Posted by surroundx  1/23/2018 9:17 am | #51 |
FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:
For me, when we say that the universe is only one quark, I'm seeing the left one. Only one quark, with no possibility of motion (no other possible or potential - the only existant is the quark, everything in red doesn't exist, even as potential).
You seem to be arguing the right one.
Correct?
Not quite. I'd argue for a middle world that essentially contains a single quark with the potential to be in another location.
No other material objects potentially exist in that world because the single quark essentially lacks the requisite creatio ex nihilo potency.
As a materialist I must be able to, at least in principle, offer a metaphysical account of motion. Motion as an emergent property (viz. composition) is problematic to say the least, since it almost certainly hinges upon denying that strict contingency calls out for explanation (viz. composites being directly contingent upon simples for their continued existence). The only plausible account is that material simples (viz. quarks, or their parts) are locomotives by their very nature. And so given it's nature as a locomotive, the quarks potential to be in another location is in virtue of the conjunction of its actuality and its nature.
|
Posted by FrenchySkepticalCatholic 1/23/2018 10:08 am | #52 |
Not quite. I'd argue for a middle world that essentially contains a single quark with the potential to be in another location.
How would you call "the potential to be in another location"? Is it something proper to the quark? Does it mean that the potential of "being at a particular location" is contained within the quark ?
No other material objects potentially exist in that world because the single quark essentially lacks the requisite creatio ex nihilo potency.
So you'd call all what is around the quark as "that-which-is-not-the-quark", rather than "space", correct?
As a materialist I must be able to, at least in principle, offer a metaphysical account of motion. Motion as an emergent property (viz. composition) is problematic to say the least, since it almost certainly hinges upon denying that strict contingency calls out for explanation (viz. composites being directly contingent upon simples for their continued existence). The only plausible account is that material simples (viz. quarks, or their parts) are locomotives by their very nature. And so given it's nature as a locomotive, the quarks potential to be in another location is in virtue of the conjunction of its actuality and its nature.
So, if I get you right, you mean that "location" is a proper thing of the simple (particle/quark, here), correct?
|
Posted by surroundx 1/24/2018 9:05 am | #53 |
How would you call "the potential to be in another location"? Is it something proper to the quark? Does it mean that the potential of "being at a particular location" is contained within the quark ?
Locomotion is not proper to the quark. It is an accidental effect, whose cause is proper to the quark. Imagine a world in which all of space is filled with material objects. In such an imaginary world the quark cannot undertake locomotion. Only if it is unfettered by other material objects will locomotion occur. Even though there is no qualitative difference between the two quarks (viz. both being material simples).
Locomotion is contingent upon the finite extension of the conjunction of all existent material objects. Or in other words, for the quark to be in another location is contingent upon a sufficient negation (viz. of the non-existence of enough material objects to give it the "room" to move).
So you'd call all what is around the quark as "that-which-is-not-the-quark", rather than "space", correct?
No, I would merely emphasise the finitude of the quark's extension. If the quark were infinitely extended (contra possibility) then locomotion could never be effected. The finitude of the quark is a necessary condition of locomotion, though as I've pointed out already not a sufficient one. Empty space is the difference between actual finite extension and infinite extension.
So, if I get you right, you mean that "location" is a proper thing of the simple (particle/quark, here), correct?
No. See above 
|
Posted by FrenchySkepticalCatholic 1/24/2018 9:25 am | #54 |
Only if it is unfettered by other material objects will locomotion occur. Even though there is no qualitative difference between the two quarks (viz. both being material simples).
Locomotion is contingent upon the finite extension of the conjunction of all existent material objects. Or in other words, for the quark to be in another location is contingent upon a sufficient negation (viz. of the non-existence of enough material objects to give it the "room" to move).
No, I would merely emphasise the finitude of the quark's extension. If the quark were infinitely extended (contra possibility) then locomotion could never be effected. The finitude of the quark is a necessary condition of locomotion, though as I've pointed out already not a sufficient one. Empty space is the difference between actual finite extension and infinite extension.
I need a few more precisions to give you an answer :
- What are the boundaries for a universe made of only one quark ?
