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Practical Philosophy » Hart's review of Feser's death penalty book » 11/28/2017 12:05 pm

"The delightful riddle here is how Catholics are willing to take as their starting point that they don't know what the Bible is and what it says, while at the same time laying claim to both true and universal Christianity. This never worked and will not work now either. If you start with that you don't know what the Bible is, then this discussion has ended. Otherwise, read Hart's review and the Bible verses there."

By now I strongly suspect that distinguishing things is not an operation you indulge in frequently, but I beseech you to try it. But here's what I've meant: I can -know- 'what' the Bible is in many different ways, some more immediate than others. I can know the Bible as a group of documents, some of which presented as primarily accounts of historical events. I can know what the word "Bible" means within the context of archaeology, textual history, patristic studies etc. But without the Church, the existence of which as a sacerdotally hierarchical society vested with true doctrinal and moral authority by God and claiming to be the true Israel I affirm due to my conviction of evidentiary value of at least some books of the Bible, I do not know what the Bible is in the sense of a divinely inspired and infallible set of books with proportional theological authority. This concerns both the set, with the list of books legitimated in some other way nowhere to be found, and individual books.

Of course, should you deign to alleviate my ignorance, you can contribute to the enlightenment of all the poor members of the Catholic sect worldwide by pointing out the manifest signs of biblicalness in the latter sense in, say, the Epistle to Philemon (or any other book, really). 

Practical Philosophy » Hart's review of Feser's death penalty book » 11/28/2017 11:32 am

"Correct, I completely reject that distinction. And I give a very strong hint to what I accept: You must argue your theological points from scripture."
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Then let me return your kind favour and give a very strong hint about my assessment of your argument here: begging the question is a crime against thought.
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"In terms of natural law, I think pretty much everything can be granted to Feser. The issue is whether natural law philosophy is something Christians can/should go by or are they held to a different standard, specifically Christian standard as derivable from scripture (and determinable by theological reasoning rather than metaphysical or logico-philosophical). In my view, Hart's emphasis is on that issue."
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Unless you're willing to present a convincing case arguing for the possibility of a Christian assent of faith by something other than a human being (or perhaps refer us to one) - the possibility of that occurring, I confess, is not something I'd put my money on - I fail to see how one can exclude natural law entirely. An argument can be made that the exclusion called for by Christian revelation is only partial and concerns only killing (or perhaps violence generally), but I can see how something like this can cause grave scandal and make one doubt the origin of this revelation in Divinity, given that the application of these principles plausibly entails societal suicide, something the Creator, Who instituted human beings as social and political, would presumably not desire, especially given that in previous (supposed revelation, for the sake of argument) He prescribed killing, ordained capital punishment and commanded wars. 
But then, there's very little reason to believe this describes Christian revelation with any accuracy. I hope to provide reasons for this assessment soon enough, when and if I address Hart's review in detail (this is contingent on the contents of Dr. Feser's reply).

Concerning Dr. Hart's emphasis and his general position,

Practical Philosophy » Hart's review of Feser's death penalty book » 11/28/2017 9:42 am

And, should anyone want to accuse me of apologising for popes, as Catholics are apparently so prone to do, at least in this matter, I'd like to make it clear that I do believe in a fairly robust version of -indirect- papal power over secular powers and few events in the sublunar world would bring as much joy to me, all things being equal, as the errection of a planet-wide Catholic empire somewhat akin to the HRE that would solemnly subordinate itself to this indirect power and establish Catholicism as its state religion. I do not, to my great sadness, know how anything mentioned above can realistically come about and entertain no such hope, but this is the ideal, and few Catholics or Orthodox, (Anglicans et al.?) should find this ideal to be odd or scandalous.

Nor do I think that faith and religion are virtues that cannot be sinned against with detriment to the common good, so I, in the (at least relatively) good company of most cultures in the world, believe that they these transgressions can be real crimes, and hence intrinsically they admit the possibility of punishment, including capital punishment. According to some (perhaps not quite in line with their own tradition?), this thought excludes the possibility of being "a civilised Christian". Ah well.

Introductions » Zdravstvuytye! » 11/28/2017 8:55 am

Thank you!

