Feser directly deals with this question in Five Proofs:

Another problem with the suggestion in question is that to say of God that he has potentiality with respect to his activity, though not with respect to his existence, entails that God has parts—a purely actual part, and a part that is a potentiality. Now, as we saw in chapter 2, whatever has parts requires a cause. The reason is that the whole of which the parts are constituents is merely potential until actualized by some principle which combines the parts. This principle cannot be something intrinsic to the thing, for in that case it would be the cause of itself, which is incoherent. So, it must be something extrinsic to the thing.

Feser, Edward. Five Proofs of the Existence of God (Kindle Locations 3050-3054). Ignatius Press.

​What did you find inadequate there?

Feser's reviewer at Secular Outpost blog strayed on this potentiality point in his fifth installment. He jumps on the term "potential attributes" and wants to understand them as "contingent attributes" instead of in terms of Aristotelian potentiality. From here on, this reviewer has changed the topic and is not on talking about Feser's proofs anymore.

UGADawg wrote:

seigneur wrote:

Feser's reviewer at Secular Outpost blog strayed on this potentiality point in his fifth installment. He jumps on the term "potential attributes" and wants to understand them as "contingent attributes" instead of in terms of Aristotelian potentiality. From here on, this reviewer has changed the topic and is not on talking about Feser's proofs anymore.

The writing style in that post is so bad it's comical.

It's like he's constantly shouting and slowing down his words.

RomanJoe wrote:

Does anyone else want to weigh in on my concern?

 
The concern misses what "actualized" and "potential" mean. And probably also what "prime mover" is. Theoretically, given Aristotelian framework, prime mover can only be fully actualized. Other propositions may begin to apply when we change every definition.

RomanJoe,
In your first comment here you distinguish between two pure acts, as it were, the first pure act being relevant to causal efficacy in the per se causal chain, the second the pure act of existence of the thing having said causal efficacy. For the difficulty to make sense, these things would have to be really distinct, not simply logically, as in the latter case you would simply have one pure act, and in the order where the act is pure there's simply no 'space' for any potency admixed (to wit, as the act wouldn't merit the characterisation as 'pure'). 
Now, the thing in question has to be a substance. It cannot be a merely accidental unity, as in that case both 'parts' would have substantial identity, and hence be two different things, one, however, dependent on the other (since, as you grant, existence precedes causal efficacy). That dependence, moreover, would be causal, as the first thing's potential to exist would have to be actualised first, so we have the same regress again and only the latter thing would merit the name of prime mover.

That leaves us with both pure acts being said to be acts of one and the same thing. That's where parts come in. Now, whatever a part is, it is really distinct from the whole.

If we are talking of physical (not "material' or 'bodily'; the term connotes relevance to the things activity) parts of a substance, in order to 'fit' at all, they have to be accidents. Yet, accidents are -dependent- on the substance (their existence is derivative of the substance, and hence we have an actualised potency). Further, accidents are determinations of the substance, and hence the substance is also potential in respect of the accident (it really can be so determined). So the 'efficacious' pure act (the power, clealy) cannot be had (as an accident, and these are only had by substances). And if it cannot be had, but has to obtain (as it does, in order to explain the causal series), it leaves us with it simply being. 

 

Last edited by GeorgiusThomas (11/26/2017 4:17 pm)