- Is "universe" a different object than the quark itself ? Or is "universe" merely equal to the quark itself ?
|
Posted by surroundx 1/25/2018 9:43 am | #55 |
- What are the boundaries for a universe made of only one quark ?
There are no boundaries.
- Is "universe" a different object than the quark itself ? Or is "universe" merely equal to the quark itself ?
The universe is synonymous with the quark.
|
Posted by FrenchySkepticalCatholic 1/25/2018 10:26 am | #56 |
- What are the boundaries for a universe made of only one quark ?
There are no boundaries.
- Is "universe" a different object than the quark itself ? Or is "universe" merely equal to the quark itself ?
The universe is synonymous with the quark.
Alright. Since the universe is synonymous with the quark (per 2), does it mean that the quark has no boundary (per 1)?
I'm trying to make sense of your ontological description of one quark moving in a universe of only one quark with no boundaries. Does motion change any essential property of the quark?
|
Posted by surroundx 1/25/2018 8:53 pm | #57 |
Alright. Since the universe is synonymous with the quark (per 2), does it mean that the quark has no boundary (per 1)?
I'm trying to make sense of your ontological description of one quark moving in a universe of only one quark with no boundaries. Does motion change any essential property of the quark?
The quark has finite extension, so one might be inclined to answer "yes, it does have a boundary". However, the nature of material simples is such that they are pure symmetry. They cannot have any asymmetries because then they wouldn't be simple. Asymmetries arise as a result of non-homogeneity. Thus the quark simply is its boundary.
No, motion doesn't change any essential property of the quark.
|
Posted by John West 3/18/2018 5:56 pm | #58 |
[I wrote most of the next couple posts while this thread was active, but then decided I wouldn't have time to follow the discussion up. I still don't have much time, but, well, no sense letting them go to waste.]
It's worth distinguishing omnipresence and non-spatiality. If an entity is omnipresent, it exists wholly at every location and therefore isn't spatially qualified; if, however, it's non-spatial, it doesn't exist in space at all and therefore also isn't spatially qualified. I know you deny the existence of non-spatial entities, but there is still a conceptual distinction that should be flagged for the sake of conversation.
It's also worth distinguishing negative reality and not existing. If space is a negative reality, it has the same status as Martin's absences, or Armstrong's limits; if, however, it doesn't exist, it simply doesn't exist. You may have used “negative reality” to mean not existing, but it's easily confused with the sense I give negative reality here.
Now, suppose that in possible world w particle a exists in our galaxy, and that in some other possible world v it exists in some far off galaxy. What makes it true in w that “a exists in our galaxy, but not the far off galaxy”? What makes it true in v that “a exists in the far off galaxy, but not ours”? You're welcome to reject various realist theories of truth to avoid this objection, but then that is a requirement of your view.*
Here is another argument. If space has any property, it exists. Physicists tell us space has properties (e.g. curvature, structure). Hence, we have good reason to believe space exists. I'm assuming you're a direct realist, rather than an indirect realist or idealist.
*You, for example, would have to reject the plausible thesis that most truths about the exterior world are made true by entities (entities in the broadest sense) in the exterior world (i.e. "most" to avoid quibbling over the two most controversial cases, negative truths and general truths), and commit to one of a limited range of more “deflationary” accounts of truth.
|
Posted by John West 3/18/2018 5:57 pm | #59 |
You've said you're a materialist and suggested at a few points that something is material if and only if it's spatially qualified. What about the property or property-instance of being spatially qualified? Is it spatially qualified? You can escape the implied objection by adopting blob nominalism, but then that is another requirement of your view we need to flag.
I don't have an actual position to defend here, by the way. I'm just trying to get to know you a bit better.
|
Posted by seigneur 3/19/2018 12:29 am | #60 |
The quark has finite extension, so one might be inclined to answer "yes, it does have a boundary". However, the nature of material simples is such that they are pure symmetry. They cannot have any asymmetries because then they wouldn't be simple. Asymmetries arise as a result of non-homogeneity. Thus the quark simply is its boundary.
No, motion doesn't change any essential property of the quark.
So quark is basically a mathematical point and that's material?
