I've always assumed that hylemorphism was the common sense view of the universe. I believe it because it makes a lot of sense and I cannot see how someone can coherently deny it without ever smuggling in a little bit of hylemorphism to account for our experience. I accept the four causes of Aristotle and to me it is very obvious that "what is X?" is very different from the question "what is X made of?". And when asked about a painting, our reply that "it is a horse" is very different from the reply that "it is a bunch of paint pigments". The form is something we perceive -- it is given to us in experience, it's not merely an interpretation we make of reality, and we could only ever make such an interpretation if we can grasp a concept such as "form" which is different from a material composition. So to me it just is commonsensical, it fits right into Aristotle's four causes and our experience of the world.

Moreover, I think we need hylemorphism to make sense of the presence of universals in the world. We know there is a commonality between human beings and a profound difference between us and dogs, for example. Form accounts for the universality of essences in material beings, the common structures shared by many beings (though form can be more than structure). I also think we need hylemorphism to make sense of change and identity; to me it's the best explanation for why our matter can be changed without our identity being lost in the process. Form can persist through a change of matter and matter can persist through a change of form. I see no way to solve the issues of identity and change without somehow smuggling form and matter into the picture.

I also think that hylemorphism may be necessary to account for the difference between real being and an ens rationis. That is, the difference between an existing cow and our thought or concept of that cow. The cow exists in real life as a material being because its form is actually informing some matter. And we can think of that cow because it has a form that is not the same thing as its matter; our concept of a cow is immaterial. The essence that the intellect grasps, therefore, cannot be matter, but must be something like form. Another reason why it must be form is because if our thoughts really are supposed to have a real correlation with reality, there must be something in common between our thought and the world, a relation of identity, and that can only be the case if there is form: the form of the existing cow is one and the same form we have in our intellect when we think of that cow. If hylemorphism were false I don't think we could sustain human thought and its connection with the external world.

Miguel wrote:

I've always assumed that hylemorphism was the common sense view of the universe. I believe it because it makes a lot of sense and I cannot see how someone can coherently deny it without ever smuggling in a little bit of hylemorphism to account for our experience. I accept the four causes of Aristotle and to me it is very obvious that "what is X?" is very different from the question "what is X made of?". And when asked about a painting, our reply that "it is a horse" is very different from the reply that "it is a bunch of paint pigments". The form is something we perceive -- it is given to us in experience, it's not merely an interpretation we make of reality, and we could only ever make such an interpretation if we can grasp a concept such as "form" which is different from a material composition. So to me it just is commonsensical, it fits right into Aristotle's four causes and our experience of the world.

Moreover, I think we need hylemorphism to make sense of the presence of universals in the world. We know there is a commonality between human beings and a profound difference between us and dogs, for example. Form accounts for the universality of essences in material beings, the common structures shared by many beings (though form can be more than structure). I also think we need hylemorphism to make sense of change and identity; to me it's the best explanation for why our matter can be changed without our identity being lost in the process. Form can persist through a change of matter and matter can persist through a change of form. I see no way to solve the issues of identity and change without somehow smuggling form and matter into the picture.

I also think that hylemorphism may be necessary to account for the difference between real being and an ens rationis. That is, the difference between an existing cow and our thought or concept of that cow. The cow exists in real life as a material being because its form is actually informing some matter. And we can think of that cow because it has a form that is not the same thing as its matter; our concept of a cow is immaterial. The essence that the intellect grasps, therefore, cannot be matter, but must be something like form. Another reason why it must be form is because if our thoughts really are supposed to have a real correlation with reality, there must be something in common between our thought and the world, a relation of identity, and that can only be the case if there is form: the form of the existing cow is one and the same form we have in our intellect when we think of that cow. If hylemorphism were false I don't think we could sustain human thought and its connection with the external world.

Can you give me an example of a denial of hylemorphism that "smuggles" hylemorphism into its account of the material world?

RomanJoe wrote:

Can you give me an example of a denial of hylemorphism that "smuggles" hylemorphism into its account of the material world?

Honestly do you even need someone else to do this for you?

I hope you mean to preclude rather naive or rash denials of form in reality; e.g., a materialist arguing that a house "is just," say, "bricks and wood and concrete and mortar," etc. or that a man "is just" flesh and bones, etc.

Last edited by Timocrates (1/02/2018 5:05 pm)