John West wrote:

It doesn't take away the legitimacy of self-evidence. Pruss also writes a bunch on this very topic in his book on PSR

The notion of self-evidence you're using stinks of dogmatism. I think there is an acceptable notion of self-evidence, but for reasons already indicated I don't think it's this (the traditional) one.

We (at least I do) take LEM to be self-evident even though there are some brilliant mathematicians who reject it. Should this fact take away LEM's self-evidence for those who find it self-evident? I don't think so.

Mathematics is a dogmatic discipline. It starts by sweeping aside all the skeptical problems of philosophers, so that it can focus on mathematical problems. But a traditional problem for mathematical axioms is that they're bare assertions and, so, by definition, no stronger than any other bare assertion.

(I actually do consider the law of the excluded middle to be apodictic in the acceptable sense I mentioned. I, however, can't see how to ground the PSR the same way.)

 
It doesn't matter that mathematics starts by sweeping aside skeptical problems; the point of the analogy is that we can believe certain principles on the basis of self-evidence, and the fact that a lot of very smart people might doubt those same principles are not a reason to reject or suspend judgment about them. We are well in our epistemic rights to take LEM to be self-evident, but many brilliant intuitionist mathematicians reject LEM. Should you abandon your belief in LEM as apodictic and self-evident? No.
Like Leibniz, I consider PSR as self-evident as well. In understanding it, I cannot reject it. It is true. The fact that it might "stink" of dogmatism to you doesn't make it any less obvious to me that there can be no contingent things existing with no explanation whatsoever, and no contingent facts holding with no explanation and for no reason whatsoever.

John West wrote:

I realize the bad conotations of the word "magic", but I think it's appropriate.

Let's put aside the hyperbolic “magic” and just talk about what we're talking about: brute facts. If I suspend judgment over the metaphysical significance of the PSR, I thereby suspend judgment over the existence of brute facts. (It's not some additional act. It's the same and justified the same as the previous.) The PSR just is the claim that there are no brute facts over some domain.

If you think a contingent thing can really exist with no explanation whatsoever, well, that's you. I know I can't bring myself to reject PSR as a metaphysical principle, or suspend judgment.

Me and a lot of the most brilliant philosophers through time and space (which, of course, points to a traditional problem with making metaphysical judgments on the back of truths about one's self).

 
Yes, and a lot of the most brilliant philosophers through time and space thought it *self-evident* that no contingent thing can exist without any explanation. Aquinas, Leibniz, Clarke, Spinoza and more are not bad company to be with. They'd take it as absurd that anyone could even suspend judgment about this issue.

It doesn't take away the legitimacy of self-evidence. Pruss also writes a bunch on this very topic in his book on PSR.

We (at least I do) take LEM to be self-evident even though there are some brilliant mathematicians who reject it. Should this fact take away LEM's self-evidence for those who find it self-evident? I don't think so.

John West wrote:

Miguel wrote:

It's not the "circular" proof that is probative; the argument would stand on its own. It's an inference to the best explanation. What is assumed is that IBE is a legitimate form of argument. If, however, it turns out that IBE depends on PSR - and I think it does - then it would be circular.

Inferences to the best explanation aren't probative by definition. I'm, however, talking about any argument that is circular, whether it's a proof or not, if the PSR has the status we're supposing it does for the sake of conversation.

And I don't mean to insult with the word "magic", just convey how it seems to me in the context of PSR's self-evidence. After all, magic is basically a rejection of PSR and PPC; that a small wooden wand can somehow produce huge thunders and fireballs, a surplus effect coming from nowhere, etc.

What you're doing, whether you realize it or not, is relying on caricatures and hyperbole to make your case seem more plausible than it is. Is it really so implausible that, in our universe, there might be freak happenings? (If we have to take the PSR as a transcendental presupposition, that more or less explains why we don't experience any.) I don't think it is.

 
I realize the bad conotations of the word "magic", but I think it's appropriate. If it seems bad to accept something like "I suspend judgment about magic", I think that's suggestive of a tacit acceptance of PSR (or at least an inclination in its favor). Calling them "freak happenings" instead of magic doesn't make them any less bad; a contingent thing cannot exist without a sufficient reason, and an effect cannot be greater than its cause. I do find it completely absurd, and if I didn't, I'd have no serious objection to magic. And I'm talking metaphysics. If you think a contingent thing can really exist with no explanation whatsoever, well, that's you. I know I can't bring myself to reject PSR as a metaphysical principle, or susp

And I don't mean to insult with the word "magic", just convey how it seems to me in the context of PSR's self-evidence. After all, magic is basically a rejection of PSR and PPC; that a small wooden wand can somehow produce huge thunders and fireballs, a surplus effect coming from nowhere, etc. That a voodoo doll somehow links with another person, and its being pinched will result in the person being pinched, etc. The more cannot proceed from the lesser; ex nihilo nihil fit; no contingent fact can obtain without a sufficient reason; these are all related to each other.

I am reminded, Feser wrote a piece on this subject years ago: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/10/magic-versus-metaphysics.html

John West wrote:

Miguel wrote:

This is not a problem; on the contrary, it would only show how fundamental PSR is.

It's a problem if you want to prove that the PSR has a metaphysical significance. You can't prove a principle with a proof that presupposes it.

So? If you *really* find the accidental property objection to be stronger than PSR, then you can have a reason to reject PSR and accept magic.

But this is a straw man. The person who suspends judgment over the metaphysical significance of the PSR and accepts that it has a transcendental significance doesn't thereby “accept magic”.

(I do actually find the accidental property objection convincing. Every premise but one follows from the definition of classical theism, and the intrinsic theory of belief (or some equivalent) premise is as well grounded as anything.)

 
As I said, if we cannot argue for PSR (as a necessary metaphysical principle) as the best explanation for our experience because we'd be assuming PSR (as a necessary metaphysical principle) then that is only more reason to accept PSR. The argument is already about PSR as a necessary metaphysical principle and not merely as a transcendental presupposition; one would compare the two proposals and see how they fare with respect to simplicity, explanatory power, etc.

The person who suspends judgment over the metaphysical significance of the PSR is epistemically open to magic in a sense those who accept PSR aren't. Of course, the person is free to suspend judgment about magic. All I'm saying is it's legitimate to consider indirect arguments; but I think voodoo magic is less plausible than the accidental properties objection