Hi Calhoun,

Well this isn't a big problem ..remember under four-dimensionalism (particularly stage theory) things,in this case conscious subject that is You, don't persist as a whole at all times ..they only persist through discrete temporal parts at particular stages ..which bear an identity like relation to each other ..It's not a whole at any time; it persists through discrete temporal parts at particular stages

I'm guessing this is applicable in some way to both stage theory or exdurantism and perdurantism, because the terminology looks mixed to me (stages/moments and temporal parts?). Or are these two compatible/interchangeable?

It's an interesting idea. It got me thinking about temporal parts and/or stages.

I am assuming a discrete stage or temporal part is assumed to exist whenever, in the case of my consciousness, two states of it possess incompatible properties and complete identity ceases.

Then each stage or part is located between two time coordinates.In the case of something like my consciousness (or say, the movement of a duck in John's example), there seem to be a very large number of different discrete stages or temporal parts.

I was wondering why, and in virtue of what, are identity-like relations between these stages established? Or, similarly, why and in virtue of what are they designated as being temporal parts of a larger object?

Are the identity like relations or temporal part designations objectively real?
Could all of the different stages or temporal parts equally be seen as seperate uni-part or uni-stage objects?

I wondered if the act/potency distinction could be one way of explaining the connection between particular stages; an object or state of consciousness actually has such and such properties between two time coordinates, but at the same time has a specific or limited range of potencies, meaning a connection can be made between it and a state of consciousness or object with some different properties between other time coordinates.

Then I am understanding this part:

So to say that you were experiencing happiness yesterday is to say that yesterday there existed a temporal part of you which have a relation of identity with you who was experiencing happiness ..

...as follows:

To say that I was conscious of being happy at t1 is to say that at t1 there existed a temporal part of my consciousness which has a relation of identity with my consciousness of being happy at t1.I'm not sure this is right because it doesn't seem to say much.

Please consult those papers I linked to earlier they tackled with these issues better ..

Can you give me the author's names or first words of the title etc. so I know I am looking at the right ones?

Last edited by FZM (4/09/2017 4:23 am)

Calhoun wrote:

well wait, this doesn't seem right ..there won't be any prime matter

All I need to uphold the distinction is secondary matter and substantial form. 

in the first place because things don't persist as a whole

If B-theory and perdurantism, the instantaneous temporal parts are substances. If B-theory and endurantism (e.g. Alexander Pruss), persisting objects are substances.

even if they do the [temporal parts?] just stand in different relations with different times

Suppose a current temporal part of Trump. The Trump-part stands in causal relations with the floor holding it up, the house's foundation holding it up, and so on; it stands in specific causal relations with past-relative temporal parts of its own spacetime worm (so that its heart beats the specific way it does, its brain is thinking the thoughts it is, etc.); it stands in causal relations to whatever actualizes its contingent existence. It doesn't just stand in temporal location relations.

I agree with Van Inwagen that no Philosophical argument for any substantive thesis has ever succeeded

I don't want you to take this the wrong way. I, however, don't think you're in any position to be declaring the failure of philosophy. You still make a lot of introductory-level metaphysics mistakes.

John West wrote:

All I need to uphold the distinction is secondary matter and substantial form.

well I am failing to see how can secondary matter account for potency here..where there just seems to be no room for it here..

John West wrote:

If B-theory and perdurantism, the instantaneous temporal parts are substances. If B-theory and endurantism (e.g. Alexander Pruss), persisting objects are substances.

well but I don't see how you go from that to substances having causal relations ..

John West wrote:

Suppose a current temporal part of Trump. The Trump-part stands in causal relations with the floor holding it up, the house's foundation holding it up, and so on; it stands in specific causal relations with past-relative temporal parts of its own spacetime worm (so that its heart beats the specific way it does, its brain is thinking the thoughts it is, etc.); it stands in causal relations to whatever actualizes its contingent existence. It doesn't just stand in temporal location relations.

Again, I don't know from where you're sneaking in ..these "things" have causal relations ..these are just event ordered that way,,there seems to be no actualization of contingent existence here..

John West wrote:

I don't want you to take this the wrong way. I, however, don't think you're in any position to be declaring the failure of philosophy. You still make a lot of introductory-level metaphysics mistakes.

Well I was talking about something else entirely here..we shall not discuss that further..its off topic..

