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4/09/2017 12:43 am  #51


Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..

John West wrote:

Suppose there is a material substance, a, composed of a parcel of secondary matter, m, and the natural kind instance, N. The secondary matter accounts for potency, and the kind-instance act. So you have your act-potency distinction.

Suppose the B-theory. Then you have your act-potency distinction on the B-theory.

(Why would a B-theorist adopt powers? One reason would be to explain alterational change. Another, to take advantage of the powers theory of laws.)

well wait, this doesn't seem right ..there won't be any prime matter in the first place because things don't persist as a whole ..and even if they do they just stand in different relations with different times ..no room for any potency seems to be here..

John West wrote:

 Callum wrote:

Are you a theist John?
I was when we started the forum. Then I was an atheist—think Sydney line metaphysics—for a while. Now I've reached a sort of dialectical stalemate, and I'm exploring other avenues.

ohh nice..well although I consider myself a theist of a sort..but a very minimal and tentative one..I am much attracted towards either some kind of fedeism or what Schellenberg calls Sceptical religion ..though I don't necessarily accept his thesis of ultimism..that just seems to me to be a secular riff on classical theism....

I agree with Van Inwagen that no Philosophical argument for any substantive thesis has ever succeeded ..so I don't let philosophical arguments dictate my beliefs (don't confuse with my ethics of belief) ...this might be an important lesson in this case..

Last edited by Calhoun (4/09/2017 12:46 am)

 

4/09/2017 4:20 am  #52


Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..

Hi Calhoun,

Well this isn't a big problem ..remember under four-dimensionalism (particularly stage theory) things,in this case conscious subject that is You, don't persist as a whole at all times ..they only persist through discrete temporal parts at particular stages ..which bear an identity like relation to each other ..It's not a whole at any time; it persists through discrete temporal parts at particular stages

I'm guessing this is applicable in some way to both stage theory or exdurantism and perdurantism, because the terminology looks mixed to me (stages/moments and temporal parts?). Or are these two compatible/interchangeable?

It's an interesting idea. It got me thinking about temporal parts and/or stages.

I am assuming a discrete stage or temporal part is assumed to exist whenever, in the case of my consciousness, two states of it possess incompatible properties and complete identity ceases.

Then each stage or part is located between two time coordinates.In the case of something like my consciousness (or say, the movement of a duck in John's example), there seem to be a very large number of different discrete stages or temporal parts.

I was wondering why, and in virtue of what, are identity-like relations between these stages established? Or, similarly, why and in virtue of what are they designated as being temporal parts of a larger object?

Are the identity like relations or temporal part designations objectively real?
Could all of the different stages or temporal parts equally be seen as seperate uni-part or uni-stage objects?

I wondered if the act/potency distinction could be one way of explaining the connection between particular stages; an object or state of consciousness actually has such and such properties between two time coordinates, but at the same time has a specific or limited range of potencies, meaning a connection can be made between it and a state of consciousness or object with some different properties between other time coordinates.

Then I am understanding this part:

So to say that you were experiencing happiness yesterday is to say that yesterday there existed a temporal part of you which have a relation of identity with you who was experiencing happiness ..

...as follows:

To say that I was conscious of being happy at t1 is to say that at t1 there existed a temporal part of my consciousness which has a relation of identity with my consciousness of being happy at t1.I'm not sure this is right because it doesn't seem to say much.

Please consult those papers I linked to earlier they tackled with these issues better ..

Can you give me the author's names or first words of the title etc. so I know I am looking at the right ones?

Last edited by FZM (4/09/2017 4:23 am)

 

4/09/2017 10:53 am  #53


Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..

FZM, I know you are genuinely curious and very interested in learning more about these issues in metaphysics ..and I really hope you are enjoying this discussion.. but you must realize that right now ..this is no time and place to attend intro lessons in four-dimensionalism ..and I am not the best resource for conducting philosophical quizzes with..

For that you must make use of some other resources ..these SEP articles on Time and Temporal Parts 
might be good place to start.. otherwise I would recommend work of Ted Sider   ..he has published many books and article on the topic..( This  paper might be most relevant to your questions.)..

 I only need to say that there is no sense in which B-theory/Eternalism is just so obviously incoherent that its invalidity can be just assumed at the out set ..when giving some philosophical arguments that are potentially incompatible with it..
 And I can't articulate entire theses of different theories here...

I'll just briefly respond to some of your remarks..

