John West wrote:

 There is quite a lot here. Could I get you to summarise your main points in one post?

Sure,


My contention is that,it seems to me that under the Eternalistic/B-theoratic view of time the Act/Potency distinction just collapses as all moments of time are equally real and nothing is reduced from being potentially X to being Actually X ..in the sense that things goes out of being and come into being ...every thing that exists, exists tenselessly.. thereby undermining A-T arguments 

It seems Act/potency requires some kind of robust A-theory combined with thoroughgoing Presentism( Kind of View William Lane Caig holds)   

Now some users claim that this actually doesn't undermine A-T arguments and Act/Potency can still be sneaked into tenseless world but I don't see how

So this is what I would like to ask you ..are Five ways and Eternalism  compatible? What concept of change are  ATists trying to uphold and how is this compatible with Eternalism and under what theory of persistence ? 

Users usually try to respond to me that A-theory/Presentism is definitely true because its the only one that can account for change..and B-theory can't account for change ..I have replied to this and many arguments given for this many time ..I don't want to repeat those here again..suffice to say there is no obvious way B-theory/Eternalism is incoherent..or so hasn't been shown..

so what I am more interested in is whether arguments like Five ways are compatible with this view or not..the user "Callum" is trying to show me that they are. and he seeks to that in his later comments .. 

hope this will suffice to give you a clear picture but if you can I would be recommend following the comments from the start..

Thanks for joining us 


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Hello Timocrates 

Timocrates wrote:

But the only now is the objective now: all else is or would be then and not now. It is simply false to call any other time other than now, now.

I am not sure what do you mean here..when have I called any other time other than now, now. ? 

you seem to be quote mining me here ..I'll advise you to please follow the discussion from the start..

Calhoun wrote:

My contention is that,it seems to me that under the Eternalistic/B-theoratic view of time the Act/Potency distinction just collapses as all moments of time are equally real and nothing is reduced from being potentially X to being Actually X ..in the sense that things goes out of being and come into being ...every thing that exists, exists tenselessly.. thereby undermining A-T arguments.

It seems Act/potency requires some kind of robust A-theory combined with thoroughgoing Presentism.

Suppose there is a material substance, a, composed of a parcel of secondary matter, m, and the natural kind instance, N. The secondary matter accounts for potency, and the kind-instance act. So you have your act-potency distinction.

Suppose the B-theory. Then you have your act-potency distinction on the B-theory.

(Why would a B-theorist adopt powers? One reason would be to explain alterational change. Another, to take advantage of the powers theory of laws.)

John West wrote:

I'm a big fan of starting these kinds of discussions by drawing distinctions and defining terms:

The first distinction is between A-theorists and B-theorists. A-theorists think there is an absolute, objective present; B-theorists deny that there is an objective present.

The second is between endurantism, perdurantism, and exdurantism. If a duck endures, it's wholly present both waddling at t1 and flying at t2; if it perdures, it's a spacetime worm with a waddling part at t1 and a flying part at t2; if it exdures, it's a whole object waddling at t1 connected by an “I-relation” to a counterpart whole object flying at t2.

The third is between alterational and existential change. If the duck-waddling-at-t1 is one and the same as the duck-flying-at-t2, that duck has undergone alterational change; if the duck-waddling-at-t1 goes out of existence and is replaced by a duck-flying-at-t2, there has been a case of existential change. Aristotelians sometimes call alterational change accidental change and existential change substantial change.

A fourth is between temporal becoming and the passage of time. A-theorists think that temporal becoming (existential change) is an objective feature of reality; they, however, usually don't think that the passage of time is an objective of feature of reality (see here). B-theorists don't believe in temporal becoming.

I think it helps prevent miscommunications.

Thanks a lot John West

Callum wrote:

Are you a theist John?

I was when we started the forum. Then I was an atheist—think Sydney line metaphysics—for a while. Now I've reached a sort of dialectical stalemate, and I'm exploring other avenues.