Posted by Dry and Uninspired  12/22/2017 9:35 am | #51 |
^ No, I think it’s his existential argument in On Being and Essence. Feser defends his version of it in Five Proofs, named the Thomistic argument.
I haven’t read this book yet. Does Feser answer the objection just raised here?
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Posted by lacktone 12/25/2017 8:53 pm | #52 |
joewaked wrote:
I’m not sure if this is the appropriate place in the Forum. Please move this post if it’s not.
I have been getting into (in-person) conversations with atheists and have found it difficult to develop practical “road maps” for these discussions.
Back in 1990, when I was moving from Protestantism to Catholicism, the material I found most helpful were conversion stories as told by men like Hahn and Matatics, and apologetic writings/debates by Keating, Madrid, Matatics and Akin. Along the way, I found solid, older, Catholic books that presented theology in systematic structures.
When explaining my decision to Protestant friends and family, I used approaches/strategies (depending on the subject) developed as a result of the apologetics learned from the gents above. Obviously, coming from a non-Catholic tradition, I was quite familiar with the more anti-Catholic arguments and responding to them was not foreign to me.
Today, I am struggling with how to make cogent and thorough arguments against atheism (or for theism). This is despite reading books by Feser, Augros and others or watching Craig’s debates. I suppose what I’m trying to say is that their arguments come across so “academic” and complicatedly sophisticated.
I read TLS and loved it after reading it the 2nd and 3rd times. I want to tell the atheist, “you need to read this book because it’ll do a heck of a better job than I’m doing.” (I actually said that once and the reply was “if you can’t prove and explain God without referring me to a philosopher’s book...”)
Is there any better debates or apologetics material that can serve as more of a “How to” approach?
The average atheist isn't so poised for the sake of it. He or she is usually a well read person in the historicity of man and his archeological exhibits substantiating his or her position on theology. Also, he or she is usually of a logic that trades in proofs rather than faiths, and more so than not has left theism because that same logic provides no other choice short of dismissing logic itself. It is said that faith is merely doubt shrouded in hope while the religious memes keep the shrouds of hope in good repair.
The declaration of atheism, however, is inwardly directed and certainly none of anyone's business. Once declared, no further expense of thought or effort is afforded all things theistic or atheistic. The entire argument for or against theology is dismissed and forgotten. Then there are a few who have heard calls for help from people, usually young people, trapped by and struggling in societies, cultures and even entire nations that do not tolerate their declarations and need a shoulder or advice. These young people can be imperiled by their views, even from their own family members, and seriously need counseling. Atheists who care about these young people abandon their silent declarations and group themselves on internet sites to provide such counseling. Unfortunately, anti-theists also join those sites and the identity and purpose of the site is degraded as such. Theists who visit anti-theist infected atheist sites suffer the same misfortune. I am an atheist and I apologize for that. It's also why I have abandoned atheist sites who do not police themselves. So far that includes all I've visited.
Approaching an anti-theist, though, is usually an exercise in futility as he or she has made the same study and decision towards theism as the atheist has. Whereas the atheist will tend to keep his or her position no one's business and remain off the grid, the anti-theist is by nature outwardly militant and for no known positive purpose displays poor conduct towards theists. Factions and actions result and the whole of it is unbecoming of mutual civility. It's best to consider carefully before waking that sleeping dog.
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Posted by Miguel 12/26/2017 10:20 am | #53 |
I disagree with your notions, they are not self-evident to me at all and actually seem false. The understanding of an essence is *mediated* by a representation, but it is not itself just a representation. When we understand something, we understand its form; the form we have in our minds is one and the same form that is instatiated in matter outside our minds. It just so happens that in our mind this one form is intentional, not informing a material substance. Likewise the essences of mammoths have never disappeared; they are not instantiated as substantial forms anymore, but they still have being "intentionally" and are present in our intellect, this is why if we somehow see a mammoth tomorrow (that e.g. had been cloned) we would be able to recognize it, because the we know the essence of mammoths. Our concept of a mammoth and the substantial form of a mammoth are not two different essences; they are the very same essence that have being in two different manners.
I know that that traditional Thomistic philosophy of mind holds that what there is in the mind is not a representation of the essence, or of the form, but the form itself, as stated e.g. by:
- Feser since the beginning of blogtimes.
- John O'Callaghan in his book "Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence", University of Notre Dame Press, 2003.
- Elena Baltuta in "Aquinas on Intellectual Cognition: The Case of Intelligible Species", in Philosophia, Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, September 2013, Volume 41, Issue 3, pp 589-602.
