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2/21/2018 3:50 pm  #31


Re: Assuming PSR is false, in what other ways can we still prove God??

aftermathemat wrote:

[...] I mean, if PSR is false, then [...]

There can be no principled reason for stating that PSR is false. It is a bet.
 

 

2/21/2018 3:53 pm  #32


Re: Assuming PSR is false, in what other ways can we still prove God??

Johannes wrote:

There can be no principled reason for stating that PSR is false. It is a bet.
 

I was only assuming it for the sake of argument in order to show what consequences necessarily follow, though.
 

     Thread Starter
 

2/21/2018 4:39 pm  #33


Re: Assuming PSR is false, in what other ways can we still prove God??

Miguel wrote:

Johannes wrote:

Miguel wrote:

Begging the question is not an option for any rational person; if we accept explicability arguments, then it is only natural for us to accept an explicability argument for why things exist - which therefore leads to PSR.

The atheist could base his position on distinguishing between physical and metaphysical explanations, and then accepting the necessity and correspondence with reality of the former while rejecting those of the latter.

That would clearly be question-begging, but the atheist could say that the theist's putting in the same bag both physical and metaphysical explanations is also question-begging, or more elegantly, a postulate.
 

 
Della Rocca discusses this option in his original paper and finds it insufficient - specifying that the explanans must be of a certain way or properties. I'll just mention it here since I've already written too much.

 
This is the part where Della Rocca discusses a proposal that seems similar to what you said. I quote:

That one needs to have such a principled line enables me not only to respond to van Inwagen and Bennett, but also to mount a response to another subtle version of (2), i.e., of the claim that no explicability argument is legitimate. On this view, the conclusions of some or even most explicability arguments are true, i.e., there are no brute disposi- tions, A is not identical to B in the Par t case, etc. But — so this view goes — the notion of explicability doesn’t do any work in reaching these conclusions. Rather, the conclusions are accepted because they cohere better with our commitments in general and have no major un- toward consequences. By contrast — so the proponent of this strategy argues — the conclusion of the explicability argument concerning ex- istence, viz., that existence itself is explicable, does not cohere with our overall commitments and does have signi cant untoward conse- quences. The conclusions of some of the explicability arguments other than the argument that concerns existence are accepted, not because one is antecedently committed to the explicability of a certain fact or feature, but because those conclusions don’t con ict with our overall views. By contrast, on this view, the conclusion of the explicability ar- gument concerning existence is rejected because it does not cohere with our overall views. Because this view sees explicability as not guid- ing our conclusions and does not see us as antecedently committed to explicability in any particular case, this view can be seen as a version of (2): while the conclusions of some explicability arguments may be acceptable, the explicability arguments themselves are not legitimate.

For this response to my position to work, an exceptionally strong claim is needed: explicability by itself provides no reason for the con- clusion that A is not identical to B in the Par t case, that there are no brute dispositions, etc. For if explicability did provide such a rea- son, then there would be analogous reason for the conclusion in the case of existence, viz., that existence must be explained in terms of some deeper feature. But if there is such reason, then there is, as I have pointed out, reason for the PSR, i.e., there is an argument for the PSR. Given that there is such an argument, one would again need to reject the argument in a non-question-begging way. But, as we’ve seen, this may not be able to be done. To respond to my argument for the PSR — once this argument gets started — one may have no choice but to appeal to the denial of the PSR, i.e., one may have no choice but to beg the question. And, once again, this is not a satisfactory posi- tion to be in. So according to this response to me, that is, according to this subtle version of (2), the consideration of explicability by itself provides no reason for the conclusions in the case of the “good” expli- cability arguments.

But this certainly seems not to be right. The conclusion that (in the Parfitt case) A is identical to B seems wrong, and at least one of the reasons it does so is that the identity of A and B would be an intolerably brute fact. It is this reason that shows that explicability is doing at least some of the philosophical heavy lifting in such cases. As long as explicability is doing some of the heavy lifting, my argument against the PSR can get o the ground, and the need to respond to it in a non-question-begging way becomes urgent. The moral once again is that one can’t let my argument for the PSR get o the ground: if it does, then one will need to be able to respond to it in a non-question- begging way, that is, one will need to draw a principled line between explicability arguments. And this is precisely what we have not yet been able to do.

