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8/31/2017 4:39 pm  #1


question about perception

what is the basic difference between the reductionist and dualist understanding of perception? where do they differ? i'm having some trouble with this so any help would be appreciated.

Last edited by am93 (9/02/2017 4:13 pm)

 

9/02/2017 5:02 pm  #2


Re: question about perception

am93 wrote:

what is the basic difference between the reductionist and dualist understanding of perception? where do they differ? i'm having some trouble with this so any help would be appreciated.

What type of dualism do you have in mind, a Cartesian or hylomorphic one? Also when you say reductionist do you mean a purely material account of the mind? Epiphenomenalism? Eliminative materialism?

 

9/03/2017 2:55 am  #3


Re: question about perception

@RomanJoe
I did not know that there were so many kinds of dualism and reductionism (should have done my research better). I think the ones i had in mind was cartesian dualism and reductive materialism.

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9/03/2017 1:48 pm  #4


Re: question about perception

Well for starters, Cartesian dualism (or substance dualism) posits an immaterial entity that inhabits a material body--a ghost in a machine. Our bodies and our minds, souls, what have you, are completely distinct substances. On this view the qualitative first-person features of the world (qualia) are really just projections of the mind. That is, the first-person phenomena of the heat of a candle, the beautiful sound of a violin, the redness of a rose, don't really exist objectively in mind-independent reality. What actually exists are featureless particles in motion--that is, those principles of reality captured by physics. So, on substance dualism, the redness of the rose (at least as a first-person, private, phenomenological qualitative experience) doesn't exist in mind-independent reality, what really exists are the surface-reflectant properties of the rose's material composition which, given the travel of photons from the rose's surface to our eyes' sensory apparatus, creates in us the experience of redness.

The issue with this type of dualism is something called the mind-body problem. Essentially, there seems to be a huge gap between the material and the immaterial. How can the purely physical world of featureless particles (devoid of any qualitative aspects) give rise in us (through our material senses) to qualitative experiences like redness. How can that which is material give rise to the immaterial? Is this not a case of more from less? If everything is just the featureless mechanistic-cum-materialistic operations of particles, then how can the immaterial, the first-person qualitative aspects of reality every emerge? 

Now the reductionist account, as you put it, typically expunges the qualitative aspects we experience. On this view (eliminative materialism), there is no mental. That is, when you experience the redness of the rose, you aren't actually experiencing it. This is a radical view because it just seems so obvious that we do have mental qualitative experiences. Despite the mind-body issues with substance dualism, it at least admitted that we have such experiences. On eliminative materialism, there is a complete denial of such experiences. Instead, all of reality, including the mind, is just consisted of the mindless motions of featureless particles. 

Epiphenomenalism is another reductionist form which admits that the mental is real, that we do have qualitative experiences. However, it says that such experiences simply emerge from the material--like the screeching of metal emerging from the movement of a rusted machine. So, in the last analysis, we have no mental agency, rather, everything is governed by the mindless sways of physical particles, and our mental experiences are just secondary, they emerge from these mindless sways. I find this as unlikely as eliminative materialism because, for one, we do seem to have mental agency. Our mental intention to pick up a cup, to move from one proposition to the next, seems to be governed by the mental, not the material. Also, it seems highly unlikely that immaterial realities somehow emerge from the material when it's configured into certain shapes--i.e. the shape of a human brain. Why this shape? How can mindless particles produce a mind? 

I'm not a philosopher of mind and there are probably others here who could explain dualist and materialist accounts of the mind better than I have. I would suggest picking up Dr. Feser's The Philosophy of Mind, and researching hylomorphic dualism. Dr. Feser has a few blog entries on it I believe. 

Last edited by RomanJoe (9/03/2017 1:52 pm)

 

9/03/2017 3:10 pm  #5


Re: question about perception

@RomanJoe
I think that both views are problematic, they don't really explain how first-person experiences emerge. I think i have to read more about the subject, il try to read the book you recommended. Thank you.

     Thread Starter
 

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