On the other hand, other authors have argued for a representationalist interpretation of Thomasian (as opposed to Thomistic) thought, e.g.:
- Robert Pasnau 1997 thesis "Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages" and 2002 paper “What is Cognition? A Reply to Some Critics,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 76 (2002) 483-90, both available at http://spot.colorado.edu/~pasnau/inprint/
- Claude Panaccio "Aquinas on intellectual representation". In Dominik Perler (ed.) "Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality". Brill, 2001.
- Sandro D'Onofrio 2008 thesis "Aquinas as representationalist: The ontology of the species intelligibilis".
I will show the problem with the traditional Thomistic position using the following hypothetical dialogue between God and a Thomist:
God: So you think the very form, in a hylemorphic sense of course, of the camel resides in your intellect? Well, I will build a camel according to that form. Let's start with DNA. Give Me the aminoacid sequence.
Thomist: I can't, Lord. I know the camel at a macroscopic level only.
God: OK, then give Me the essence at the macroscopic level and I'll figure out the DNA. Let's start with the number and shape of the camel's teeth.
Thomist: Lord, I don't know the camel at such level of detail.
God: Then how can you possibly claim that the very form of the camel has come to reside in your intellect?
Moreover, it is still the case that what-a-stone-is, its essence, is distinct from the existence of the stone itself. If it weren't, then the stone would be a necessary being. The mere fact that a stone was a stone would be sufficient for it to exist. This isn't just a conceptual distinction, it is a real distinction and our conceptual distinction is made possible by the real distinction, not the other way around.
Not necessarily. The situation may be understood as a contingent entity having a contingent essence which implies contingent existence. This understanding obviously implies that what resides in intellects is a representation of the form - a perfect representation (actually pre-presentation) in the divine Intellect, a more or less abridged representation in human intellects - and not the form itself.
This understanding is logically self-consistent: the essence of a stone is actually present only in an actual stone.
- A stone exists (obviously contingently). => An essence of a stone is in that stone.
- No stone exists. => No essence of a stone is anywhere.
There are numerous problems with representationalism, so I don't think it's an open road at all. I don't wanna turn this thread into a discussion of representationalism however, but I'll just say that denying we know the same essence in different modes seems to me to make us liable to absolute skepticism.
Your dialogue does not establish that we really don't know the form of the camel, only that we do not fully comprehend all of it. This is to be expected since our knowledge of the form is mediated by representations -- which is different from saying that we only have access to representations; we don't have an immediate intuition of everything contained in the nature "camel", but we have the nature in our minds understood universally. The form of the camel is one and the same form both in the camel and in our intellect, which does not mean that we grasp the entirety of what that form implies or can give a perfect definition for it.
I don't think your answer to what I said about the stone solves the problem, either. The stone is a contingent being, sure, and it exists contingently, but if the essence of a stone included its contingent existence, then there is no sense in which a stone is a *possible existent* instead of an actual one; the stone would just have to pop up completely ex nihilo since there could never be an essence of the stone that is not already existing; it wouldn't be the case that matter takes on the form of the stone; rather there would be no form of the stone whatsoever without its actual existence. Things would not really change, it would not be the case that there is a substratum that remains in change (matter) as new forms take over matter, because these forms already would ontologically be actual from the start, things would have to be caused ex nihilo all the time. It seems like a mess to me. And when we get God into the picture it seems to me even worse, because I don't see how we can make any sense of the idea of a "perfect representation". What is a "perfect representation" of an essence if not the essence itself? There would have to be something in the essence that makes it different from a "perfect representation", but if that's the case then the perfect representation is not perfect at all. Moreover, if the stone we were just discussing had existence as part of its essence, then the "perfect representation" of the stone would already include the existence of the stone.
I just noticed there is an extra problem with thinking any contingent being can have existence as part of its essence. It actually collapses modality.
Say, if Johannes claimed, the stone had contingent existence as part of its essence. But what this means is that in certain possible worlds the stone would exist and in other possible worlds it would not exist. However, since the stone's essence itself already includes existence, it means that the stone, even as a possibility -- by its essence -- would have to exist, so in any possible world in which such a stone is possible it follows that it exists. But how would the stone NOT be possible in certain worlds? If we take alethic modality to be based on the existence of causes (something is possible if there is something that exists that can bring it about), then it would follow that a necessary being (who exists in all possible worlds, by definition) could create the stone, and therefore the stone would exist in all possible worlds. But how can this be if the stone is contigent? It's contradictory. If modal possibility is however just rooted in some sort of logical possibility, then again the stone exists in all possible worlds, because what could ever preclude the possibility of a stone, if it's not logically incoherent?
