Classical Theism, Philosophy, and Religion Forum » Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..

John West · 4/12/2017 1:27 pm

Here is the dilemma you're in. Either perdurantist B-theory entails Humean or counterfactual causation, or it doesn't. If it does, perdurantist B-theory stands refuted by both argument and perceptual experience. If it doesn't, perdurantist B-theory needs causal relations.

(Nor will appeals to Relativity help you. The concepts and principles that underlie it imply the existence of enduring objects, e. g. a worldline is a sum of events, all of which involve a single material body.)

Calhoun · 4/12/2017 2:57 pm

John West wrote:
Think of it like a dependency relation. If that conjoiner weren't there, g wouldn't be conjoined with e.* The conjoiner “grounds” the conjoining of g and e.*

Similarly, if perdurantism and my ten past-relative temporal parts didn't exist, my brain wouldn't be thinking what it's thinking, my arms wouldn't be where they are, and so on.

On eternalism, both are the case eternally.

Well your illustrations make perfect sense but its only because they are events that themselves have parts..in all these events some process can be said to occur in which objects are persisting through their parts ..But I am having a hard time thinking about any event (can conjoining of A's essence with its existence even be called that?) that doesn't involve any parts and thats how this conjoining process(can it even be called that) seems to me when I try to think about it ..it just seems like a changeless event which seems incoherent ..

John West wrote:
I haven't “sneaked” anything in. (It's disingenuous of you to keep saying I have.) I've given you arguments—that you haven't replied to—that the causal relations have to be real.

Maybe I have missed something or perhaps forgotten it but which arguments are you talking about?
you merely said that we need powers to account for potency, I told you that there just doesn't seem to any potency here ..
And You said that our perceptual experience gives credence to Causal Powers,about that I'll say that it seems it actually doesn't ..because I can just as well conceive my perceptual experience being present in all those events..because my consciousness persist just the way all other objects do . so you'll have to say more about what actually is it about event causation that would eliminate perceptual experience of causing something?

John West wrote:
Here is the dilemma you're in. Either perdurantist B-theory entails Humean or counterfactual causation, or it doesn't. If it does, perdurantist B-theory stands refuted by both argument and perceptual experience. If it doesn't, perdurantist B-theory needs causal relations.

Well I don't see how this constitutes a daunting dilemma ..none of your argument seems to succeed in undermining those theories and its not clear how exactly is Dispositional theory any better ..I've also given an argument for this claim ..

And I don't know why you make that point about relativity, I haven't used relativity to argue for those views on causation..it just merely entails B-theory

Last edited by Calhoun (4/12/2017 2:59 pm)

John West · 4/12/2017 3:02 pm

Calhoun wrote:
Well I don't see how this constitutes a daunting dilemma ..none of your argument seems to succeed in undermining those theories

But (contrary to your bald assertion) they do! You even conceded that they're nice arguments.

(If you've given arguments for your claim, you're going to have to point them out. As far as I or anyone else can tell, you've just asserted your thesis over and over.)

Last edited by John West (4/12/2017 3:03 pm)

John West · 4/12/2017 3:09 pm

Here's what I think we should do. I think we should step back from this thread. You're struggling with even the basic notions you need for the discussion. So, instead of engaging with what's being said, you say you "don't understand" or “don't see” things, and flail around asserting the opposite.* You're making an ass of yourself. (I even had a couple users email me suggesting you're just trolling me last night; I don't think you are.)

We're looking at rebooting the ontology reading group in the near future (with a broader focus than just ontology this time). You should sign up.

*And some of those assertions are pretty out there: you reply to comments about secondary matter by asserting that the lack of prime matter and substantial change means no change; you fail to see how secondary matter can account for potency; you confuse compatibility claims with parsimony claims. Other interesting stuff includes questions about whether possible worlds or brute facts are sufficient truthmakers for “John caused the vase to break”. I can go on if you like.

Calhoun · 4/12/2017 3:52 pm

John West wrote:
But (contrary to your bald assertion) they do! You even conceded that they're nice arguments.