The atheist you mention would be rejecting explicability arguments as such, because he would deny that explicability by itself gives us reason to accept X instead of Y. Rather, the atheist requires us to make a distinction between physical and metaphysical explanations; would (question-beggingly) accept only physical explanations; but would claim we also beg the question if we accept metaphysical explanations because we accept physical explanations.

But there is no question-begging on our part. The point is that explicability and lack of explicability full stop -- regardless of specifying physical or metaphysical explanations -- is what gives us a reason to accept (say) a hypothesis X instead of Y. This is what explicability arguments are all about. And in the cases provided by Della Rocca as examples of explicability arguments, which the atheist would accept, are cases in which explicability by itself -- not having to be specified as "physical" -- is doing the "heavylifting", is doing the work which leads us to accept a hypothesis X instead of Y. So on this basis it is evident that metaphysical explanations, insofar as they are explanations, will be acceptable so long as we accept explicability arguments. No question-begging.

Also, I think we can go even further: remember I mentioned that the denial of explicability arguments is self-defeating, as it leads to a reductio since we reach conclusions because of explicability arguments also, so if we rejected them we could not justify this rejection, we could not explain it if we reject explicability, so it is invalidated (Feser defends this too). But here is what I'd add: keep in mind that what is relevant to explain a conclusion, or premisses, or other steps commonly involved in rational inference is intelligibility/explicability BY ITSELF, and not intelligibility or explicability in terms of "physical explanations". What does the relevant work in rational inference just is the intelligibility of a concept; the "physical" in a "physical explanation" would be completely accidental to what is relevant in actual explicability in rational inference. So the atheist's division as a way to avoid explicability arguments as such would be subjected to the same reductios as before.

The theist, by contrast, doesn't beg the question. Because the accepts that explicability as such is what is relevan in giving us reasons to accept X instead of Y, it is only natural that metaphysical explanations, insofar as they are explanations, would be part of explicability arguments. It is up to the atheist to reject metaphysical explanations without rejecting explicability arguments as such, and without begging the question.

Last edited by Miguel (2/21/2018 4:48 pm)

 

2/21/2018 4:53 pm  #34


Re: Assuming PSR is false, in what other ways can we still prove God??

Miguel wrote:

It is up to the atheist to reject metaphysical explanations without rejecting explicability arguments as such, and without begging the question.



One small question, if you don't mind:

Even if we were to somehow concede to the atheist that there is a legitimate and principled reason as to why explicability doesn't apply to existence, could we still make arguments in favour of PSR?

I am thinking here in terms of objects popping into existence in the future, things ceasing to exist, fundamental uncertainty / intuition-violations and other such things as being useful arguments for PSR  even if  we give a principled reason for why existence is not explicable, precisely because the above arguments I mentioned follow from the premise that existence is inexplicable.
Maybe we could even make the argument that  all  possible brute facts involve existence claims, such that brute facts involving, say, objects inexplicably hovering in the air for no reason or planes crashing for no reason, are in the same category as brute facts about existence.

If we could establish the above idea that all brute facts are existential claims, then  even if  we concede to the atheist that there is a principled reason for denying that existence is explicable (and thus abandon the Della Rocca argument), we can still prove PSR by showing how brute facts still undermine everyday expectations of explicability, natural intuitions about reality and even continue to undermine explicability arguments because the brute fact option is always present as a real possible result between 2 different balancing scales, melting tablets etc. And even if we cannot prove the above, we would still have arguments related to existence that can still easily be used to justify PSR.

Last edited by aftermathemat (2/21/2018 5:00 pm)

     Thread Starter
 

2/21/2018 6:29 pm  #35


Re: Assuming PSR is false, in what other ways can we still prove God??

Miguel wrote:

The atheist you mention would be rejecting explicability arguments as such, because he would deny that explicability by itself gives us reason to accept X instead of Y.

Note that holding "that explicability by itself gives us reason to accept X instead of Y" implies the assumption that reality is rationally explainable at all levels, ultimately rationally explainable.

Miguel wrote:

The point is that explicability and lack of explicability full stop -- regardless of specifying physical or metaphysical explanations -- is what gives us a reason to accept (say) a hypothesis X instead of Y. This is what explicability arguments are all about.

Here the mentioned implicit assumption is even more clear.

