| Theoretical Philosophy » God and Free-Will » 7/07/2015 10:06 pm |
- John West
- Replies: 37
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TomD wrote:I don't see how it begs the question and I do not see any other possible disjunct.
Since the infallible barometer was just a placeholder to illustrate how the possibility of divine foreknowledge without necessitation might look, let's put the analogy aside. The reason I called it question begging is that it's an incomplete disjunction. Let "~" be the "not" operator, "v" be the "or" operator, P be your proposition about luck, and Q be your proposition about God's “fore”knowledge necessitating the occurence of the events He knows. Your argument is P v Q. ~P. ∴, Q.
But from the Law of the Excluded Middle and the inference rule of addition, "If P v Q, then P v Q v ~Q". Hence, given ~P, all that follows is Q v ~Q. But we kinda already knew that. ~Q is what I'm arguing in the first place. So, the reason I called it question begging is that the only way for you to get Q is for you to include (and prove) the premise ~~Q, but that just means all your work is still cut out for you.
| Introductions » Hello » 7/07/2015 6:53 pm |
- John West
- Replies: 3
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Always calm, interesting questions, too. It's good to see you around.
| Theoretical Philosophy » Panentheism » 7/07/2015 6:35 pm |
| Theoretical Philosophy » Panentheism » 7/07/2015 6:01 pm |
- John West
- Replies: 12
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Hi Etzelnik,
Both the First Way and the cosmological argument from metaphysical parts entail that God is absolutely simple. If God is absolutely simple, he has no parts (this premise is logically equivalent to the law of the excluded middle: God either has parts or does not have parts). Hence, if the First Way or cosmological argument from metaphysical parts go through, God has no parts.
But if panentheism holds, the universe--which itself has many parts--is part of God. If the universe is part of God, then God has parts. Hence, if the First Way or the cosmological argument from metaphysical parts go through, the universe is not part of God. Therefore, if the First Way or the cosmological argument from metaphysical parts go through, panentheism does not hold. So, for compelling arguments, I recommend the First Way and cosmological argument from metaphysical parts (which is, in essence, Plotinus's argument).
| Theoretical Philosophy » God and Free-Will » 7/07/2015 4:01 pm |
- John West
- Replies: 37
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TomD wrote:
Okay here is the issue. Assuming a Barometer can be 100% correct, this is either due to luck or due to the fact that certain causes detectable in the present determine the weather.
This just begs the question. It states that the only way perfect predictivity is possible is if determinism is the case[1]. I take it the whole issue here is whether perfect "pre"dictivity entails determinism. It might be okay to claim that it's temporally the case that if God knows q, then necessarily q occurs (well, actually, it's not okay, because God doesn't exist in time in the first place). But there is no reason to hold that this is the logical order (and, as my comment with the formalisms shows, logically we have no problem talking about omniscience without talking about determinism).
Unless what you're trying to ask is whether there is a conflict between free will and divine providence, and human freedom (and it sounds like you are). In that case, I take it Scott's answer is correct and the alleged conflict is based on the notion that every cause necessitates its effect. I take it that a cause brings about its effect, but that there is no obvious reason to assume that it does so with any particular kind of modality[2].
[1]There is a disjunct about luck in there, but I pretty clearly wasn't talking about luck.
[2]And historically, few if any classical theists have assumed this. The view that all causes necessitate their effects only really becomes dominant with Liebniz and Spinoza.
| Theoretical Philosophy » God and Free-Will » 7/07/2015 2:42 pm |
- John West
- Replies: 37
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Etzelnik wrote:
I've seen this point brought up by way of modern modals. It may have been IEP?
I'm not sure what the acronym stands for, but this is definitely a problem that gets chopped up in modal logic terms. I even wrote out a technical half to the comment that I held back (for various reasons, I've been trying to cut back on my use of formalisms in public philosophy).
Edit: Since you mentioned it, here it is: let L be the necessity operator and → be the conditional. In short
(1) q → Lp
is not the same as
(2) L(p → q)
(1) says that if q holds, then necessarily p holds. So, if God knows that I choose to go to the grocery store tomorrow, then I must go to the grocery store tomorrow. In contrast, (2) says that necessarily, if p holds, then q holds. So, necessarily, if I choose to go to the grocery store tomorrow, then God knows that. Divine "fore"knowledge entails (2), but not (1). In other words, exactly what I said with the barometer example (which, for the record, isn't my own, but I can't for the life of me remember where I first heard it).
| Theoretical Philosophy » God and Free-Will » 7/07/2015 2:39 pm |
- John West
- Replies: 37
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Nick wrote:
Just to be clear: the Thomist position is incompatible with libertarian free will, is it not?
Of the radical Jamesian variety, where actions are free only if they are mere twitches, I think so. I understand there are, however, species of libertarian free will that allow for reasoned choices. It's likely compatible with one of those.
| Theoretical Philosophy » God and Free-Will » 7/07/2015 2:14 pm |
- John West
- Replies: 37
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Having skimmed through the posts a couple times now, there may be deeper problems based on the notions of free will being used to sort out first. For people under the huge but largely unrecognized influence of Ockham's voluntarist and nominalist view of man, an action is freely willed if and only if nothing (feelings, desires, natural ends, etc.) precedes Scott's choice; the will must be completely prior to all else. In contrast, for Thomists, an action is free if and only if nothing constrains the nature of the person from realizing his intrinsic teleological ends in making that choice. So, for Thomists, Scott's choice to not order the mushroom steak is free because it is Scott fully realizing his nature and nothing is placing a constraint (ignorance, weakness, external factors, etc.) on that.
The point I take Scott—a Thomist—to be making is, essentially, that denying the mushroom steak is free because it follows from his intrinsic nature, not from the influence of some external factor.
[1] I'm assuming that Scott means for mushroom dislike to be an essential property of Scott.
| Introductions » Hello » 7/07/2015 1:41 pm |
- John West
- Replies: 5
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semioticsymphony wrote:
Feel free to visit my mischief on...oh well, Daniel, can't seem to leave a link to my blog this time around either
Yeah. The forum doesn't let accounts (not even moderators' accounts) post links until that account has published at least two other posts. It's to block spam. But now that you've posted twice, next time you will be able to link to your blog.
Oh, and welcome.
| Theoretical Philosophy » God and Free-Will » 7/07/2015 11:38 am |
- John West
- Replies: 37
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Scott wrote:
I have a feeling John West might like to weigh in here when time permits.
As it happens, me too.
TomD wrote:How does God know our free-choices?
I'll have to look at the rest later, because I think it's going to involve a longer reply.
For now, we ought to make sure we're drawing a distinction between predictivity (or foreknowledge) and necessitation (or determining). Consider an infallible barometer. The barometer perfectly predicts the weather. It never makes a mistake. But clearly the barometer doesn't determine the weather. It's just that if the weather were different, the barometer reading would have been different. So, insofar as divine knowledge of free choices is concerned, you're free to do anything you want. You're just not free to fool the barometer.
Incidentally, the distinction between predictivity and necessitation is so important as to be common coin in the free will debate, even among deterministic naturalists.