Moreover, could we even say that such a stone would not be possible without assessing its essence -- and therefore its existence, contra the claim it is not possibly existent? The contingent stone would exist in every possible world, but that is absurd.
Also, something's contingent existence being part of its essence would have to mean that it is the essence of a stone to exist in worlds w1 w2 w3 and NOT exist in worlds w4 w5 w6. But that seems absurd, and if existence is part of its essence, how can non-existence be included? And how could we ever think of such an essence correctly -- representation or whatever -- without concluding it exists?
Essence and existence MUST always be distinct in contingent beings. It is not possible for something to have contingent existence as part of its essence.
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Posted by Johannes 12/26/2017 1:59 pm | #54 |
Let's talk about mammoths instead of stones.
But what this means is that in certain possible worlds the stone would exist and in other possible worlds it would not exist.
This is correct independently from the real distinction between essence and existence. Mammoths exist in our universe U1 and do not exist in a parallel universe U2 which has the same physical laws and constants as U1, but where solar-driven global warming proceeded faster than on our Earth and did not allow enough cool time for mammoths to appear.
However, since the stone's essence itself already includes existence, it means that the stone, even as a possibility -- by its essence -- would have to exist,
No, it would not have, because the essence of a mammoth is not anywhere in U2. Some U2 scientists have inferred that mammoths were biologically possible in U2 if the evolution of their sun had proceeded more slowly, so in their intellects there is an abridged (p)representation of the essence of a mammoth, or even better, an abridged representation of the perfect (p)representation of the essence of a mammoth that is in the divine Intellect.
Summarizing the situation in both possible worlds:
U1: actual mammoths with contingent essence and contingent existence, which may or may not be really distinct.
U2: no mammoths, so no essence of a mammoth anywhere.
Restating the "table" of the consistency of the possible combinations of theories of knowledge and real distinction (at the end of this post):
If one assumes that essences are really present in intellects (your position), then one must also assume real distinction between essence and existence for the system to be consistent.
If one does not assume that essences are really present in intellects (my position), then one is free to assume either real or notional/conceptual distinction between essence and existence.
Last edited by Johannes (12/26/2017 5:18 pm)
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Posted by joewaked 12/26/2017 7:11 pm | #55 |
....For me, whatever the near-ultimate fundamental forces end up being, behind them we find the Finger of God. Am I arguing incorrectly?
Let me begin by giving you two links....
1) Everything we experience and know, and in particular every material thing, is conditioned. its existence depends on something else. It is not pure actuality. Why should the fundamental forces be any different? How could another material thing, which is ontologically not too different from us (still material) somehow be purely actual, unconditioned, and exist all by itself?
2) The essence of fundamental forces or whatever they describe is still different from its existence, we can conceive of it failing to exist, etc. Even quarks, which are taken to be the most elementary particles, cannot exist alone and must always be joined by two or three others; it's not unconditioned. The only real "stop" would be a being whose essence just *is* existence, something that exists completely unconditioned, something that necessarily exists and could never have failed to exist, something that is purely actual with no potency, something whose essence is not distinct from existence. Every material thing changes, is not purely actual; every material thing could have failed to exist or could have been different, etc.
3) Also, if such a material being were a necessary being, then it would follow that everything would have to be *necessitated* by it, since the existence of everything would ultimately be explained by an impersonal and necessary material thing (though that is an oxymoron, but whatever), which is simply bizarre. It seems that necessitarianism would follow and the fact that you're wearing a red shirt instead of a blue one (for instance) would be a *necessary fact* instead of a contingent one, which is bizarre.
4) Finally, it is also counter-intuitive. I don't think it would make any sense to think there is a necessary physical force, as if we could not ask why it exists or why it operates the way it does. A necessary being, a purely actual being, would have to be wholly different from the type of things physics tells us, though that is also pretty much what 1 and 2 say.
So you must reach a purely actual, or a being whose essence just is existence, that is perfectly inconditional, or a necessary being, that explains the whole causal chain. The alternative would be for the atheist to deny PSR or PC, but as I stated in my previous post, that would be extremely problematic.
I wish we had a LIKE button on this board!
Thanks Miguel.
