A brief comment on the skepticism issue that keeps coming up. I'm not sure we need anything as fancy as transubstantiation to raise it. Consider causes and effects. If it's possible for God to interfere with (ie. stop from happening) causes' effects, then we have no way of knowing whether any given cause will bring about its effect. This includes effects like feeling when we touch objects, hearing because of sound, and seeing when light strikes our eyes. By the same reasoning, it would also entail radical skepticism about our sensory perception of the world around us. In contrast, if it's not possible for God to interfere with causes' effects, then we essentially lock Him out of the created order.  

Even on concurrentism, surely God can stop effects from happening by not concurring with them happening.  

My own view is that Christians have good ethics-based (and probably theological) reasons to hold that God wouldn't just bugger around with us. But if the above dilemma holds, it's no longer just a problem for members of the old churches.

Hi Mark,

Could I get you to rephrase any remaining questions you have (if there are any)?

Etzelnik,

A Rambam resources thread seems fine. Since only Jeremy can sticky posts in this forum, however, it will have to wait for Jeremy before becoming a sticky.

I'm sure others will have more to add:

Feser, Edward. Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide.
Stump, Eleonore. Aquinas.

I thought it would be good to have these resources listed here as well as in the other thread:

Alexander wrote:

Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange.

A great deal of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange's works are available on the internet (legitimately), so I thought I'd share a few links here. As a (relatively) recent commentator on Aquinas he's probably unmatched. I hope someone finds them useful.
Reality: A Thomistic Synthesis
The Trinity and God the Creator: A Commentary on St. Thomas' Theological Summa, Ia, q. 27-119
Christ the Saviour: A Commentary on the Third Part of St. Thomas' Theological Summa
Grace: Commentary on the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 109-114
Providence
Life Everlasting

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

Well, they'd have to properly analysis what the Platonist means by the exhaustive or inexhaustive nature of any particular religious tradition (ie., the inability of a corporeal form to entirely capture what is supraformal). They could then either, one, try to dispute the notion of exhaustiveness being used; or, two, try to show how the Christian tradition can meet this standard of exhaustiveness. I'd be sceptical of option two (well, obviously I 'm also sceptial of option one - but I think a better case can be made for it than two), given the fact the Christian tradition is obviously limited to a particular imaginal, doctrinal, ritual, and symbolic framework.

Okay. But before I can provide a proper analysis of exhaustiveness as you mean it, I'm going to need you to expose your flank a bit here and define it as you mean it for me. I'm also going to need some reason why the Catholic ought to accept that this is something he need do that doesn't implicitly presume the correctness of your Platonic metaphysic over the scholastic metaphysic (well, close enough).

For instance, does any of this rely on the Platonic Non-Dualism that you said is "essentially panentheist"? Since from what you've written in the past I think this Non-Dualism both runs into modal problems and falls foul of the First Way, I would heavily dispute that part of the Platonic metaphysic. In other words, if what you're writing is "If the Platonic (yours) metaphysic is correct, then A, B, and C.", then the Platonic metaphysic is precisely what we should be discussing. Though, at that point, it may be worth starting a new thread.