Well esse will either be had by something intrinsically or extrinsically (there are no other options), corresponding to a necessary being vs contingent being, respectively. Either way there's a reason the esse is actual and "connected" to the thing in question, for lack of a better word.

Perhaps you mean to say something could have esse yet lack sufficient reasons, but this is exactly what RGL / Sullivan attempt to show is incoherent.

IOW, the PSR critic can always appeal to a brute fact to counter RGL/Sullivan's argument. The critic may concede that a being must possess an act of existence to explain its distinction from nothing, but he still has the luxury of appealing to a brute fact when the PSR adherent presses him to locate the source of this act of existence in the being itself or another being.

So would you say an esse without a source--i.e. an esse that does not have a point of origin in anything--is really nothing? I'm debating whether or not the dichotomy of possessing esse in either a being's nature or an external being needs to even be appealed to by a PSR critic. Why must he concede that esse has a source to begin with? A person fond of brute facts may say its possible that an esse just happens to be inexplicably, with no source for its act.

UGADawg wrote:

Esse is always the esse of something, which should make sense given that it's defined in terms of that in virtue of which something is distinguished from nonbeing. So I'm not sure it's even coherent to speak of a sort of "free floating" esse, or whatever you want to call it. 

Ah, that's a good way if putting it. I need to think on this more.