For what it's worth..
Speaking of books, my recommendation of Oderberg does not extend further than you personal library of his works, but that I've found "Real Essentialism" really informative, if perhaps not quickly processed by me. 
I recommend both "Moral Theory" and "Applied Ethics", but I'd suggest that they really should be read with Dr. Feser's natural law chapters in mind or perhaps lying right next to them (as metaethical questions not specifically addressed can arise from time to time, at least they have in my case). His website is truly worth checking out because of the articles posted there from time to time.
 

Practical Philosophy » Hart's review of Feser's death penalty book » 11/28/2017 8:31 am

"I have no idea what this means, but it sounds like special pleading for Catholicism."

What this means is that I'm not really interested in this debate unless you can somehow justify your selection of points relevant for this discussion. For example, you seem to basically dismiss tradtional Catholic (and also Eastern Orthodox, to some degree) distinctions between magisterial and non-magisterial pronouncements as unimportant, without any argument or even a hint at one. I suppose what at least prima facie seems to be an imputation of 'spinning the history" of the Church, particularly in the last few centuries, is also something that, I think, will fail to inspire the interest of pretty much anybody not in substantial agreement with you and/or possessed of an extraordinary interest in your (unargued) opinions.
What -would be- interesting is, among other things, to see the important point in history (after which ecclesial writers stop being considered relevant witnesses) identified, and, for that matter, the detailed reasoning that would allow one to impute any theological (as distinct from historical) authority to the collection of writings known as the Christian Bible, particularly in connection with the above-mentioned item of interest, especially the property this collection of books apparently has in your understanding, namely, the one ordaining the necessity for any contender for Christian authenticity to be able to positively reconstruct all the aspects of its doctrine and practice from it that you consider to be important (this also being a delightful riddle). In other words, it would be positively grand to see the standard, that I supposedly fail to apply, properly defined and defended.

What makes the above-mentioned points especially interesting is my distinct impression of bearing witness to an entire brood of principia being begged. But I will try to carry on presuming good faith, and in this spirit  ask precisely why you think that citing a document of u

Theoretical Philosophy » Theoretically, could the prime mover have unactualized potentials? » 11/28/2017 7:29 am

Perhaps you can argue that, but I wonder how you would go about something like that.

I really think that at this point in our discussion I have to ask what you mean by "metaphysical part". The reason is this: what I believe Dr. Feser to be referring to as "part" in his latest book is something belonging to a substance and being essentially relevant for "actualising" (activity), as the final cause is the cause of all causes, and all others are there for the sake of teleological activity. 

For example, my heart is one, and so is my soul, in a different order. The crucial thing about these parts is that their being is caused by the substance: were my heart to be surgically removed, it would cease to be my part. After my death, my soul will no longer be actually informing my body; I am - as a substance - rid of actuality, even if not all of it, and my soul is bereft of actually informing my body. The actuality of these parts is in some way dependent on them being parts of the whole, and hence it is said that parts are in potency to the whole. 

So suppose a candidate for primemovery is moved. Clearly, if it is moved by another, then the regress proceeds. If it is moved by itself, then the only intelligible way that can happen is by having one part move the other. This moving part, if it is not moved itself, is pure act. But if it is, and parts are in potency to the whole, and it is actually a part, then it has to be moved in order to be an actual part of the whole. 
But, then again, if we apply the name of "part" to something that derives no new determination in being joined to the whole, what reason do we have for calling it a part? It is rather a substance with no potentiality. And if you have to further ask if it is possible for there to be some potentiality, to accommodate this, I think, you'll have to posit parts again. But, as I have, I hope, shown, we can't posit any in the real prime mover.

I suspect

Practical Philosophy » Hart's review of Feser's death penalty book » 11/28/2017 5:45 am

You can, naturally, cite the current situation as evidence of a flip-flop. But this change of strategy, adopted at Vatican II and involving, among other things, the revocation of secular-arm rights and duties from existing states, abandonment of serious attempts to legally establish Catholicism (to disasterous effect, in my opinion), was explicitly just that, in light of what the people behind it had considered to be a peculiar historical situation. It is also, needless to say, recent, and done in the context of existing and public accessible teaching.