Miguel wrote:

And in the cases provided by Della Rocca as examples of explicability arguments, which the atheist would accept, are cases in which explicability by itself -- not having to be specified as "physical" -- is doing the "heavylifting", is doing the work which leads us to accept a hypothesis X instead of Y.

Those cases of explicability arguments are accepted by the atheist because they belong to a level of reality which the atheist assumes to be rationally intelligible. Basically the atheist views reality this way:

Physical level: how the universe evolves. Reality at this level is rationally explainable.
Explanations of facts at this level can and need to be developed, and the smart ones (*) agree with reality.

Metaphysical level: why the universe exists. Reality at this level may or may not be rationally explainable.
Explanations of facts at this level can be developed but may not need to be, and they may or may not agree with reality.

(*) Instances of smart explanations: General Relativity, the Standard Model of QM.

Miguel wrote:

Also, I think we can go even further: remember I mentioned that the denial of explicability arguments is self-defeating, as it leads to a reductio since we reach conclusions because of explicability arguments also, so if we rejected them we could not justify this rejection, we could not explain it if we reject explicability, so it is invalidated (Feser defends this too).

As I said in previous posts, the denial of explicability at the metaphysical level is not, and cannot be, a conclusion. It is always an assumption (= question-begging = bet). So it does not lead to a reductio.

Miguel wrote:

But here is what I'd add: keep in mind that what is relevant to explain a conclusion, or premisses, or other steps commonly involved in rational inference is intelligibility/explicability BY ITSELF, and not intelligibility or explicability in terms of "physical explanations". What does the relevant work in rational inference just is the intelligibility of a concept;

Yes, but atheists posit (= beg the question = bet) that reality, at the metaphysical level, is not intelligible, not amenable to explanations, just a brute fact.

Miguel wrote:

It is up to the atheist to reject metaphysical explanations without rejecting explicability arguments as such, and without begging the question.

They reject "explicability arguments as such" because they posit (= beg the question = bet) that reality is not rationally explainable at some level.

It is interesting to examine how the atheist's position, at least as I understand it, relates to the well-known Pauline passage on the possibility of the natural knowledge of God:

"For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, both His eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen, being understood through the things made, so that they are without excuse." (Rom 1:20)

To Paul's statement that the invisible qualities (aorata) of God are understood (nooumena) through the things made (tois poiēmasin), the atheist would reply that Paul is assuming that the kosmos of visible things, which may or may not have been actually made, is ultimately intelligible (noētós), i.e. including at the metaphysical level, which may or may not be the actual case. Since it is clear where, or to Whom, that assumption leads, the atheist opts for assuming that reality is not intelligible at the metaphysical level.

And initially at the physical level too, as established physics - as opposed to unfalsifiable speculations - strengthens the case that the universe had an absolute beginning in time.

Last edited by Johannes (2/21/2018 7:48 pm)

 

2/21/2018 7:35 pm  #36


Re: Assuming PSR is false, in what other ways can we still prove God??

Johannes,

How can an assumption not lead to a reductio? A reductio would show that the assumption is false. The problem isn't just that the atheist would undermine possible reasons for supporting his own view (which is why you're calling it an assumption I guess, to show that since it's a baseless assumption it needed no explicit support), the problem is that he would undermine any explicability arguments that feature in any of his rational inferences, which would completely destroy reason. The person who accepts PSR, by contrast, has no such problem, because they accept that explicability as such can lead us to accept X instead of Y.

The fact that an acceptance of explicability as such assumes (what is then shown to be an implication) that reality os rationally explainable at all levels is just another reason why the atheist CAN'T accept explicability arguments, but the theist/PSR supporter can do so and is NOT "begging the question" when he accepts metaphysical explanations. Because metaphysical explanations simply follow as legitimate from explicability arguments as such, inasmuch as metaphysical explanations are explanations. So the point is that the whole argument hinges on whether or not someone accepts explicability arguments, understood as arguments in which explicability itself can lead us to accept X instead of Y.

