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6/08/2018 5:34 am  #21

Re: Disembodied soul in Aquinas: a substance?

ficino wrote:

@ Greg and Miguel, thank you for the pointers about survivalism vs. corruptionism, and Miguel, thank you for the references. I read Feser's paper; it explains many issues. I shall see whether I can find some of Klima's.

How did you get hold of Feser's new paper?!


6/08/2018 6:16 am  #22

Re: Disembodied soul in Aquinas: a substance?

I accessed it through my library. I am sorry that I am not allowed to post a link. Maybe you can find the Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism somewhere; that's where Feser's paper appears.

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6/08/2018 9:22 am  #23

Re: Disembodied soul in Aquinas: a substance?

You could try emailing Feser. I have gotten his articles that way in the past.

If you're on Facebook, you can get into the Thomism Discussion Group, and someone there might be able to get a hold of it for you.


6/08/2018 2:10 pm  #24

Re: Disembodied soul in Aquinas: a substance?

seigneur wrote:

Greg wrote:

That is not Aristotle's definition of substance, since he thinks the unmoved movers are immaterial substances.

A quote (from Aristotle) would be nice. As far as I have read Aristotle's Metaphysics, his examples of substances are a man and a horse, not unmoved movers.

When Feser discusses the same thing, he says, "That a human being is this unique, indeed very weird sort of substance -- corporeal in some respects and incorporeal in others -- is what makes us different from, on the one hand, non-human animals (which are entirely corporeal) and on the other hand, angels (which are entirely incorporeal)."

Substance very suspiciously looks like composite on the Aristotelian view. Maybe there is a way around it, but it would be a roundabout way.

Seigneur, I just came across this by C.D.C. Reeve in his transl/comm on De Anima, which seems relevant to what you write:

To pan refers not to the totality of things, but to those in the spatio-temporal realm—the universe. That is why Aristotle can claim that everything (= everything that is a part of the universe) has matter and a moving cause (Met. XII 5 1071a33-34)—something that is manifestly false of all substances. For substances such as the primary god “must be without matter” (6 1071b20-21).”

     Thread Starter

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