In many writings, Pruss has defended an argument for PSR from his Aristotelian-inspired causal powers view of modality. The way I understand it, I don't think the argument works, but that may be because I'm not really grasping it correctly, so it would be nice if someone could clear it up a little.

That view of modality, as I get it, is basically that every "purely possible" state of affairs can ultimately be caused by something (in other words, X is possible if there is something that can initiate a chain of causes leading to X holding).

The argument for PSR is as follows: say p is a false contingent proposition, and (given ~PSR) it is possible that p holds without an explanation. Then let p* be the proposition that p holds without a causal explanation. By the assumed account of modality, if p* is possible then there is something that can initiate a chain of causes leading to p* holding, but that is absurd since that chain of causes would causally explain both why p holds and that it holds without a causal explanation.

Now, the problem I have is it seems like p* is being reified/thingified in some illegitimate way here. Say p is a contigent thing (a chicken, for instance) and p* reports the brute existence of that chicken. It's not p* that needs a possible cause, but rather p. P* simply is p holding without a cause. A contigent chicken is possible because there is something that can initiate a causal chain leading to the existence of that chicken; p* is simply reporting the fact that the chicken does not actually have a cause. P* holds if p holds without an actual cause, that's all. It makes sense to think the chicken can have a cause, but why think "the chicken's existing without a cause" is something that can also be caused?

I guess this would be a criticism of that specific view of alethic modality. It makes sense to say positive states of affairs can be caused (the existence of a chicken can be caused; events such as the chicken eating corn can be caused

To me ethics wouldn't make much sense if it weren't grounded in the essences of things; it's because man is the type of creature he is that he has so many rights relating to his (even potential) reason, needs and capacities. So I'm inclined to think some NL does capture what is ultimately important and meaningful in morality. However, as I said, I am also sympathetic to the idea that we feel something transcendent in morality. I try to do justice to it by differentiating between the grounding of morality - which may be found in rather prosaic facts, such as a creature being conscious, rational, having certain needs, etc - and our experience of morality - the way we sometimes come in contact with basic moral norms, which can be similar to powerful aesthetic and even religious experiences. And this experience is often a big motivator for following natural law (answering some kind of sartrean "why be moral?" questions)

Perhaps this approach would be close to the arguments stated in 2, from value properties to a transcendent source of all value. The way some basic facts (such as "murder is wrong") which get their explanation/grounding from natural law are nonetheless embued with a special "value", or presented to us in transcendent experiences, or as commands from what could be described as a "voice of conscience" or "voice of God" which stands in absolute authority over us.

I am not entirely sure where I stand w.r.t. moral arguments in natural theology. I tend to ground morality in natural law. So for me morality doesn't directly depend on God, but on the natures and ends of natural substances, in particular of rational beings. That being said, sometimes I can't help but feel like there's something transcendent in moral norms.

(I do think morality provides some evidence in favor of theism against (say) naturalism, because we can reasonably expect contingent reality to include moral agents under theism. But here I'm talking about the standard argument from objective norms and duties to God, not this kind of teleological consideration)

I am not entirely sure what to make of this experience of the transcendent in morality. I'd like to hear people's thoughts on moral and axiological arguments for God.

I think my current view, which I'm still developing, is that although the objectivity of morality is grounded in natures, independently from God, the *experience* we often have of good/evil is indicative of transcendence and divinity. Think something like Newman's argument from the voice of conscience.

"In "Religion After Naturalism," Eric Steinhart thinks that philosophy of religion has gotten stuck because its conception of religion sets it against naturalism. As more and more people come to realize that naturalism is true, philosophy of religion is in danger of fading away much like theorizing about outdated scienc"

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mnels123 wrote:

Really, so you think the rationalist proof is stronger than the Aristotelian proof? What, would you say, are the advantages of that argument?

 
I like the Aristotelian proof. I think it's sound. But yes, I do prefer the rationalist one.

The main advantage is precisely that it sidesteps distinctions between essentially ordered x accidentally ordered series of causes, as well as any debates about infinite series. It doesn't have to rule out an infinite regress of causes; all it has to do is point out that an infinite regress doesn't explain why there are these contingent beings. We can still ask why there is something rather than nothing, and that fundamental question would persist whether or not there is an infinite chain - if all reality were entirely contingent, there would be no explanation for its existence.

If there is an infinite chain of contingent causes (whether essentially or accidentally ordered, doesn't matter), we can still ask "why do these contingent causes exist, rather than other causes, or none at all?". The totality of contingent causes is just as contingent as any contingent thing. It could've failed to exist. Or there could've been a different totality, with different contingent things.

It's a big advantage.

Another potential advantage (this one is somewhat small, though) is that some people may find it easier to understand the contingent/necessary distinction than the potency/act one.

The "disadvantage" is that it requires a somewhat stronger principle than the aristotelian proof - PSR as the strongest, but at least an explanatory principle that seeks explanations for facts about the existence of contingent things (including pluralities). But most arguments given for the weaker principle of causality can also be given for a stronger explanatory principle, and in any case I think that most people who accept PC will likely accept the explanatory principle. So to me the advantages far outweigh the disadvantage.