In sum, the Church has never, either as "formal" magisterium or as a practical moral imperative, as far as I know, taught that "the pope can appoint emperors" is a binding statement under natural or revealed law, rather,  it was believed due to other reasons. As to feet kissing carried out by princes, well, I don't know, perhaps they should. I don't see anything wrong per se with the idea of kissing pontifical feet as a secular ruler: it seems to me to be a fitting if antiquated way of showing reverence to Christ, Whom the faithful - as rulers should in last analysis be - expect to be seen in their pastors.

Practical Philosophy » Hart's review of Feser's death penalty book » 11/28/2017 5:26 am

The link that I recommended contains, in particular, what I consider to be a very good discussion of contemporary and historic Catholic (sometimes held at least by some Catholics) view(s) on the relationship between Church and State, having as its basis the teaching of Pope St. Gelasius I (r. AD 492-486) expressed in his famous letter to Emperor Anastasius. Whether you'll see white-washing where I see careful consideration, is, of course, not entirely up to me or the author. 

Practical Philosophy » Hart's review of Feser's death penalty book » 11/28/2017 5:14 am

[color=#000000]Let us.

Nota bene, though: unless you somehow prove your possession of a special grace of soul-reading or something equivalent, I submit that anything that presupposes judging internal dispositions of the popes whose behaviour you claim to be talking about is at least as uninteresting as Catholic appeals to the abscence of some propositions in magisterial texts or insufficient grounding within them. 

I propose to distinguish between popes qua vicars of Christ (visible heads of the Church) and popes qua secular rulers/bodies prescribed by particular constitutions. The papacy has never claimed political authority over what would become the Papal States on the basis of the first mentioned privilege: historically papal rule arose out of necessity caused by the decline of Byzantine authority in Italy (Ravenna's reach gradually diminished to the point of incapacity of enforcing imperial peace). This was confirmed in the Donation of Pepin and some employed the (forged, most probably by clerics in Gaul/Francia) Donation of Constantine, and in these documents direct political power of the papacy is presented as derivative: it's communicated to the popes by secular authorities (King Pepin III of the Franks and ever-august Constantine respectively) and viewed as competent to do that. 

Even popes like St. Gregory VII of Canossa fame didn't claim immediate supreme political power within Christendom in virtue of their Petrine charism. The Roman argument against lay investiture had never been that the Pope is a secular authority above the emperor. Investiture of clerics and monastics, whose ecclesiatical position had the status of imperial princes attached to it, wasn't claimed on the basis that the Pope and ecclesial hierarchy generally were superior princes anyway, but rather due to the relative eminence of ecclesial responsibilities compared to imperial ones.

The situation with further papal involvement

Chit-Chat » Stubborn feminist and abortion » 11/28/2017 2:51 am

Apart from suggesting that you should probably evaluate whether the argument with that person is at all worth it (as someone who debated the topic fairly often on social media I can testify that this is something to consider), I suggest employing examples that would probably cause her to reflect on the nature of her commitment to the principle. David Oderberg's modest proposal about legalising contract killings as an answer to the backstreet abortions argument, for example, does a fairly good job, in my experience.

I suppose an absolute commitment to bodily autonomy in cases such as that of pregnancy makes sense given our contemporary cultural emphasis on desire as the most important thing in all things sexual. What I think is important to highlight is that duties don't actually have to arise out of voluntary contracts, and I think this truth is largely still retained (even?) in contemporary West.

Suppose, for example, you're ice skating in a park. Then, all of a sudden, a little girl next to you falls through the ice (which for some reason turned out to be thin or melted) and grabs your leg so as to hold on to something. Now, the little girl is indeed little, and you are not in any immediate danger of being dragged into the pond and subsequently drowning. The poor thing did, however, it would seem, violate your bodily autonomy: she hadn't been given explicit permission to grab any part of your body prior to that. Suppose also that park rules don't explicitly state that skaters are bound to help each other in periculo mortis. The situation clearly calls for action to resolve it. However, pulling the child out of the hole, apart from saving it, means sweating, exposing oneself to ice, snow and cold water, which probably means you'd have to go home to change your clothes. Then there's the risk of catching a cold and missing a cinema reservation later this evening. So not only does the child infringe upon your bodily integrity, it would probably claim the ent

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