aftermathemat wrote:

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

In a way. More like, if we accept epistemic nihilism by denying PSR, we'll end up accepting PSR. Which is fine.  

So what you are admitting is that if we deny PSR, we have to accept at least the possibility of epistemic nihilism and all of the conclusions that follow from that, which is even worse than the consequences Feser points out of  ~PSR  , which means that  ~PSR  is potentially both  meaningless  and  unbelievable , and thus we know PSR is true?

Indeed. The only reason for ~PSR to be meaningless and unbelieveable in a coherent meaning would be that meaning and believeable at least exists. Otherwise, how do you make the slightest difference between ~PSR and PSR? Sure, you can tell that they're not equal. But what does it mean? Either it has a meaning, and thus we're out of the confusion; either it doesn't, and we end up in an "ultimate monism", in where there are no difference between things.

aftermathemat wrote:

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

 I don't think aren't efficient, but that they are *too* efficient. Like that even if we could have a proof that God doesn't exist (not just an argument), that would show the existence of God.

You mean, the denial of God results in the same consequences as the denial of the laws of logic, which is that to even deny the above 2 you have to presuppose them? Well, beat me over with a fish-stick, who would have thought that!?!

Indeed.

aftermathemat wrote:

I don't think this is a problem, I think this is God revealing Himself basically. There is a reason why classical theism says that God is Reason itself.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

See what I mean? I sound crazy, but it appears so : one of the decisive proofs of God is that the absence of God, the absence of proof, skepticism or nihilism *all end up* showing God when applied thursly.

So what you are saying is that, if one denies the existence of God, one also ends up finding nihilism, skepticism and a whole host of other irrational conclusions that would in any other case be fatal to proposition in question (namely, the proposition that God doesn't exist)?

Exactly. Unless we remain perfectly silent, then God necessarily exists. And, *EVEN IF WE REMAIN SILENT*, a single noise would suffice.

Now, I'm either making the biggest mistake and bad logic ever, either I'm seeing what Aquinas means by “To one who has faith, no explanation is necessary. To one without faith, no explanation is possible.”

I think it's like "the ultimate retorsion argument". Sure, under nihilism, "classical theism is false". But what does it mean ? Does it have an importance ?

It's something similar to realizing that claiming "2+2=4" is a moral claim.

Did I go nuts, or do you see what I mean ? :/

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

Exactly. Unless we remain perfectly silent, then God necessarily exists. And, *EVEN IF WE REMAIN SILENT*, a single noise would suffice.

Now, I'm either making the biggest mistake and bad logic ever, either I'm seeing what Aquinas means by “To one who has faith, no explanation is necessary. To one without faith, no explanation is possible.”

I think it's like "the ultimate retorsion argument". Sure, under nihilism, "classical theism is false". But what does it mean ? Does it have an importance ?

It's something similar to realizing that claiming "2+2=4" is a moral claim.

Did I go nuts, or do you see what I mean ? :/

I see what you mean. And to illustrate further, let me quote a YouTuber called IvanTheHeathen who happens to be a classical theist that was actually convinced of theism by PSR, though he isn't a Christian and is just a generic classical theist.


On one of his videos, he made a response in the comment section to someone who asked about the PSR as it stands in relation to the Munchausen dilemma. He accepts the Munchausen dilemma (by now, since you are a denizen of the forums, you should know that the Munchausen objection to PSR was easily answered by the fact that it presupposes that self-evidence cannot be a foundation for first principles, which the classical theist and any other sensible person would deny), but reveals why the Munchausen dilemma, even if accepted, does not undercut classicla theism. I think his comments will prove quite interesting, perhaps even helpful to you.


Here it goes, the full comment. I will underline his most amazing points:


<<<The point about the Munchausen Trilemma is very interesting, but I don't think that it poses a serious problem for the PSR. Here is why.

Let me illustrate a point with an example from model theory. Model theory is a branch of mathematics that attempts to analyze general classes of mathematical structures and their structural properties. One of its uses is as a tool to prove the consistency (or inconsistency) of some given mathematical structure. This is generally done as follows:

Take some formal language L. A set of sentences in L, s1, s2, s3,... is called a theory. A model is an interpretation of some such given theory, where an interpretation is an assignment of meaning - usually the assignment of a truth value - to the sentences of that theory.

