(To be fair, the discussion is kind of rigged in the skeptic's favour. I only need to argue that the dispute over the PSR's metaphysical significance is undecided (in the sense from a couple days ago) to argue that we should therefore suspend judgment and refuse to take sides in it. You have produce an argument that determines the dispute one way or the other. It's an interesting question whether an argument that isn't probative, and so leaves open the possibility of being overturned at some point in the future, can actually do that.)

John West wrote:

Miguel wrote:

It's not the "circular" proof that is probative; the argument would stand on its own. It's an inference to the best explanation. What is assumed is that IBE is a legitimate form of argument. If, however, it turns out that IBE depends on PSR - and I think it does - then it would be circular.

Inferences to the best explanation aren't probative by definition. I'm, however, talking about any argument that is circular, whether it's a proof or not, if the PSR has the status we're supposing it does for the sake of conversation.

And I don't mean to insult with the word "magic", just convey how it seems to me in the context of PSR's self-evidence. After all, magic is basically a rejection of PSR and PPC; that a small wooden wand can somehow produce huge thunders and fireballs, a surplus effect coming from nowhere, etc.

What you're doing, whether you realize it or not, is relying on caricatures and hyperbole to make your case seem more plausible than it is. Is it really so implausible that, in our universe, there might be freak happenings? (If we have to take the PSR as a transcendental presupposition, that more or less explains why we don't experience any.) I don't think it is.

 
I realize the bad conotations of the word "magic", but I think it's appropriate. If it seems bad to accept something like "I suspend judgment about magic", I think that's suggestive of a tacit acceptance of PSR (or at least an inclination in its favor). Calling them "freak happenings" instead of magic doesn't make them any less bad; a contingent thing cannot exist without a sufficient reason, and an effect cannot be greater than its cause. I do find it completely absurd, and if I didn't, I'd have no serious objection to magic. And I'm talking metaphysics. If you think a contingent thing can really exist with no explanation whatsoever, well, that's you. I know I can't bring myself to reject PSR as a metaphysical principle, or suspend judgment.

"Any argument that is circular" like what? Perhaps I'm not understanding you. As I said, I take most arguments for PSR to be formulated like a dilemma. IBE is a great example. Is IBE justifiable without presupposing PSR as a metaphysical principle? If not, we should accept PSR, by modus tollens (or abandon IBE, but I take it that most people wouldn't want to do that); If it is, then we can make non-circular arguments for PSR from IBE. Then we'd have to see how PSR as "transcendental presupposition" fares against PSR as a metaphysical principle when it comes to explaining why contingent things don't just snap out of existence; why they don't pop into existence for no reason; why contingent things don't undergo unexplained changes, etc.

Last edited by Miguel (7/02/2018 3:40 pm)

I don't think so-called coincidences pose problems for strong PSR and I take strong PSR to be self-evident, but I think it's also important to keep in mind a difference between full blown PSR and a principle that requires explanations for the existence of contingent things.

Sure, and I've replied with a PSR restricted to existence in mind until the post I linked the coincidence thread in. (I confess that after rejecting the two stronger versions of the PSR, I'm starting to wonder whether there isn't something even weaker, that doesn't lead to the conclusions you would like, that I should be looking for, though.)

If someone thinks the accidental properties objection really is unimpeachable, perhaps they can doubt the classical theism inference rather than suspend judgment about magic.

But I also find the existential proof and some of the other classical arguments persuasive. (I don't come at the existential proof from the perspective of someone doing natural theology. I come at it from the perspective of someone investigating the problem of Being.) So, I suspend judgment over theism as well.

I realize the bad conotations of the word "magic", but I think it's appropriate.

Let's put aside the hyperbolic “magic” and just talk about what we're talking about: brute facts. If I suspend judgment over the metaphysical significance of the PSR, I thereby suspend judgment over the existence of brute facts. (It's not some additional act. It's the same and justified the same as the previous.) The PSR just is the claim that there are no brute facts over some domain.

If you think a contingent thing can really exist with no explanation whatsoever, well, that's you. I know I can't bring myself to reject PSR as a metaphysical principle, or suspend judgment.

Me and a lot of the most brilliant philosophers through time and space (which, of course, points to a traditional problem with making metaphysical judgments on the back of truths about one's self).

Miguel wrote:

"Any argument that is circular" like what? Perhaps I'm not understanding you. As I said, I take most arguments for PSR to be formulated like a dilemma. IBE is a great example. Is IBE justifiable without presupposing PSR as a metaphysical principle?

You might have lost the thread of the conversation. You wrote:

I think technically one might be able to construct arguments without assuming PSR, at least on the surface, but I'm not entirely sure if there's no assumption of PSR behind everything (for instance, it could be that appeals to principle of indifference, so common in many arguments, actually presuppose PSR).

I started my circularity argument: “Suppose it's true”, and meant “Suppose it's true that there is an assumption of PSR behind everything".