- Calhoun
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
John West wrote:
Secondary matter is the substratum of accidental change. It's a constituent posited, in the first place, to account for potency.
well everything else seems fine here but I don't understand this part...
what sort of potency needs accounting for here in the first place? which "thing;s" potency to do or for what? ..
I'm not willing to claim that the brick breaking the window doesn't involve a brick and a window.
Again, why?
But all I was showing was that there can be causal relations in a perdurantist B-theory
Well you haven't done that yet ..or at least I haven't understood how you did it..
You've given no arguments for why perdurantist B-theory entails a Humean or counterfactual view of causation
Well like I said before ..they are the only options that seem viable to me here because to me, things don't seem to do anything..
and you're against scholarly consensus on the point (including Davids Lewis* and Armstrong).
Sucks to know.. 
One reason is that, if perdurantism, I need something to “pick out” one spacetime worm from another. In other words, I think “I-relations” are causal relations. Another is that I need truthmakers for statements like “John caused the vase to break”, “The brick broke the window”, etc.
Well I would have liked to ask why not possible worlds ? or brute facts? but it seems those views you already find problematic ..if you can clarify what sort of potencies you were talking about earlier we won't have to go in that debate right now..
Another is that, pace Hume, I think we perceive cases of causation through our introspective awareness of the operation of the will.* You can test this by lifting an arm, picking a direction, and moving it in that direction (repeat as often as you like). You'll have had a direct perception of your causing your arm to move.
I also think we perceive cases of causation through pressure on the body, though the historical dominance of the representative theory of perception made it less likely for people to focus on in the past.
These seem nice arguments but those other issues need settling first I think..
- Calhoun
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
ohh wait, maybe you mean potency in the sense of the word possibility , Do you?
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Thread Starter- John West
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
It's worth distinguishing two claims you've made. The first is “that [. . .] under the Eternalistic/B-theoratic view of time the Act/Potency distinction just collapses” (#42). The second is that B-theory makes the act-potency distinction superfluous. The first is a claim about compatibility, whereas the second has to do with parsimony.
ohh wait, maybe you mean potency in the sense of the word possibility , Do you?
Nope. I mean potency in the sense of potency.
A potency is a capacity for something to be brought about. A vase has the potency to be shattered; an unripe green apple has the potency to ripen into a red one; a rose, to wither and die. And these things can have the potencies whether or not they ever manifest.
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
It's worth drawing the distinction between an entity a's essence and a. a's essence is identical with a. a is identical with a's essence. No matter how you slice it, they're the same thing. (a's essence encompasses all of what a is.)
It's also worth drawing a distinction between a's essence and a's existence. a's essence is just a. a's existence is something additional to a (e.g. Barry Miller's existence property). The result is that there is a (real) distinction between a and existing a.
what sort of potency needs accounting for here in the first place? which "thing;s" potency to do or for what? ..
Contingent existence is one sort of potency that needs accounting for.
Suppose there is a world, w, with only one contingent entity, g. g is of itself purely potential and cannot exist unless it's conjoined with an act of existence, e (cf. Feser's manual pp. 105 – 106).
But what conjoins g and e? If it were some existing relation, that existing relation would itself be a composite of essence and existence and its essence and existence would need to be conjoined. And if it's essence and existence were conjoined by a further existing relation, that relation would itself be a composite of essence and existence and need to be conjoined, and so on ad infinitum.
Mutatis mutandis any other kind of entity whose essence and existence are distinct. So, g and e's conjoiner isn't an entity whose essence and existence are distinct. So, if g and e have a conjoiner, that conjoiner's essence and existence are identical (non-distinct).
For essentially Bradleyan reasons, the connection of g and e needs to have a conjoiner—a ground.* (It can't be “brute”.) So, g and e have a conjoiner. So, g and e have a conjoiner whose essence is identical to its existence.
So, the existence of g requires an actualizer whose essence is identical to its existence. The same argument can be run, mutatis mutandis, for any B-theoretic, perdurantist universe you like.
