Jeremy Taylor wrote:

On the first question - that about the non-exhaustive nature of any formal manifestation - the Catholic would have to explain a little more, though. He'd have to explain how the particular imaginal, doctrinal, saramental, and ritual matrix of Christianity, or Catholicism, are truly universal in the sense they can exhaustively be a truly be exhaustive, or at least throw doubt on the Platonic perspective on the matter.

Well, if Catholicism is correct, not only is it—almost from the meaning of that statement—exhaustive of the entire spiritual truth, the "extra exhaustiveness" of Platonism is actually misleading people.

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

The position you lay out seem to imply the Aristotelian position of a man who can be more or less naturally perfected through corporeal or earthly means alone, whose spiritual destiny is supernaturally distinct, as well as a position that downplays the role of higher levels of being and things like symbolism and the imaginal and sacramental.

Sorry. Could you unpack this? I didn't mean to suggest (and don't think) that man can be perfected through corporeal means alone. I have an idea why you think I meant to convey that, but it would be helpful to know precisely what you're saying before I reply.

Hi Jeremy,

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

1. Is that a genuine religious tradition is a revelation of God, ultimately. It is a distillation of his truth and a guide to him. It is highly questionable whether, to the Platonist, a single corporeal form (an en-formed corporeal entity) can universally express such truth. That is, can one religious tradition, with its rituals and sacraments, imaginal world, doctrines, authorities, and so on, truly express this truth exhaustively for all men and all times and cultures[?] Prima Facie it is hard to see how it could.

2. Is basically just an a posteriori version of number one: the great religions of the world seem to express a lot of spiritual truths (to the Platonist at least), so how do we conclude one is the true one.

3. Is, again, closely related to the above two, and is basically the question about the limited spatial and temporal reach of Christ's message. Would the divine not provide for all men and cultures? (this latter point is in many ways just another way of expressing, or any extension of number one).

The Catholic answer to your first question is, of course, “Yes.” Catholic means universal. Since the Catholic claim is that Christianity ("Catholicism") does express the whole truth exhaustively, it begs the question to assume it cannot express the whole truth (at least, without further reason why).

Your second question is interesting and at the core of the whole thread. It doesn't, however, follow from not knowing how else to conclude that one religion is true that more than one religion is therefore true. 

As to your concerns about spatial and temporal reach, the Church teaches that the invincibly ignorant don't go to Hell[1]. 

Given the doctrine of invincible ignorance is correct, 3 can be reduced to two main questions. The first question is “Why would God deprive the invincibly ignorant of the good of knowing Him?” My response is that God doesn't deprive them the good of know

Alexander wrote:

Obviously, the historical evidence alone is not sufficient to show that Christianity is correct. I do in fact believe that Christ is the only way to salvation, but I do not think that this entails Christianity is the only way to salvation, and in any case the historical evidence wouldn't even touch either of those claims.

Okay. That's fair enough. It can be rephrased more explicitly as a trilemma. Either the historical evidence is sufficient for (to entail that we ought to hold) the metaphysical commitments of only one religion, more than one religion, or less than one religion[1]. I hold the metaphysical commitments of one religion but, as you write, I don't think the historical evidence is sufficient to entail that we ought to have those metaphysical commitments.

As for the view that people of other religions will or at least can be saved, if you're saying what I think you're saying I think I agree (ie. the doctrine of invincible ignorance demands it). I'm hoping to go into this in more detail after I get a chance to reply (more directly) to Jeremy's three points. 

[1]All given theism, of course.

Alexander wrote:

A related note: A really detailed treatment of a philosophical approach to revelation is Menssen and Sullivan's "The Agnostic Inquirer". I don't agree with everything in it, but it goes into the much neglected topic of why we might accept revelation on grounds other than historical inquiry.

Much neglected. Thanks for the recommendation. I'll check it out. At the very least, I hope there are other means of demonstrating the truth of Christianity and would like to think there are.

iwpoe wrote:

John, I hope this doesn't go too far afield, but is it even right to say that confirmation of just the resurrection is sufficient to confirm Christianity *full stop*? Why wouldn't it merely confirm that Christ was himself paranormal in some respect or some other limited aspect of the complex that is the tradition? Wouldn't you need additional considerations to confirm the rest?

Right, and Craig is aware of this issue. He argues that Jesus's own radical claims during His life may give us reason to believe Christian particularism.

Scott wrote:

Of course, and that's part of the point. In fact, it's entirely possible to think the Resurrection was a literal, historical event that nevertheless doesn't support anything like the whole of Christianity -- even the belief that Jesus Himself was in any way "paranormal," let alone the sole Way of salvation (or indeed any such Way).

Right. What's more, even if it did mean that Jesus is God's son, if universalists are right, it could still be that He's not the only way to salvation.

iwpoe wrote:

Am I incorrect to remember Bill saying that he personally grounds his faith in religious experience? I cannot place the memory.

You're absolutely correct. He holds Christianity both as a properly basic belief and also holds that the evidence is sufficient for belief in Christian particularism ("Mere Christianity").