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4/01/2017 6:36 pm  #1


The pure actuality of the first mover

I have been familiar with the metaphysics behind Aquinas's first way for quite a while now, and I have had reoccurring contention with the conclusion that the first mover must necessarily be purely actual, and in nowise in potentiality. In all of the literature I have read on the metaphysics behind Aquinas's argument, and can't seem to come across anything satisfying to my objection. 

So here's a question, why can't the first mover be unchanging and unchangeable and still lack actualized potentials? To go from saying that it must be unchanging and unchangeable to saying that it has absolutely no unrealized potentials seems like a non-sequitur jump to me. What's the problem with saying that it just has certain potentials actualized relevant to its action of causing change in other things, but that it has other unactualized potentials of its own which it never advances towards or even in principle could advance towards, and which aren't related to its actualization of the potentials of other things? 
 
One notion that people might use to justify this inference, I have thought, is the notion that everything which has potentiality must be undergoing change, but this seems manifestly false since I can conceivably imagine many scenarios in which there's absolutely no change occurring in a thing, and yet that thing has plenty of potentials.(e.g., in some possible world there exists two electrons in empty space, both completely inert, static, existing in an unchanging eternal state). 

I desperately want my confusion to be eliminated so much feedback is appreciated. 

Sincerely, Techmology

Last edited by Techmology (4/01/2017 6:48 pm)

 

4/02/2017 11:25 am  #2


Re: The pure actuality of the first mover

"So here's a question, why can't the first mover be unchanging and unchangeable and still lack actualized potentials?"

What follows is largely based on a discussion of a similar objection in Prof. Feser's "Aquinas".

The quick answer would be that the First Mover is not something that has actualised potentials.

For if that is what we're talking about, we have to ask, what actualises potentials relevant to the actualisations of other things' potentials? Suppose the answer is "the First Mover".
In that case, it would seem that some part actualises the other parts. We then have to ask whether this part in turn requires some potential to be actualised for it to actualise other potentials. If it does, then the regress continues. If it doesn't, then it will have to be pure act and the real First Mover. But given that parts are in potency to the whole, and pure act cannot be in potency to anything, it is impossible for pure act to be a part of something. So it appears that our supposition that the First Mover is a part of some whole is wrong, and is rather "a substance" that is purely actual.

Last edited by GeorgiusThomas (4/02/2017 12:26 pm)

 

4/02/2017 3:35 pm  #3


Re: The pure actuality of the first mover

"For if that is what we're talking about, we have to ask, what actualises potentials relevant to the actualisations of other things' potentials?"

I don't think we need to ask that, for suppose as I have suggested that the prime mover has existed forever in an unchanging and eternal state, such that there was no moment in time in which it was actualized in the specific way that it is, and suppose that besides the specific way that it is actual, that there's many further logically possible ways in which it could be actual, or logically possible determinations of its being, that it could never advance towards in reality, but still could still possess in some abstract sense. Then it doesn't seem that it would need anything exterior to it to actualize those potentials, since they never were actualized: they're just eternally actual. 

Unless there's genuine change involved in a thing's actuality be specified in some way rather than the many other ways it could be specified, I see no reason for it to need to an outside cause for being specified in this way rather than another. (,i.e., as being actual in this respect rather than another one). 

Thank you for your feedback, GeorgiusThomas. 

Sincerely, Techmology. 


(P.S., I had to time this rather fast since I'm busy with life right now, so I do apologize if there are any irking grammatical errors.) 

 

     Thread Starter
 

4/11/2017 8:27 pm  #4


Re: The pure actuality of the first mover

I'm not sure if saying something has potential "that it could never advance towards in reality, but still could still possess in some abstract sense" makes sense.  If some state can't ever be actualized, then it is not, by definition, potentially actual, or more simply, you are not talking about potential.  So I think to ask your question, you would have to ask, why the unmoved mover is partly actualized and partly potential.  If this is what you are asking, then either 1) you aren't talking about the unmoved mover, or 2) GeorgiusThomas' answer would apply here.

Let me know if I misunderstood your question, or skipped over something.

 

5/01/2017 11:34 am  #5


Re: The pure actuality of the first mover

I would love for this thread to pick up again. I've struggled with this issue too. How does one get to the notion of pure act? It seems to me that there could be a first mover whose causal power is pure act but this mover could also have unactualized potentials. If this is the case then couldn't something like a hunk of matter be the first mover? Couldn't we have a hunk of matter whose existence just is--and all other things derive their own existence and causal efficacy from it. 

 

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