*Here is a scholastic reason: if there can be brute connections between g and e, you have to give up the principle that “nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality except by something in a state of actuality” (ST I.2.3). And once you give that up there is no reason think that things aren't randomly, brutely reduced from potentiality to actuality all the time (which leads to skeptical scenarios).
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
I'm not willing to claim that the brick breaking the window doesn't involve a brick and a window.
Again, why?
The sheer intuitive implausibility of it. I agree with Moore that, at the very least, the onus is on the person who wishes to throw out our common sense beliefs (and that their argument had better not be based on any thesis significantly less plausible than the one it's used to refute).
Well I would have liked to ask why not possible worlds ? or brute facts? but it seems those views you already find problematic
That's right. I'm a fictionalist about possible worlds and, like most people, I consider brute facts theoretically undesirable.
(I don't think either possible worlds or brute facts are sufficient truthmakers for “John caused the vase to break” either, but we don't need to get into that for our purposes here.)
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
The second is that B-theory makes the act-potency distinction superfluous.
Well I've told you why and so far you've given no reason to doubt it..
Nope. I mean potency in the sense of potency.
A potency is a capacity for something to be brought about. A vase has the potency to be shattered; an unripe green apple has the potency to ripen into a red one; a rose, to wither and die. And these things can have the potencies whether or not they ever manifest.
Well this the problem you(or me) just don't seem to understand,Nothing getting "Brought about" about here ...You are just sneaking in dynamic change where there is none..vase is just not shattered at one time and shattered at other ...there is no actualization of any potential what so ever here ..
Contingent existence is one sort of potency that needs accounting for.
What? didn't you say you weren't talking about possibility when I asked you?
The rest of this comment in just muddled, I can't make sense of it without presupposing some tensed view of time..
Actually all that essence-existence stuff does make sense to me but I can't make sense of conjoining of essence-existence ..without the composite ever being brought about...
John West wrote:I'm not willing to claim that the brick breaking the window doesn't involve a brick and a window.
Again, why?
The sheer intuitive implausibility of it. I agree with Moore that, at the very least, the onus is on the person who wishes to throw out our common sense beliefs (and that their argument had better not be based on any thesis significantly less plausible than the one it's used to refute).
Well I would have liked to ask why not possible worlds ? or brute facts? but it seems those views you already find problematic
That's right. I'm a fictionalist about possible worlds and, like most people, I consider brute facts theoretically undesirable.
(I don't think either possible worlds or brute facts are sufficient truthmakers for “John caused the vase to break” either, but we don't need to get into that for our purposes here.)
Well as I told before, Those two accounts are the only one plausible here because under certain types of Temporal Parts theory ..all change can be reduced to Temporal parts of persisting objects and can be characterized by those parts being different from each other...but those parts them selves are changeless ..they just "Don't do anything" there is no "actualization of potentiality" there is no "thing" causing other "thing" ..
So I still don't understand from where you are sneaking in this type of causation...there just is no room for it .the parts and whole relation could just either be brute or some counterpart relation ..or so it seems to me right now...
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Thread Starter- FZM
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
Hi Calhoun,
I've been following the interesting discussion you have been having with John. Two related points struck me particularly:
Well this the problem you(or me) just don't seem to understand,Nothing getting "Brought about" about here ...You are just sneaking in dynamic change where there is none..vase is just not shattered at one time and shattered at other ...there is no actualization of any potential what so ever here ..
From what I read John has said that he thinks substances have causal powers. As far as I can see, this would mean that on B-theory eternalism the powers would be operating and bringing about their effects eternally.
Also it seems like on the A/T view you could have potencies being actualised eternally as well. In these cases change isn't being sneaked in and it could look like your interpretation of B-theory eternalism involves sneaking in Humean or similar assumptions about causation, substance etc.