FZM wrote:

I'm guessing this is applicable in some way to both stage theory or exdurantism and perdurantism, because the terminology looks mixed to me (stages/moments and temporal parts?).

see the distinction John has drawn...stage theory is generally just synonym of Exdurantism..

FZM wrote:

I was wondering why, and in virtue of what, are identity-like relations between these stages established?

well you know the answer to the why question..to explain change and persistence ..
-these relations could either be humean relations(which basically means taking it as brute fact) ..or they are some modalcounterpart relations(analogously) ..

FZM wrote:

Are the identity like relations or temporal part designations objectively real?

Yes..if they are true ..

FZM wrote:

Could all of the different stages or temporal parts equally be seen as seperate uni-part or uni-stage objects?

well those slices can be divided further ..so I think so..

FZM wrote:

I wondered if the act/potency distinction could be one way of explaining the connection between particular stages; an object or state of consciousness actually has such and such properties between two time coordinates, but at the same time has a specific or limited range of potencies, meaning a connection can be made between it and a state of consciousness or object with some different properties between other time coordinates.

Well the connection can be made but I don't see how it would be an actualisation of potency...because those things already exist..

FZM wrote:

Then I am understanding this part:

So to say that you were experiencing happiness yesterday is to say that yesterday there existed a temporal part of you which have a relation of identity with you who was experiencing happiness ..
...as follows:

To say that I was conscious of being happy at t1 is to say that at t1 there existed a temporal part of my consciousness which has a relation of identity with my consciousness of being happy at t1.I'm not sure this is right because it doesn't seem to say much.

well I don't know what seems inadequate to you in such an account.
its not that "at t1 there existed a temporal part of my consciousness which has a relation of identity with my consciousness of being happy at t1."
instead its that ..at t1 you "were" that temporal part who was happy...remember you don't exist as whole or same at all the times ...

FZM wrote:

Can you give me the author's names or first words of the title etc. so I know I am looking at the right ones?

Yes, if you'e interested ..then Ted Sider's work seems to be best resource on the topic..

 

Last edited by Calhoun (4/09/2017 10:55 am)

     Thread Starter
 

4/09/2017 12:20 pm  #54


Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..

Calhoun wrote:

well wait, this doesn't seem right ..there won't be any prime matter

All I need to uphold the distinction is secondary matter and substantial form. 

in the first place because things don't persist as a whole

If B-theory and perdurantism, the instantaneous temporal parts are substances. If B-theory and endurantism (e.g. Alexander Pruss), persisting objects are substances.

even if they do the [temporal parts?] just stand in different relations with different times

Suppose a current temporal part of Trump. The Trump-part stands in causal relations with the floor holding it up, the house's foundation holding it up, and so on; it stands in specific causal relations with past-relative temporal parts of its own spacetime worm (so that its heart beats the specific way it does, its brain is thinking the thoughts it is, etc.); it stands in causal relations to whatever actualizes its contingent existence. It doesn't just stand in temporal location relations.

I agree with Van Inwagen that no Philosophical argument for any substantive thesis has ever succeeded

I don't want you to take this the wrong way. I, however, don't think you're in any position to be declaring the failure of philosophy. You still make a lot of introductory-level metaphysics mistakes.

 

4/09/2017 5:37 pm  #55


Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..

Calhoun,

FZM, I know you are genuinely curious and very interested in learning more about these issues in metaphysics ..and I really hope you are enjoying this discussion.. but you must realize that right now ..this is no time and place to attend intro lessons in four-dimensionalism

Well, thank you for the links, some of which I am already familiar with. I was more interested in clarifying your own use of terms in your reply to me than you giving me intro-lessons into four dimensionalism:

Well this isn't a big problem ..remember under four-dimensionalism (particularly stage theory) things,in this case conscious subject that is You, don't persist as a whole at all times ..they only persist through discrete temporal parts at particular stages ..which bear an identity like relation to each other ..It's not a whole at any time; it persists through discrete temporal parts at particular stages

It's true that I haven't read a great deal on this, but I have become used to seeing temporal parts in the context of perdurantism and stages in the context of exdurantism.

I only need to say that there is no sense in which B-theory/Eternalism is just so obviously incoherent that its invalidity can be just assumed at the out set ..when giving some philosophical arguments that are potentially incompatible with it..

I don't know; I'm not interested in showing that B-theory Eternalism is obviously incoherent.