Hello FZM.

FZM wrote:

Well, thank you for the links, some of which I am already familiar with. I was more interested in clarifying your own use of terms in your reply to me than you giving me intro-lessons into four dimensionalism:

..

You're welcome , just thought you might be interested in learning more..

FZM wrote:

It's true that I haven't read a great deal on this, but I have become used to seeing temporal parts in the context of perdurantism and stages in the context of exdurantism.

perdurantism and exdurantism both posit temporal parts ..stages are talk of particular temporal parts ..see johns example again..and I too haven't read a very great deal too

FZM wrote:

Also, you seem to have an idea about the act/potency distinction, that it necessarily involves temporal becoming of the kind that is only available to A-theory presentists. I'm not sure about this, but again it is an interesting idea.

As far as I understand it, the potencies in a per se ordered causal series are actualised simultaneously and such a series could exist eternally.

Yes, this is my contention and this is my question..

You see, what I am trying to tell John and Callum is that under B-theory/Eternalism ..and particularly four-dimensionalism is that "things" don't stand in Causal relations ...because no dynamic change happens .."Change" under such a view is merely analogous to being different...its just that these different "parts" exists eternally and tenselessly ..(think of the world as one giant Stop motion film where all the events are present simultaneously or one giant film reel..these events are merely different but they don't exhibit dynamic change,"things" in any of those event don't "Cause" other things ) ..

so for example ..if I try to use the paradigmatic illustration of per se causal series ...My hand pushing a stick which is pushing a stone..their is no sense which it could be said that ..its the "thing" which is "my "hand" which is pushing the "thing" which is "stone" ..its just that all these objects which are persisting through time persist through discrete temporal parts ..which are present in these "events" which are merely different from each other ..but which "Don't do anything" .. (they just keep sitting there )

so there is no sense in which any series of causes can be said to be ordered per se ..its just all these events ordered per accidens , characterized by B-relations(earlier,later,simultaneous with)..
Hope this helps make the point more clear..

FZM wrote:

I didn't get to the point of judging it either adequate or inadequate, I was asking for clarification about what you meant. Either my fault or you didn't express the idea very clearly, but you clarified it in a way I found clearer anyway.

My bad, I read .I'm not sure this is right because it doesn't seem to say much.  as you finding it inadequate
..

FZM wrote:

When I apply this idea to my own conscious states I feel a bit Buddhist. For example, I need the temporal parts that have a relationship to each other to explain my own persistence over time. I only believe that I persist over time because I believe in the temporal parts having a relationship with each other.  

FZM, are you a thomist? or a theist? 

And yes, these talk of i-relations seem to be the most tricky part of four-dimensionalism .

FZM wrote:

Here are you talking about events just being ordered 'per accidens' in the A/T sense of a per accidens causal series? This is because in A/T terms the members of a causal series per accidens do have causal power and relations to other members of the series and this doesn't seem to fit with your general point about parts not standing in causal relations with each other.

well I didn't say it would be a series of "causes" I said it would just be series of "events" 

FZM wrote:

So your general point would be along the lines that B-theory eternalism necessitates adopting a position on causation which is incompatible with the A/T one? Otherwise I think it would be pretty clear that B-theory eternalism plus a view of causation incompatible with the A/T one precludes anything like the act/potency distinction.  

Yes, this is what I am trying to say..and that view of causation undermines A-T arguments e.g Five ways..even though not necessarily all arguments for existence of God.

But note that it only follows if what i have said here is true. and that might not necessarily be the case ..its just based on my own observations and from what I know...



 

Again, I don't know from where you're sneaking in ..these "things" have causal relations

One reason is that, if perdurantism, I need something to “pick out” one spacetime worm from another. In other words, I think “I-relations” are causal relations. Another is that I need truthmakers for statements like “John caused the vase to break”, “The brick broke the window”, etc.

Another is that, pace Hume, I think we perceive cases of causation through our introspective awareness of the operation of the will.* You can test this by lifting an arm, picking a direction, and moving it in that direction (repeat as often as you like). You'll have had a direct perception of your causing your arm to move. 

I also think we perceive cases of causation through pressure on the body, though the historical dominance of the representative theory of perception made it less likely for people to focus on in the past.

*This seems so whether or not those are free operations of the will.