Those two accounts are the only one plausible here because under certain types of Temporal Parts theory ..all change can be reduced to Temporal parts of persisting objects and can be characterized by those parts being different from each other...but those parts them selves are changeless ..they just "Don't do anything" there is no "actualization of potentiality" there is no "thing" causing other "thing" ..
This may be the case because certain sorts of temporal parts theory have theories of causation incompatible with the A/T and causal powers ones intrinsic to them.
If that is what's happening, it may not be the case that B-theory eternalism itself is necessarily incompatible with A/T and causal powers views, but that B-theory eternalism when its interpretation involves a range of views about causation, substance etc. that are incompatible with the A/T position, unsurprisingly, is.
Feser's manual, that John provided a link to in his post above, has a more detailed explanation of the act/potency distinction and hence an explanation of what 'potency' is in the context of Scholastic philosophy, than 'Last Superstition...' or 'Aquinas'.
- Calhoun
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
Hi FZM,
From what I read John has said that he thinks substances have causal powers. As far as I can see, this would mean that on B-theory eternalism the powers would be operating and bringing about their effects eternally.
Also it seems like on the A/T view you could have potencies being actualised eternally as well. In these cases change isn't being sneaked in and it could look like your interpretation of B-theory eternalism involves sneaking in Humean or similar assumptions about causation, substance etc.
I don't know why you are misunderstanding this point again and again..please go back to the example involving hand and stone..I think I've made it pretty clear that why I am thinking that only some Humean or Counterfactual view could be viable ..(and it has nothing to do with me being a fan of Hume and/or Lewis)
Let me say it once again, the reason why causation can only be event based is because ..all change is just reduced to changeless parts ..which themselves don't do anything..they don't "move" they "don't go in and out of existence" they don't get "generated and corrupted" they don't get reduced from "Potentially X to Actually X" they are just Parts possessing different properties ..
so its seems superfluous to talk about any "powers" or "potencies" because powers to do what? or Potency for what? so it seems causation can be nothing but "loose and separate" as Hume characterises it ..
So for example in any event where where i am pushing a cart ..its not the "substance" which is "me" who is "causing" the "cart" to "move" by pushing it ..its just different parts of me and cart together in one event...
so I still don't get from where this talk of "Causal Powers" is getting sneaked in..
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Thread Starter- Dennis
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
At this point of the thread, I only want to ask you how you define change. From the looks of it, you completely disagree with what counts as change. If something is contingent, even if it exists eternally, it remains contingent. It doesn't seem like you are willing to grant this. Most theists opt. for B-Theory (in my experience) in order to avoid problems concerning Divine Action, that is something I'll stay out of.
The clock hand is pointing to 8 at T1.
The clock hand is pointing to 11 at T2.
The clock always has these properties, I'm assuming you'd reject (rightly, I think) that the clock has properties irrelevant of the timeslice; this would make temporal variation of properties for an object impossible. If this is so, all the problem that's being caused here is because you are assuming perdurantism along with B-Theory.
For suppose that the clock exists eternally, then the clock at T1 is both numerically and qualitatively identical to the clock existing at T2. This would fulfil the criteria for robust change, where there is a temporal variation of properties, and thus, change.
Last edited by Dennis (4/12/2017 12:33 pm)
- John West
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
Actually all that essence-existence stuff does make sense to me but I can't make sense of conjoining of essence-existence.
Think of it like a dependency relation. If that conjoiner weren't there, g wouldn't be conjoined with e.* The conjoiner “grounds” the conjoining of g and e.*
Similarly, if perdurantism and my ten past-relative temporal parts didn't exist, my brain wouldn't be thinking what it's thinking, my arms wouldn't be where they are, and so on.
On eternalism, both are the case eternally.
So I still don't understand from where you are sneaking in this type of causation
Haha. 
I haven't “sneaked” anything in. (It's disingenuous of you to keep saying I have.) I've given you arguments—that you haven't replied to—that the causal relations have to be real.
*Since the conjoiner's essence and existence are identical, it wouldn't exist in time even on an A-theory.