I accessed it through my library. I am sorry that I am not allowed to post a link. Maybe you can find the Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism somewhere; that's where Feser's paper appears.

seigneur wrote:

Greg wrote:

That is not Aristotle's definition of substance, since he thinks the unmoved movers are immaterial substances.
 

A quote (from Aristotle) would be nice. As far as I have read Aristotle's Metaphysics, his examples of substances are a man and a horse, not unmoved movers.

When Feser discusses the same thing, he says, "That a human being is this unique, indeed very weird sort of substance -- corporeal in some respects and incorporeal in others -- is what makes us different from, on the one hand, non-human animals (which are entirely corporeal) and on the other hand, angels (which are entirely incorporeal)."

Substance very suspiciously looks like composite on the Aristotelian view. Maybe there is a way around it, but it would be a roundabout way.

Seigneur, I just came across this by C.D.C. Reeve in his transl/comm on De Anima, which seems relevant to what you write:

“To pan refers not to the totality of things, but to those in the spatio-temporal realm—the universe. That is why Aristotle can claim that everything (= everything that is a part of the universe) has matter and a moving cause (Met. XII 5 1071a33-34)—something that is manifestly false of all substances. For substances such as the primary god “must be without matter” (6 1071b20-21).”