From what I can tell you are interested in demonstrating a strong conflict between B-theory Eternalism and the act/potency distinction; they are basically incompatible. (Then, possibly that there are strong arguments for B-theory Eternalism and consequently against anything incompatible with it?) I did find this interesting.

Also, you seem to have an idea about the act/potency distinction, that it necessarily involves temporal becoming of the kind that is only available to A-theory presentists. I'm not sure about this, but again it is an interesting idea.

see the distinction John has drawn...stage theory is generally just synonym of Exdurantism..

I didn't think or write that it was anything else.

Well the connection can be made but I don't see how it would be an actualisation of potency...because those things already exist..

As far as I understand it, the potencies in a per se ordered causal series are actualised simultaneously and such a series could exist eternally.

well I don't know what seems inadequate to you in such an account.

I didn't get to the point of judging it either adequate or inadequate, I was asking for clarification about what you meant. Either my fault or you didn't express the idea very clearly, but you clarified it in a way I found clearer anyway.

Last edited by FZM (4/09/2017 5:41 pm)

 

4/10/2017 2:43 am  #56


Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..

John West wrote:

All I need to uphold the distinction is secondary matter and substantial form.

well I am failing to see how can secondary matter account for potency here..where there just seems to be no room for it here..

John West wrote:

If B-theory and perdurantism, the instantaneous temporal parts are substances. If B-theory and endurantism (e.g. Alexander Pruss), persisting objects are substances.

well but I don't see how you go from that to substances having causal relations ..

John West wrote:

Suppose a current temporal part of Trump. The Trump-part stands in causal relations with the floor holding it up, the house's foundation holding it up, and so on; it stands in specific causal relations with past-relative temporal parts of its own spacetime worm (so that its heart beats the specific way it does, its brain is thinking the thoughts it is, etc.); it stands in causal relations to whatever actualizes its contingent existence. It doesn't just stand in temporal location relations.

Again, I don't know from where you're sneaking in ..these "things" have causal relations ..these are just event ordered that way,,there seems to be no actualization of contingent existence here..

John West wrote:

I don't want you to take this the wrong way. I, however, don't think you're in any position to be declaring the failure of philosophy. You still make a lot of introductory-level metaphysics mistakes.

Well I was talking about something else entirely here..we shall not discuss that further..its off topic..

Hello FZM.

FZM wrote:

Well, thank you for the links, some of which I am already familiar with. I was more interested in clarifying your own use of terms in your reply to me than you giving me intro-lessons into four dimensionalism:

..

You're welcome , just thought you might be interested in learning more..

FZM wrote:

It's true that I haven't read a great deal on this, but I have become used to seeing temporal parts in the context of perdurantism and stages in the context of exdurantism.

perdurantism and exdurantism both posit temporal parts ..stages are talk of particular temporal parts ..see johns example again..and I too haven't read a very great deal too

FZM wrote:

Also, you seem to have an idea about the act/potency distinction, that it necessarily involves temporal becoming of the kind that is only available to A-theory presentists. I'm not sure about this, but again it is an interesting idea.

As far as I understand it, the potencies in a per se ordered causal series are actualised simultaneously and such a series could exist eternally.

Yes, this is my contention and this is my question..

You see, what I am trying to tell John and Callum is that under B-theory/Eternalism ..and particularly four-dimensionalism is that "things" don't stand in Causal relations ...because no dynamic change happens .."Change" under such a view is merely analogous to being different...its just that these different "parts" exists eternally and tenselessly ..(think of the world as one giant Stop motion film where all the events are present simultaneously or one giant film reel..these events are merely different but they don't exhibit dynamic change,"things" in any of those event don't "Cause" other things ) ..

so for example ..if I try to use the paradigmatic illustration of per se causal series ...My hand pushing a stick which is pushing a stone..their is no sense which it could be said that ..its the "thing" which is "my "hand" which is pushing the "thing" which is "stone" ..its just that all these objects which are persisting through time persist through discrete temporal parts ..which are present in these "events" which are merely different from each other ..but which "Don't do anything" .. (they just keep sitting there )

so there is no sense in which any series of causes can be said to be ordered per se ..its just all these events ordered per accidens , characterized by B-relations(earlier,later,simultaneous with)..
Hope this helps make the point more clear..

FZM wrote:

I didn't get to the point of judging it either adequate or inadequate, I was asking for clarification about what you meant. Either my fault or you didn't express the idea very clearly, but you clarified it in a way I found clearer anyway.

My bad, I read .I'm not sure this is right because it doesn't seem to say much.  as you finding it inadequate
..

