- Scott
- Moderator
Offline 
- From: Ohio, USA
- Registered: 6/26/2015
- Posts: 357
Re: Questions on p. 245 of 'Scholastic Metaphysics'
musiclover wrote:
Scott - Yes, but do you agree that a being whose essence is identical with *its* existence is not existence itself?
Sorry, missed this yesterday.
No, I don't. On the contrary, as Aquinas argues (Chapter 4; sections 88-92, especially 89), a being whose essence is its own existence doesn't belong to a genus. In that case it isn't just one "existence" among (possibly) others; it just is existence, full stop.*
Perhaps you're confusing this conclusion with the claim that this being is the existence of all particular things as well. But Aquinas argues against that in section 90 and contends instead that this existence is distinct from the existence of "every existence" (meaning the existences of things whose essences are not identical with their existences).
----
* I alluded to this point in a footnote in my previous post but didn't spell it out. Now you know why it's important.
Last edited by Scott (7/14/2015 7:47 pm)
- mashsha'i
- Member
Offline
- Registered: 7/16/2015
- Posts: 12
Re: Questions on p. 245 of 'Scholastic Metaphysics'
musiclover,
i've always understood the identity in just the way you stated; God's essence is identical with His existence. for 'existence itself', as Avicenna would have said, is ambiguous between (1) existence with the condition of no addition and (2) existence without the condition of this addition. (1) is God's existence; for, being perfect, God's existence positively excludes any addition. (2) is being qua being (wujud 'aama/esse commune, in the Arabic and Latin respectively), which doesn't include any addition but can do so. And importantly, (1) =\= (2).
'What is, is as it ought to be; and what ought not to be, is not.' - Tusi (d. 1274)