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5/17/2017 1:01 pm  #21


Re: Modal Knowledge of entities and propositions

     @Dennis, Sorry I was away for so long, the semester was getting busy.

Dennis wrote:

Explanations do not bring about things, the explanation of why the suns rays takes about 5-8 minutes does not bring the state of affairs about, but it's the sun and its properties, tied with other things in physical minutiae that bring that truth to be. Explanations would not be classified as entities that are in the world which could serve as truthmakers for truthbearers, and thus I need something in the actual world which would do the job.

Since you want to nitpick, I was using "explanation" as a catch-all term, including every factor behind <p> being the case, which will usually include causes, or some kind of entailment relation (and entailment seems like a kind of "bringing about"). Obviously, saying "When an explanation brings something about" does not commit me to saying that an explanation is always a cause in the modern sense of cause, especially since a phrase like that is more of a metonymy than a literal expression. (After all, you're treating "explanation" like just a description in the same way I am. What fault can you find in my exposition?)
     Your own example doesn't refute my claim, either, or even create a difficulty. First, the sun and its properties are part of the explanation, and at least one of those is a causal factor! Second, and by consequence, if the sun and it properties were different, or its relationship to Earth, then it would take a different amount of time for light to reach the Earth. The conditional "Light does not have to take eight minutes to travel from the sun to the Earth" clearly depends on these factors. The same, it seems, can be said for pretty much any other true counterfactual claim. So at first glance, it doesn't seem like you've made a dent.
     To add to the above, my claim doesn't require the assumption that conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. I can't even see where I imply that.
     That still doesn't say much for my own explanation. In fact, Proclus' view seems better to me.

Last edited by Grace and Rust (5/17/2017 1:02 pm)


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