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Posted by joewaked 12/26/2017 7:24 pm | #56 |
In other words, since the essence of the stone is distinct from existence and does not include/imply existence, it never properly has existence by itself. It only "borrows" existence (by participation, in a more metaphysical analysis). So it needs to be caused to exist (to "remain in existence") just as much right now as it did when it was first brought into existence, because the essence by itself does not have existence; it constantly needs to be kept in existence by an existence landlord who rents existence to it
If the nature of the stone was not capable of making it exist, it would also not be able to keep itself in existence once it is caused in its first moment.
Let me take a stab...
Every thing that comes to exist is necessarily contingent.
There is nothing that has always existed.
Therefore, every thing is contingent and will go out of existence.
Consequently, every thing will go out of existence if not continuously caused to exist by whatever brought it into existence.
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Posted by SteveK 12/29/2017 12:54 pm | #57 |
joewaked,
My personal favorite way of getting to the crux of things is to start discussing morality because it's a proxy for talking about God. It's easy for most atheists to deny God as a myth, a storybook character or wishful thinking, but morality is an undeniable reality for most atheists.
Most atheists will keep asking for various proofs/evidences for God, but most won't keep asking for proof/evidence of good and evil (morality) because most accept it as a fact. After all, if there is no actual evil then there can be no actual problem of evil.
Morality allows you to start from a common place of agreement - you both agree it's real in some sense. The conversation will quickly center around WHAT morality is. This is the ontological playing field that you want to be on.
Last edited by SteveK (12/29/2017 12:59 pm)
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Posted by joewaked 12/31/2017 10:55 am | #58 |
joewaked,
My personal favorite way of getting to the crux of things is to start discussing morality because it's a proxy for talking about God. It's easy for most atheists to deny God as a myth, a storybook character or wishful thinking, but morality is an undeniable reality for most atheists.
Most atheists will keep asking for various proofs/evidences for God, but most won't keep asking for proof/evidence of good and evil (morality) because most accept it as a fact. After all, if there is no actual evil then there can be no actual problem of evil.
Morality allows you to start from a common place of agreement - you both agree it's real in some sense. The conversation will quickly center around WHAT morality is. This is the ontological playing field that you want to be on.
Thanks Steve. I think you’re right about morality being common ground to build on. I would need to read up some more and understand how to respond to objections such as evil is not a “thing”, why/how atheists can be moral without ever acknowledging God, and are there really such things as objective or absolute moral goods.
I suppose I’m trying to say that I’m not confident I can carry the argument for morality from premises to conclusions without detecting fallacious reasoning along the way.
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Posted by Miguel 12/31/2017 11:18 am | #59 |
Will reply later on
Happy new year everyone
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Posted by DanielCC 1/01/2018 8:58 am | #60 |
I’m not sure if this is the appropriate place in the Forum. Please move this post if it’s not.
I have been getting into (in-person) conversations with atheists and have found it difficult to develop practical “road maps” for these discussions.
Back in 1990, when I was moving from Protestantism to Catholicism, the material I found most helpful were conversion stories as told by men like Hahn and Matatics, and apologetic writings/debates by Keating, Madrid, Matatics and Akin. Along the way, I found solid, older, Catholic books that presented theology in systematic structures.
When explaining my decision to Protestant friends and family, I used approaches/strategies (depending on the subject) developed as a result of the apologetics learned from the gents above. Obviously, coming from a non-Catholic tradition, I was quite familiar with the more anti-Catholic arguments and responding to them was not foreign to me.
Today, I am struggling with how to make cogent and thorough arguments against atheism (or for theism). This is despite reading books by Feser, Augros and others or watching Craig’s debates. I suppose what I’m trying to say is that their arguments come across so “academic” and complicatedly sophisticated.
I read TLS and loved it after reading it the 2nd and 3rd times. I want to tell the atheist, “you need to read this book because it’ll do a heck of a better job than I’m doing.” (I actually said that once and the reply was “if you can’t prove and explain God without referring me to a philosopher’s book...”)
Is there any better debates or apologetics material that can serve as more of a “How to” approach?The average atheist isn't so poised for the sake of it. He or she is usually a well read person in the historicity of man and his archeological exhibits substantiating his or her position on theology. Also, he or she is usually of a logic that trades in proofs rather than faiths, and more so than not has left theism because that same logic provides no other choice short of dismissing logic itself. It is said that faith is merely doubt shrouded in hope while the religious memes keep the shrouds of hope in good repair.
1. What does ‘religion’ or ‘faith’ have do with theism? If one wants to prove the truth of Christianity or another world religion that’s a whole different ballgame.
2. What on earth does archeology have to do with theism?
3. This would be the same ‘logically’ wellread person who is ignorant of Kripke correct?