     Thread Starter
 

4/10/2017 5:14 am  #57


Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..

Calhoun,

so for example ..if I try to use the paradigmatic illustration of per se causal series ...My hand pushing a stick which is pushing a stone..their is no sense which it could be said that ..its the "thing" which is "my "hand" which is pushing the "thing" which is "stone" ..its just that all these objects which are persisting through time persist through discrete temporal parts ..which are present in these "events" which are merely different from each other ..but which "Don't do anything" .. (they just keep sitting there )

When I apply this idea to my own conscious states I feel a bit Buddhist. For example, I need the temporal parts that have a relationship to each other to explain my own persistence over time. I only believe that I persist over time because I believe in the temporal parts having a relationship with each other.  

so there is no sense in which any series of causes can be said to be ordered per se ..its just all these events ordered per accidens , characterized by B-relations(earlier,later,simultaneous with)..
Hope this helps make the point more clear..

Yes, thanks for that. 

Here are you talking about events just being ordered 'per accidens' in the A/T sense of a per accidens causal series? This is because in A/T terms the members of a causal series per accidens do have causal power and relations to other members of the series and this doesn't seem to fit with your general point about parts not standing in causal relations with each other.

So your general point would be along the lines that B-theory eternalism necessitates adopting a position on causation which is incompatible with the A/T one? Otherwise I think it would be pretty clear that B-theory eternalism plus a view of causation incompatible with the A/T one precludes anything like the act/potency distinction.  


 

 

4/10/2017 7:30 am  #58


Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..

FZM wrote:

When I apply this idea to my own conscious states I feel a bit Buddhist. For example, I need the temporal parts that have a relationship to each other to explain my own persistence over time. I only believe that I persist over time because I believe in the temporal parts having a relationship with each other.  

FZM, are you a thomist? or a theist? 

And yes, these talk of i-relations seem to be the most tricky part of four-dimensionalism .

FZM wrote:

Here are you talking about events just being ordered 'per accidens' in the A/T sense of a per accidens causal series? This is because in A/T terms the members of a causal series per accidens do have causal power and relations to other members of the series and this doesn't seem to fit with your general point about parts not standing in causal relations with each other.

well I didn't say it would be a series of "causes" I said it would just be series of "events" 

FZM wrote:

So your general point would be along the lines that B-theory eternalism necessitates adopting a position on causation which is incompatible with the A/T one? Otherwise I think it would be pretty clear that B-theory eternalism plus a view of causation incompatible with the A/T one precludes anything like the act/potency distinction.  

Yes, this is what I am trying to say..and that view of causation undermines A-T arguments e.g Five ways..even though not necessarily all arguments for existence of God.

But note that it only follows if what i have said here is true. and that might not necessarily be the case ..its just based on my own observations and from what I know...



 

     Thread Starter
 

4/10/2017 12:54 pm  #59


Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..

Calhoun wrote:

well I am failing to see how can secondary matter account for potency here..where there just seems to be no room for it here..

Secondary matter is the substratum of accidental change. It's a constituent posited, in the first place, to account for potency.

these "things" have causal relations ..these are just event ordered that way

I'm a fact or states of affairs ontologist. I think there are events, but that they have parts.* I'm not willing to claim that the brick breaking the window doesn't involve a brick and a window.

But all I was showing was that there can be causal relations in a perdurantist B-theory. You've given no arguments for why perdurantist B-theory entails a Humean or counterfactual view of causation, and you're against scholarly consensus on the point (including Davids Lewis* and Armstrong).

*I also happen to think that events are reducible to their parts.
*Though Lewis thought he had other reasons for rejecting relations.

 

4/10/2017 12:55 pm  #60


Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..

Again, I don't know from where you're sneaking in ..these "things" have causal relations

One reason is that, if perdurantism, I need something to “pick out” one spacetime worm from another. In other words, I think “I-relations” are causal relations. Another is that I need truthmakers for statements like “John caused the vase to break”, “The brick broke the window”, etc.

Another is that, pace Hume, I think we perceive cases of causation through our introspective awareness of the operation of the will.* You can test this by lifting an arm, picking a direction, and moving it in that direction (repeat as often as you like). You'll have had a direct perception of your causing your arm to move. 

I also think we perceive cases of causation through pressure on the body, though the historical dominance of the representative theory of perception made it less likely for people to focus on in the past.

*This seems so whether or not those are free operations of the will.

 

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