I don't know why are you calling it bald assertion, I've told you in the very same comment why I find them unconvincing..I've told another user just recently why I think that, it could be mistaken but its hardly a
bald assertion..
and I merely said that about your argument from experience that its nice but I wanted to ask you what you mean by potency first..many arguments can be nice but unsound..

John West wrote:
Here's what I think we should do. I think we should step back from this thread

Sure, because you're just getting annoyed

John West wrote:
You're struggling with even the basic notions you need for the discussion

I don't know where, but even if I am I don't know where have I just went around asserting the opposite,like I said it could be some mistakes or disagreements but its hardly assertions..

John West wrote:
You're making an ass of yourself. (I even had a couple users email me suggesting you're just trolling me last night; I don't think you are.)

Well its hardly fair if you'll just kick someone if two people would tell you they didn't like what they saw..

John West wrote:
*And some of those assertions are pretty out there

Ok, lets see where..

John West wrote:
you reply to comments about secondary matter by asserting that the lack of prime matter and substantial change means no change; you fail to see how secondary matter can account for potency

Well I asked you right there how it can and you've didn't reply .

John West wrote:
you confuse compatibility claims with parsimony claims.

Even if I did its hardly asserting ..and you didn't correct this mistake sooner if its the root of the problem..

John West wrote:
Other interesting stuff includes questions about whether possible worlds or brute facts are sufficient truthmakers for “John caused the vase to break”. I can go on if you like.

Well I didn't exactly asked you this question if you read closly..but even if I did its hardly asserting something baldly..

if you're so annoyed I can leave anytime ..but your having a temper tantrum isn't a way to go..

John West · 4/12/2017 4:10 pm

Calhoun wrote:
and I merely said that about your argument from experience that its nice but I wanted to ask you what you mean by potency first

See what I mean?

John West wrote:
Here's what I think we should do. I think we should step back from this thread
Sure, because you're just getting annoyed.

A little. Rather, I thought speaking bluntly might help.

John West · 4/12/2017 4:11 pm

John West wrote:
you reply to comments about secondary matter by asserting that the lack of prime matter and substantial change means no change; you fail to see how secondary matter can account for potency
Well I asked you right there how it can and you've didn't reply .

Yes, I did, and so did FZM. I told you that the whole point of secondary matter is that it's the substratum of accidental change (see #61 and #67).

John West wrote:
you confuse compatibility claims with parsimony claims.

Even if I did its hardly asserting ..and you didn't correct this mistake sooner if its the root of the problem..

I pointed it out to you posts ago (see #63).

John West wrote:
Other interesting stuff includes questions about whether possible worlds or brute facts are sufficient truthmakers for “John caused the vase to break”. I can go on if you like.
Well I didn't exactly asked you this question if you read closly..but even if I did its hardly asserting something baldly..

You may as well have asked me in post #61—apophasis-like way of bringing it up aside. I included it as another illustration of your lack of grasp of the notions you need for the discussion, not as another example of an assertion. (That's why I gave it its own sentence starting "Other interesting stuff includes questions. . .")

Last edited by John West (4/12/2017 7:45 pm)

John West · 4/12/2017 4:21 pm

Calhoun wrote:
Well its hardly fair if you'll just kick someone if two people would tell you they didn't like what they saw..

Characterizations like those in the previous and following quotes:

if you're so annoyed I can leave anytime ..but your having a temper tantrum isn't a way to go..

Are no doubt part of why they suggested that.

(For the record, it wouldn't be me who kicks you. To avoid conflicts of interest, I don't moderate my own discussions. Likewise other moderators and their discussions.)

John West · 4/12/2017 8:16 pm

These parts of #72 went up after I wrote #73:

..But I am having a hard time thinking about any event (can conjoining of A's essence with its existence even be called that?) that doesn't involve any parts and thats how this conjoining process(can it even be called that) seems to me when I try to think about it ..it just seems like a changeless event which seems incoherent ..

Absent further argument, all this says is that the existence of events entails the existence of a non-event. It's irrelevant to the main thrust of the argument.

