Posted by Miguel  1/10/2018 11:57 pm | #1 |
I'm mainly making this thread out of curiosity for different views on this subject.
The standard aristotelean-thomistic view has been that consciousness is a purely material process, inasmuch as it is something produced by the brain, unlike intellection or the abstraction of universal or determinate concepts/forms. However, A-T usually agrees that consciousness is a problem for modern *naturalism*, since the contemporary naturalist conception of matter really is insufficient to account for consciousness and thus is open to arguments such as the knowledge argument, the zombie argument, etc. A-T would then argue that consciousness can be understood naturally if we accept forms, real accidental features etc in our ontology.
Do you agree with this? Opinions on the hard problem of consciousness? On veridical NDEs? On other related stuff?
I tend to agree with the A-T view, but I haven't delved too much into this subject. Just curious to see what any of you think about these subjects.
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Posted by DanielCC 1/11/2018 8:06 am | #2 |
I think that ironically consciousness is the main problem for materialism if one endorses a teleologically 'rich' view of matter a la C.B. Martin and other naturalistic Aristotelians. On hindsight I wonder if Feser's claim in his Philosophy of Mind that the problems of consciousness reduce to the problems of intentionality were not some what tactical (because if he admitted they were a problem it would cause problems for the Thomistic tripartite theory of soul).
I don't think the A-T- account of mind really provides a convincing or even fully fleshed out account of how phenomenal consciousness can be built up out of non-conscious processes. I'd need to re-read books on the subject but two immediate persisting problems would be the unity of conscious and the endurance of the ego over time.
The Thomistic theory of cognition is riddled with problems or at least inadequacies (that is points which may be right but need a hell of a lot more fleshing out). For instance what does it mean to say a form exists in the mind? Or, even worse, the Imagist elements in their account of singular cognition.
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Posted by surroundx 1/11/2018 10:03 am | #3 |
Whatever the epistemic difficulties in trying to give a materialistic account of consciousness, I don't at all see how positing immateriality offers any explanatory benefits whatsoever. That's my two cent(ence)s.
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Posted by Dry and Uninspired 1/11/2018 1:34 pm | #4 |
surroundx wrote:
Whatever the epistemic difficulties in trying to give a materialistic account of consciousness, I don't at all see how positing immateriality offers any explanatory benefits whatsoever. That's my two cent(ence)s.
They’re not just epistemic problems; they’re metaphysical problems, The idea is that matter *on the materialistic* conception can’t account for consciousness even in principle. Asking what the “explanatory benefits” of a metaphysical argument are is kind of like asking what the “explanatory benefits” of a mathematical theorem are. The argument either works or it doesn’t.
But that’s not what the OP is talking about. I think the OP pretty much presupposes a non-materialistic conception of matter, but then asks if those aspects of minds that are material on the Aristotelian really are so.
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Posted by RomanJoe 1/11/2018 1:54 pm | #5 |
I really want to better understand the mind from an A-T view. My initial reactions when I first came across A-T accounts of mental experience, and how it supposedly doesn't fall victim to the hard problem of consciousness, is that it really is just a form of epiphenomenalism, no? Certain material forms can generate a rush of mental experience (qualia, intentionality, privacy) and these mental experiences can't be assessed empirically like the third-person motions of material processes.
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Posted by Dry and Uninspired 1/11/2018 6:01 pm | #6 |
I really want to better understand the mind from an A-T view. My initial reactions when I first came across A-T accounts of mental experience, and how it supposedly doesn't fall victim to the hard problem of consciousness, is that it really is just a form of epiphenomenalism, no? Certain material forms can generate a rush of mental experience (qualia, intentionality, privacy) and these mental experiences can't be assessed empirically like the third-person motions of material processes.
I’m no expert, but I doubt Thomists would consider it epiphenomenalism, not with the four causes system and all. I could be wrong, but under epiphenomenalism it would then basically be a part of the material cause or at least subordinate to it.
The material cause of consciousness would be the neurons involved in it, the efficient cause whatever happened to bring the neurons into existence...So we still have the formal and final causes, which are not somehow less important (which they would be if epiphenomenalism were true).
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Posted by Jeremy Taylor 1/11/2018 6:44 pm | #7 |
I think Dry and Uninspired puts well the point that (some of) the problems with a materialist explanation of the mind are not a matter of simply not having a proper materialist explanation today, but rather seem to make such an explanation intrinsically impossible. That said, there are also empirical issues with materialist explanation of the mind, alongside the more familiar philosophical ones. These are primarily of two related categories: paranormal phenomena (admittedly, the determined materialist will tend dismiss these, but as C.D. Broad put it, no one who seriously studies the evidence of psychical research and is at all intellectually honest could do that) and extraordinary (but not paranormal) phenomena, especially things like psychophysical influence, aspects of genius and creativity, and so on.
