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| Theoretical Philosophy » A better argument from contingency. » 12/31/2018 1:54 am |
- Jimbo28
- Replies: 15
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There's a lot here, but I just want to look at one thing you said.
Noble_monkey wrote:Every property the necessary object has must be a property it necessarily has
This is problematic. If every property the necessary being has is necessary, then its property of having chosen to create the universe is necessary. One potential problem that comes up here is the freedom of the necessary being. If you believe that alternative possibilities are required for freedom, then it follows that the necessary being is not free.
But more importantly, if the choice to create the universe is necessary, then it follows that the universe itself is necessary. If there is no possible world in which A does not exist, and no possible world in which A does not cause B to exist, then it follows that there is no possible world in which B fails to exist, which is another way of saying that B exists necessarily.
This of course contradicts the starting premise that there are contingent things.
| Theoretical Philosophy » How do you feel about WLC Kalam Argument? » 12/30/2018 4:28 pm |
- Jimbo28
- Replies: 13
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ClassicalLiberal.Theist wrote:
I have essentially abandoned this argument, simply because it hangs in the balance of scientific discovery
Well, in Craig's view, the Kalam decidedly does not hang upon the scientific evidence. I recall hearing him say on multiple occasions that he believes the primary evidence that the universe began to exist is philosophical. He believes that there is good philosophical justification for the impossibility of an infinite past, and that any confirmatory scientific evidence is just icing on the cake.
The Kalam is certainly defensible. Or at least, it isn't obviously a failure of an argument. There are a lot of interesting philosophical issues that come up with it. I think the Kalam is a better argument than classical theists tend to give credit for.
| Theoretical Philosophy » Playing the Devil's Advocate : bubbles of nothingness » 11/06/2017 4:21 pm |
- Jimbo28
- Replies: 3
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Whoa! Frenchy, reading this reminds me of the old idea that we're all actually brains in vats being fed this experience of an external world. I cannot disprove it, but I have absolutely no reason to believe it, and in accordance with the principle of credulity, in the absence of defeaters I'm rational to believe what seems to be the case to me, and what seems to be the case is that the external world is real. That is my general stance towards the suggestions you listed. For most of them, I cannot disprove them, but I have absolutely no reason to believe them either. For some of them in particular, they are open to being positively disproved. For example:
[color=#000000]FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:9. Logic can't be trusted (because it doesn't really exist), and it's probable that there is no truth.
This is itself a claim to truth. So the statement is disproved in virtue of its being self-contradictory. Also, the statement that logic doesn't exist or can't be trusted presupposes logical absolutes. In order to deny the principle of noncontradiction, one has to assume it in order to disprove it. If the principle of noncontradiction isn't true, then that entails that it is also true, because if there is no principle of noncontradiction, all propositions can be both true and false. The laws of logic are therefore philosophically incorrigible, or self-evident, or necessary, or self-affirming, or whatever you want to call it. You get the idea though.
FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:From a block-universe view, reality can't be changed or altered, so it's impossible for us to change or to do anything
Well, that doesn't really follow in a very significant sense, and compatibilists can tell you all about that.
FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:I'm wondering why my mind is causing them to be hard onto my poor self, so I post them here in the hope of help. At times, I feel that my mind embraces irrationality. It's rather horrificly scary, and I d
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| Theoretical Philosophy » Is Scholastic realism actually a realist ontology? » 11/04/2017 1:47 pm |
- Jimbo28
- Replies: 8
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It seems to me that if one looks at a piece of toast, and ignores what is incidental to it, one has already brought to the table a standard of what is essential and what is incidental. So that one is not abstracting something out of the toast so much as one is abstracting something onto the toast.
I am trying to read through the SEP article on Aristotle's metaphysics, but at this point I can't make heads or tails of what The Philosopher himself thought of such things.
| Theoretical Philosophy » Is Scholastic realism actually a realist ontology? » 11/03/2017 4:40 pm |
- Jimbo28
- Replies: 8
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Here is my difficulty: The abstract object which is a triangle for example is not inherent in any concrete reality. In concrete reality, there are only forms which approximate a triangle. However the abstract object which is the triangle is perfect. So how is it that we pull out or drag away from concrete reality something which is not actually in concrete reality?
| Theoretical Philosophy » Is Scholastic realism actually a realist ontology? » 11/03/2017 3:08 pm |
- Jimbo28
- Replies: 8
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My understanding of Scholastic realism is that abstract objects do not exist in any kind of mind-independent "third realm". Rather, they only exist in contingent minds and in the eternal intellect of God. This view is generally construed as a realist ontology. But isn't it in a very obvious sense an antirealist ontology? That is, according to this view, abstract objects don't exist independent of observation.
What is the philosophical motivation for construing this view of abstract objects as a realist one?
| Theoretical Philosophy » Question on causes containing effects formally vs virtually » 11/03/2017 1:53 pm |
- Jimbo28
- Replies: 8
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I don't understand why you say the rock has kinetic energy virtually. If it is falling towards the water, why doesn't it have kinetic energy formally?
| Theoretical Philosophy » Question on causes containing effects formally vs virtually » 11/03/2017 2:03 am |
- Jimbo28
- Replies: 8
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Jason wrote:
No the rock does not contain the effect of waves either formally, virtual or eminently
This simply cannot be correct. The principle of proportionate causality necessitates that the effect is in the cause in one of these three senses.
| Theoretical Philosophy » Question on causes containing effects formally vs virtually » 11/02/2017 5:04 pm |
- Jimbo28
- Replies: 8
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Jason, I'm confused because in your first comment you said the waves are not contained in the rock formally, nor virtually, and in your last comment you said nor are the waves contained in the rock eminently. But these three categories are exhaustive. Wouldn't you agree that the rock necessarily contains the waves in at least one of these three senses?
Jason wrote:When you pick up the rock and throw it you actualize the kinetic energy in the rock and from the moment the rock touches the surface of the water till the time it comes to a full stop it passes that kinetic energy to the water by actualizing the kinetic energy in water (this is where the principle of proportionate causality is maintained)
From this, you seem to say that the rock contains the waves formally. Would you agree with that?
| Theoretical Philosophy » Question on causes containing effects formally vs virtually » 11/02/2017 1:20 pm |
- Jimbo28
- Replies: 8
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Neither? So does the rock contain the effect eminently? My understanding of the principle of proportionate causality is that for any instance of a cause producing an effect, the cause necessarily contains the effect either formally, virtually, or eminently.
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