But it doesn't follow from your trouble thinking of an event involving the conjoining of essence and existence that there is no such event anyway. I've given you arguments that, if the real distinction between essence and existence, such a conjoining has to occur in entities whose essence and existence are distinct.*

And You said that our perceptual experience gives credence to Causal Powers,about that I'll say that it seems it actually doesn't .. because I can just as well conceive my perceptual experience being present in all those events..because my consciousness persist just the way all other objects do . so you'll have to say more about what actually is it about event causation that would eliminate perceptual experience of causing something?

Could you try cleaning up your writing a little? For instance, you don't need all these little ..s, and they make reading your prose burdensome.

It looks like you're saying you can conceive of yourself experiencing real, irreducible causation in a perdurantist B-theory. I agree. You, however, can't experience real, irreducible causation if there is none (as per the Regularity theory).

*Incidentally, the conjoining would involve parts: the essence and existence.

Last edited by John West (4/12/2017 9:30 pm)

Calhoun · 4/13/2017 9:15 am

John West wrote:
John West wrote:

you reply to comments about secondary matter by asserting that the lack of prime matter and substantial change means no change; you fail to see how secondary matter can account for potency
Well I asked you right there how it can and you've didn't reply .
Yes. I did, and so did FZM. I told you that the whole point of secondary matter is that it's the substratum of accidental change (see #61 and #67).

Well I did tell you and him that speaking of Potency here just smacks of tensed language ..I even asked you that do you mean possibility? and you replied with no and said it means capacity for something to be brought about(which again is entirely tensed term) but then you went on to characterise contingent(which I understood as metaphysical possibility) existence as potency later on anyway. And you're then Arguing for Essentialist Explanation for Contingent existence ..

John West wrote:
*Incidentally, the conjoining would involve parts: the essence and existence.

This is what I wasn't taking into account,objecting that time so that argument seems OK but I am going to ask again what do you mean by potency? does it mean contingency?

John West wrote:
John West wrote:
You may as well have asked me in post #61—apophasis-like way of bringing it up aside. I included it as another illustration of your lack of grasp of the notions you need for the discussion, not as another example of an assertion. (That's why I gave it its own sentence starting "Other interesting stuff includes questions. . .")

I don't know how is this an illustration of my lack of grasp of the notions you need for the discussion it just seems you are being Uncharitable. I think I very clearly told you there that the reason why I would not go into it is that for present purposes, you providing the reason for positing those potencies is sufficient. I don't know why you are trying to provide the worst possible interpretations of my statements after quote-mining from anywhere you like.

John West wrote:
Calhoun wrote:

Well its hardly fair if you'll just kick someone if two people would tell you they didn't like what they saw..
Characterizations like those in the previous and following quotes:
if you're so annoyed I can leave anytime ..but your having a temper tantrum isn't a way to go..
Are no doubt part of why they suggested that.

Well Here's how wiki defines a troll

"In Internet slang, a troll is a person who sows discord on the Internet by starting arguments or upsetting people, by posting inflammatory,extraneous, or off-topic messages in an online community (such as a newsgroup, forum, chat room, or blog) with the intent of provoking readers into an emotional response or of otherwise disrupting normal, on-topic discussion,often for the troll's amusement."

Now I don't know where have I intended to do any of that, sure I am the one who has started an argument but I can hardly be labelled a troll for that. Just because two people don't like what they see is No reason why I could be called a troll,so its totally up to them to show exactly what it is that I've said that can be correctly characterised as "trolling".

John West wrote:
Could you try cleaning up your writing a little? For instance, you don't need all these little ..s, and they make reading your prose burdensome.

Well they are totally unintentional,so I am sorry if any are still left,its just a habit of mine.

And it would be much much better if you stay on topic and talk less about me.

John West wrote:
It looks like you're saying you can conceive of yourself experiencing real, irreducible causation in a perdurantist B-theory. I agree. You, however, can't experience real, irreducible causation if there is none (as per the Regularity theory).

I don't know why I can't conceive if there is none, just as I can conceive free will where there could be none.