Posted by Gary  11/09/2017 9:24 pm | #1 |
The term being is an analogical term predicated of things on the basis of a proportional resemblance between them. My being is to me as your being is to you. Does this notion of analogy only apply to uses of the term being where the term being refers to the ens or the complete entity of a thing, or does it only apply to uses of the term being where the term being refers to the esse of a thing, understood as a mere constituent of a complete entity, or does it apply to both uses somehow? Furthermore, would it be correct to construe my own being as the very being of God insofar the term being expresses my esse, but not my ens? Is my esse the same as God's esse, but not my ens?
Last edited by Gary (11/09/2017 9:25 pm)
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Posted by ficino 11/12/2017 9:17 am | #2 |
This is a big topic, Gary ... as are the others, too, of course.
In Aristotle "analogy" refers to proportional analogy of A is to B as C is to D. one of his examples is the "cuttlebone/pounce" of the cuttlefish is to the spine of the fish is to the bones of a land animal. Analogy of this proportional kind plays a huge role in Aristotle's philosophy of nature.
There is another kind of predication which the scholastics also called analogy but which is differently based. It's known as pros hen predication or focal meaning/focal predication among Aristotle scholars.
When Aristotle tries to tackle things that are 'spoken of in many ways,' he points out that the words that refer to these things are the same, but the 'being' of the things is not. For example, we can talk about a healthy man, a healthy drink, and healthy urine. The primary sense of healthy rests on what health is in an organism. A healthy drink is called healthy in a derivative sense, because it is productive of health. Healthy urine is so called in a derivative sense because it is a sign of the animal's health. The focus term is the primary one. The second two cannot be understood except in reference to an animal's health, but the meaning of "animal's health" can be understood without reference to things that produce it or are signs of it.
Gwil Owen called this second kind of predication "focal" predication, and in Aristotelian studies a lot of attention has been given to focal meaning since Owen's seminal article, which has been reprinted at least twice. Some people call it "pros hen" predication from Aristotle's own name for this way of predicating something "in relation to one thing".
Pros hen predication figures largely in the central books of the Metaphysics (esp. Gamma through Eta) , where Aristotle is trying to get a scheme in which to investigate being qua being. Since being is said in many ways, there have to be ways of talking about both the being of substances and the being of things that are attributes of substances. For example, "the pale" or "the musical" in Socrates has being in a derivative sense, and Socrates has being in a primary sense. A key place where Ari starts to develop the notion of pros hen predication is in the Eudemian Ethics, where the primary friendship is that between good men, and friendships of youths or of businessmen are said to be friendships in a derivative sense. You don't understand friendship between good men from friendship based on shared pleasure or utility, but you can understand how those are secondary forms of friendship once you understand primary friendship.
There is much more, but you can start by investigating "focal meaning" and/or "pros hen predication." Not everyone agrees with Owen's analysis, btw.
Last edited by ficino (11/12/2017 9:18 am)