Given L, we can take a set of sentences A = {s1, s2, s3,...} in L which we'll designate as the axioms of L, the sentences from which all other sentences in L can be derived. If it is possible to construct a model of A, this suffices to prove that L is consistent. The statements in the model, however, will have to be expressed in some meta-language L' which we will use to make statements about the language L. So model theory enables us to take some language, construct a meta-language for that language, and then use the meta-language to prove the consistency of the original language. And this procedure can be applied to all formalized mathematical systems.

Here's an interesting question: May one use model theory to prove the consistency of model theory itself? The answer is "yes"! If one takes M to be model theory and creates a meta-language M' (a "meta-model theory"), one can construct a model of model theory itself within the language M'. The interesting part of this procedure, however, is that even though M' is a different formal language from M, one would only be using the elements of M within this demonstration.

That is, model theory itself would be a subset of the meta-language used in a model-theoretic proof of model theory's own consistency. And only the elements common to both model theory and the meta-language would be used in this proof. In short, model theory can be self-referentially applied to itself to prove its own consistency.

(As an aside, Godel's Incompleteness theorems would make an appearance here in that model theory, if provable to be consistent in this way, would have true statements within itself which could never be proven true. Hence, the meta-language M'. My intuition, however, is that in this one very special case, M would be isomorphic to M', making model theory uniquely self-referential.) 

Some might object that this is a circular argument - and indeed, it is. However, in this case, I don't think that that is a reason to rule the move that I have described inadmissible. For if it is ruled inadmissible, mathematics - and therefore, by extension, all formalized reasoning, since all logics, whether classical or no, are themselves formal systems - would be without foundation. What all of this shows is that you can't use reasoning to non-circularly prove the validity of reasoning. Ironically, the worth, power and validity of logic, in a sense, have to ultimately be taken on faith. If one does not do this, one is too far gone to be helped.

This model-theoretic consistency proof of model theory is fascinating because, if we examine the three types of arguments referred to in the Muchausen Trilemma, we find that it is all three of these types at once! It is circular and self-referential; it generates an infinite regress because once the meta-language M' is used to prove the consistency of M, another meta-meta-language M'' will be needed to prove the consistency of M', and so on ad infinitum; and it is an axiomatic argument because the basic axioms of model theory that are used all throughout are taken as given. In addition, the infinite regress form of this argument points toward something truly amazing: the inexhausibility of mathematics. The nerd in me loves stuff like that!

Anyway, what I think this shows is that the point made by the Muchausen Trilemma can, in certain special cases, be true, and yet not deadly to an argument. Using the PSR to prove the existence of God is rather like the model-theoretic argument that I sketched above. It is circular. If one believes in the power of reason (as would be indicated by one's acceptance of the PSR), then one is justified in believing in God; and if one believes in God, one is justified in believing in the power of reason. This, I think, is what is really meant by John when he says that God is the Logos. One cannot non-circularly prove the validity of logical reasoning. One must either agree take this on faith and proceed from there, or else surrender oneself to the void.

But once one does accept reasoning - whether one realizes it explicitly or not - one has already implicitly accepted belief in God. God and reason are two sides of the same coin; they are one; they stand or fall together, and cannot be separated. This is the great truth at the bottom of the relation, or supposed conflict, between faith and reason. It is this revelation that made me into a theist.

In addition to being circular, the cosmological argument for the existence of God that makes use of the PSR is also, in a sense, productive of an infinite regress. Once one establishes that the contingent cosmos had to have been brought into existence by Existence Itself, one can ask why God chose to make the cosmos as He made it. Once one does this, one is forced to dive into the theology of the divine nature, and encounter the far-reaching consequences that the doctrine of divine simplicity has within classical theism for all thinking and speaking about God. And once one properly thinks through all of this, one sees that the answer to the question of why God freely chose to make the cosmos as He made it, rather than some other way, is that God is God. And when one asks the further question of why God is God, one must repeat that same answer again. And so on, ad infinitum, for an endless series of questions and meta-questions phrased in this way.

