judging whether Aristotle gives us the truth about metaphysics by comparing it to other metaphysical options instead of just saying: It's not part of Physics, therefore devoid of truth and unnecessary.
Please read my post again, because I gave arguments, either implicitly or explicitly, showing how I thought this metaphysics was false in addition to being obsolete. For example (though I hate repeating myself), how do we know what 'potentialities' a thing has? I asked about aluminium sparking when put in a microwave: Did it have the potential to spark before the microwave was invented? If not, why not? If so, how do you determine what potentialities a thing has? Does everything contain every logically-possible potentiality? (Is that how God works miracles?) Yet Dr. Feser rejects this idea (without explanation) in his book, as I note. Is it only post-facto? If so, then how can you show you're not just making ad hoc statements to maintain an assumed premise? If things can gain potentialities by virtue of our inventions to interact with them, then how can you be sure the potentiality is an aspect intrinsic to the thing rather than being dependent on its environment?
Overall, I am looking for someone to answer my questions: I am not interested in bickering or "proving myself right". I find it troubling that rather than answer my questions, people's first reaction is to say, "He's wrong." That suggests to me that you're more interested in 'being right' than seeking knowledge, and perhaps that you're not so sure of the philosophy yourself. I came here to learn, so I'm hoping future posts will answer the questions I've asked in my original post (OP).
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Posted by Jason 10/31/2017 7:42 am | #7 |
Metaphysics is basically an abstraction of first principles and is fundamental to our study of being. This means it is the base of science itself and what scientist use as assumptions when they have run an experiment or look at results (they do not have to know about these assumptions to do science). When you see a red ball you are rightly saying that the ball is red but scientists are taking that as an effect and see what the cause of that redness is in the ball, in this case that light bounces off the ball. This is where science excels in finding causes from their effects and then using that knowledge to get other effects as and when needed.
You say that "Change occurs when atoms interact" and you are correct scientifically but then you are assuming there is such a thing as change itself. This itself needs to be explained and more importantly assumed in order to know what happens when atoms interact for instance. This is where metaphysics plays a vital role, even though we do not see those assumptions and / or explanations. Would you be able to make that statement if there was no such thing as change outside of your mind?
If potentiality was just rooted in our minds then there would not be any change outside of our minds and that is simply absurd. “ Does aluminium have the potential to spark regardless of whether the microwave has been invented?” and the answer is yes and it would always have that as a potential even if we never invented the microwave. Science then plays its vital role in identifying these potentials by experimenting with interactions that actualizes these potentials. That does not mean that every potential we can possibly conceive of will be added to aluminium but that which is logically and empirically possible.
The Kalam argument has nothing to do with St Thomas’ arguments, where he famously assumed that the universe always existed back in time (he believed that there was a beginning of the universe theologically but not philosophically). You may want to look into the difference between a per se /per accident casual series to properly understand what is meant with the start of the actualization series (i.e. first cause) rather than its end.
I will look into the rest of your questions and will reply time permitting.
Last edited by Jason (10/31/2017 7:43 am)
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Posted by ficino 10/31/2017 8:25 am | #8 |
Hello ForumUser, I'm back, fwiw, and I'm glad you've posted your questions. As I said earlier, I don't have a science background. I do have an extensive background, compared to most people, in Greek and Latin and ancient philosophy, and I publish in refereed venues, though not (so far?!) on Aristotle or Aquinas.
As Jason said, I think there are a few places in your OP where you use terms differently from the way they're used in A-T metaphysics. (I have some issues over how appropriate it is to conflate Aristotle's and Aquinas' metaphysics, but that's a separate topic.) My reply will become too long if I try to propose explanations of the terms I think you use differently. I'll just list them as I see them:
matter (in Aquinas it's basically potentiality, not "stuff", except in a sense not worth getting into now)
form (In Ari it's not only configuration but configuration that makes the thing's action and reaction possible)
motion (basically, change; Aq is interested in hierarchically ordered series of movers in act in a virtual present, not in a temporal series going back in time)
I do think you bring up important problems. You ask, why should we adopt the A-T metaphysical framework? I take it you mean, as opposed to some other one?
You also note that we all tend to think we know things' essences or forms, as they are in themselves, and that we know occasions of causality, when in fact we are working from models that need not capture the reality of the things in themselves. Over on Edward Feser's blog and on other blogs, such as Victor Reppert's, I've seen back-and-forth for years between commentators who make points similar to yours vs. other commentators who insist that macro-level notions of essence and event are accurate. Feser himself will constantly use as examples of causal series groups of things like the air conditioner cooling the room, being powered by the power plant, all the way up in the same time frame to the First Unmoved Mover. Then other people will say that Feser's examples are misleading because what he thinks are essences and events are just macro-level models of realities that are "really" different at the atomic or subatomic level. At that point, I myself don't know where is a common ground for working through this stuff.
I think it would be great if you can contribute to greater clarification, if only through questions.
I noticed there is a recent book out on Aristotelian metaphysics and science. I don't know about it except what I saw here:
https://books.google.com/books?id=JpOtAQAACAAJ&dq=aristotle+metaphysics+modern+science+tahko&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi236XK-prXAhXC5yYKHYgJCNoQ6AEITjAH
Feser himself writes often that science cannot provide answers to metaphysical questions.
Last edited by ficino (10/31/2017 9:25 am)
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Posted by ficino 10/31/2017 8:46 am | #9 |
You say that "Change occurs when atoms interact" and you are correct scientifically but then you are assuming there is such a thing as change itself. This itself needs to be explained and more importantly assumed in order to know what happens when atoms interact for instance. This is where metaphysics plays a vital role, even though we do not see those assumptions and / or explanations. Would you be able to make that statement if there was no such thing as change outside of your mind?
Jason, this mystifies me. You are saying that a metaphysical argument is needed to establish that there is such a thing as change? It is already directly evident that there is change; "Certum est enim, et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo." I would consider our lived experience of change more certain than arguments against, say, Parmenides' First Way, since such arguments can always be countered along the lines that change and multiplicity remain illusions.
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Posted by RomanJoe 10/31/2017 9:14 am | #10 |
Can't really give you a thorough response atm but I can quickly address your concern that the act/potency division can just be explained by scientific processes. Any Thomist will likely concede that, say, the ice cube melting involves a transfer of energy and a loss of a rigid molecular structure resulting in a loose molecular structure and consequently a liquid form. However, such a process still involves change and subsequently still involves an actualization of potential states (loose molecular structure) from a previous actual state (rigid molecular structure). Even when you talk about the absorption of radiation frequencies, that still involves change and a subsequent transfer from potential to actual. Metaphysics deals with first principles--it's not positing a scientific explanation for change, but rather an explanation of change as such, principles that explain change in all beings. It took me awhile to see this. Think of it like this, metaphysics undergirds even our scientific analyses of the world, it does not compete with them.