Romanjoe,
I am not sure I understand your point. I would hazard a guess you mean A-T sees much of the mind as material and only the intellect as immaterial, and that the latter supervenes on the former. Modern epiphenomenalism is, however, based on a post-Cartesian idea of matter, which the Thomists reject (it is also incoherent - if phenomenal qualities can have no effect on the material, we shouldn't be able to even speak of them).
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Posted by Miguel 1/11/2018 9:07 pm | #8 |
I really want to better understand the mind from an A-T view. My initial reactions when I first came across A-T accounts of mental experience, and how it supposedly doesn't fall victim to the hard problem of consciousness, is that it really is just a form of epiphenomenalism, no? Certain material forms can generate a rush of mental experience (qualia, intentionality, privacy) and these mental experiences can't be assessed empirically like the third-person motions of material processes.
I’m no expert, but I doubt Thomists would consider it epiphenomenalism, not with the four causes system and all. I could be wrong, but under epiphenomenalism it would then basically be a part of the material cause or at least subordinate to it.
The material cause of consciousness would be the neurons involved in it, the efficient cause whatever happened to bring the neurons into existence...So we still have the formal and final causes, which are not somehow less important (which they would be if epiphenomenalism were true).
From what I remember, according to a standard A-T view, or at least Feser's interpretation, what we perceive as qualia would be real accidental features of substances, so it would be part of the formal cause I presume. I think it makes sense, and at least it is, to my mind, the best "natural" explanation one could give to qualia.
It's interesting to see different perspectives on the subject. While I am a committed hylemorphist, I recognize that "Cartesian" dualism still has very able defenders; Karl Popper, Swinburne, Goetz, Collins, etc. Fr. Robert Spitzer in particular defends what he calls "trialist interactionist hylomorphism", in which he complements John Eccles's later model of interactionism with a hylomorphism inspired by Bernard Lonergan and Polanyi. Although I don't know many details.
A small problem I have with hylemorphic dualism -- or at least Feser's view -- is that its view of the afterlife seems a little too limited without miraculous interference. Basically, I agree with this assessment: https://thomism.wordpress.com/2016/03/27/the-survivalism-debate/ It could be that Aquinas's own development leaves more room for a more robust view of the afterlife that does not depend on divine intervention. This may seem like a minor detail for some people, like I'm trying to square the immortality that follows from our rational nature with traditional Christian accounts of immortality, which seem a little more robust. But I think we have independent reason for accepting this kind of afterlife, apart from Christian revelation: I think St Anselm's argument for immortality is a plausible one. There's also the data of veridical NDEs. Although these are compatible with Feser's account of the afterlife, they seem more easily suited for a *naturally conscious* afterlife. I don't think it's a big problem, but I think it's a way Feser's view can be criticized.
A related problem for a Cartesian view which would treat consciousness as transphysical would be the possible implication that animals have natural immortality, too, which seems weird. That's one of the reasons that made Descartes take the (obviously nuts) position that animals are like "machines". Not to mention the interaction problem, among others.
And about materialism and consciousness, I agree with Dry's assessment of the qualia issues as metaphysical problems. I think it's irrelevant whether or not "immateriality" gives a particularly satisfactory explanation or not; the problem is rather that we know materialism cannot even in principle explain or accomodate for consciousness (contra McGinn's mysterianism too); knowledge arguments, zombie arguments, Nagel's arguments, they all show that there is no logical supervenience between qualia facts and physical facts.
Last edited by Miguel (1/11/2018 9:08 pm)
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Posted by surroundx 1/12/2018 4:12 am | #9 |
They’re not just epistemic problems; they’re metaphysical problems, The idea is that matter *on the materialistic* conception can’t account for consciousness even in principle.
There is no unified materialist conception of matter. And even if every person who self-identifies as materialists did conceive of matter as x, that does not rule out other conceptions. You would have to rule out every possible materialist conception of matter. And given that matter at the most fundamental levels probably doesn't behave in the way that the objects of our experience ordinarily do, that "in principle" is just a tad premature.
Asking what the “explanatory benefits” of a metaphysical argument are is kind of like asking what the “explanatory benefits” of a mathematical theorem are. The argument either works or it doesn’t.
Whether the argument works or not is contingent upon it having an explanatory benefit that simpler ontic positions lack. Lest it be ad hoc. If it is not clear that materialist conceptions of matter are explanatorily deficient, then there is no substantive basis upon which to predicate a sound non-materialist argument from consciousness. So conversely, if you formulate an argument which argues that materialism is explanatorily insufficient, you're arguing that non-materialism enjoys an explanatory benefit. Hence, explanatory benefits are what causes an argument to work.
But that’s not what the OP is talking about. I think the OP pretty much presupposes a non-materialistic conception of matter, but then asks if those aspects of minds that are material on the Aristotelian really are so.
The OP title is about natural explanations of consciousness, and the OP asks about NDE's and "other related stuff". So I take it that my comments aren't so tangential as to be rudely appended to the thread. Otherwise I wouldn't have posted 