The argument is also axiomatic in that either God's existence is taken as axiomatic, and is thereby able to allow one to conclude that reasoning is to be trusted; or one starts with an implicit, axiomatic faith in reasoning, represented by acceptance of the PSR, and thereby reasons one's way to God. (Of course, circularity once again reappears here, just in the fact that one is using an argument at all.)

And by the way, acceptance of the PSR does ultimately rest on a belief in the power and validity of reasoning. As Michael Della Rocca points out in his excellent and extremely important paper on the PSR, without accepting the PSR, one ultimately cannot make explicability arguments of any kind, which would destroy must of the reasoning that philosophers are apt to deploy in their disputations. Here is a link to Della Rocca's paper. I highly recommend reading it.

http://www.apologeticsinthechurch.com/uploads/7/4/5/6/7456646/psr.pdf

...

As a final point on the Muchausen Trilemma, let me offer a thought-provoking speculation that just occurred to me.

Attempts to prove the existence of God, or (which, in a sense, is ultimately the same thing) the validity of reasoning lead to arguments that are simultaneously all three of the types of arguments described in the Muchausen Trilemma. This shows that these special kinds of arguments are at the core of reasoning itself. I can't help but remark that this seems to reflect the triune character of God in Christianity. You must admit that the synchronicity with the Trinity here is eerie. >>>


So what do you think?


Of course, keep in mind that Miguel pointed out that the Munchausen trilemma presupposes that self-evidence cannot be used as a princple to ground this, which is a typically modern assumption. So one doesn't even have to take the Munchausen objection as a serious problem, since the existence of God, like the laws of logic (heck, God is Reason itself which means He is Logic and grounds Logic), naturally flows from their nature. They are necessary of themselves.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

I'd go further than him on one point, though : sure, Faith and Reason stand or fall together... though it's impossible to have them fall, for their fall implies faith/reason in bigger principles than the original ones we've been ascribing to.

Let's take my old topic I had on here a few times ago : even if we assume that the "universe is bubbles of nothingness", then we're making a positive claim about realities, and that we're ultimately committing us to. 

In other words, to reject Reason or to make Reason fall is simply to affirm it on another topic/dimension. For if the Fall of Reason is absolute, therefore, this absolute is """divinelike""" (with scare quotes).

In other words, God exists because reasoning is true, and to deny reasoning is self-defeating and incoherent in more ways than one. 

So there you have it, if PSR were false then epistemic nihilism entails at least as a possibility, but since nihilism is self-defeating and incoherent, denying the PSR is self-defeating and incoherent, so PSR is true.


But PSR entails God, so God exists. Q.E.D.


I remember someone once asked a freshly converted Christian  "Why are you having so much fun?Why are you so joyful?", to which the Christian replied  "Because God exists, that's why!!!". 


I think we should follow his footsteps...
 

aftermathemat wrote:

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

I'd go further than him on one point, though : sure, Faith and Reason stand or fall together... though it's impossible to have them fall, for their fall implies faith/reason in bigger principles than the original ones we've been ascribing to.

Let's take my old topic I had on here a few times ago : even if we assume that the "universe is bubbles of nothingness", then we're making a positive claim about realities, and that we're ultimately committing us to. 

In other words, to reject Reason or to make Reason fall is simply to affirm it on another topic/dimension. For if the Fall of Reason is absolute, therefore, this absolute is """divinelike""" (with scare quotes).

In other words, God exists because reasoning is true, and to deny reasoning is self-defeating and incoherent in more ways than one. 

So there you have it, if PSR were false then epistemic nihilism entails at least as a possibility, but since nihilism is self-defeating and incoherent, denying the PSR is self-defeating and incoherent, so PSR is true.


But PSR entails God, so God exists. Q.E.D.
 

Nope. It's actually simpler. On nihilism, weakenning the PSR weakens the POI to the point of complete monism. You end up to the point where you can have both PSR and ~PSR.
Or, in our case, God exists and God doesn't exist. Don't try going back to a "rational" ground : you've proved that God exists, and that's enough for your purposes. If your opponent wants to argue against it, that's fine : play with his rules. Don't try any "incoherent" or similar replies. ;)