Della Rocca then shows that intuitively we all accept forms of explicability arguments, therefore we should accept an explicability argument for why things exist. Since metaphysical explanations necessarily follow as legitimate from the very notion of explicability arguments themselves, the atheist cannot accuse the theist of "begging the question" in accepting metaphysical explanations. If we accept explicability arguments, then we accept that metaphysical explicability, insofar as it involves explicability, can lead us to conclude X instead of Y. The PSR supporter begs no question. The atheist does, however. And as my reductio shows, the atheist cannot reject explicability arguments on pain of invalidating the prospects of rational inference. So the theist/PSR supporter simply recognizes: okay, we use explicability arguments, we accept them, and they imply also a metaphysical explanation in terms of PSR. It is up to the atheist to resist without begging the question, because the theist/PSR supporter is begging no question but simply accepting explicability arguments (which include metaphysical explicability) because of its essentiality in rational inference and common sense.

 

2/21/2018 9:02 pm  #37


Re: Assuming PSR is false, in what other ways can we still prove God??

Miguel wrote:

How can an assumption not lead to a reductio? A reductio would show that the assumption is false.

I was not referring to any reductio, but to the specific reductio you had talked about:

"remember I mentioned that the denial of explicability arguments is self-defeating, as it leads to a reductio since we reach conclusions because of explicability arguments also, so if we rejected them we could not justify this rejection, we could not explain it if we reject explicability,"

First, the atheist's rejection of EAs at the metaphysical level is an assumption, not a conclusion.

Second, the atheist's making that assumption does have an obvious explanation, not at the metaphysical but at the psychological level: he feels better that way.

Miguel wrote:

The problem isn't just that the atheist would undermine possible reasons for supporting his own view (which is why you're calling it an assumption I guess, to show that since it's a baseless assumption it needed no explicit support), the problem is that he would undermine any explicability arguments that feature in any of his rational inferences, which would completely destroy reason.

No, because he is not rejecting EAs in toto, but just those of a particular level.

Miguel wrote:

So the point is that the whole argument hinges on whether or not someone accepts explicability arguments, understood as arguments in which explicability itself can lead us to accept X instead of Y.

The theist's acceptance of EAs is unrestricted, the atheist's acceptance is restricted to specific levels of reality.

Miguel wrote:

Della Rocca then shows that intuitively we all accept forms of explicability arguments, therefore we should accept an explicability argument for why things exist.

Not a particularly happy argument for the unrestricted acceptance of EAs, because intuitively we'd think that the sun revolves around the earth.
 

 

2/22/2018 2:35 am  #38


Re: Assuming PSR is false, in what other ways can we still prove God??

I think you are missing the point.

1- Explicability arguments are such that we take explicability or lack thereof -- metaphysical, physical or whatever -- to play an important role in our acceptance or denial of different theses;

2- If the atheist is rejecting metaphysical explicability arguments, then he IS rejecting explicability in toto, because he is rejecting the idea that explicability full stop (or lack thereof) is what is ultimately relevant to our acceptance or rejection of different theses. Instead the atheist requires that an explanation be physical; even if there is a particularly illuminative metaphysical explanation for X, he will reject it simply because it is metaphysical, therefore he rejects explicability arguments as understood in 1.

3- The theist, or the PSR supporter, by contrast, simply accepts explicability arguments with no further qualifications necessary. He accepts that explicability -- any explicability, whether physical metaphysical conceptual or whatever -- is better than none, and that if a thesis or idea X is such that there would seem to be no explanation whatever for it, we should reject it.

For example, Archimedes's conclusion that if there is a balance in which everything is alike on both sides, and equal weights are hung on the two ends of the balance, the whole will be at rest, since there would be no reason why in these conditions any of the sides should hang lower than the other.

4- But we all accept many explicability arguments. Atheists accept explicability arguments all the time, in fact. Della Rocca cites numerous examples. But then we can make an explicability argument for PSR, which is of course a conclusion that the atheist wants to avoid.

5- Again, there is NO question-begging whatsoever on part of the theist/PSR supporter when it comes to accepting metaphysical explanations, because the theist simply accepts explicability (of any kind, per 1) arguments, which naturally will include metaphysical explanations insofar as these are explanations or at least possible explanations.

6- The atheist however is the one who has to create such a distinction, in order to outright REJECT explicability arguments -- rejecting the idea that explicability qua explicability (of any kind therefore: physical, metaphysical, etc) is better than none and can lead us to accept or reject certain theses on that basis --; the atheist will therefore have to insist that explicability is not what does the work in our common, ordinary quest for truth; rather what is relevant is something like "explicability in terms of physical causes". That's the atheist proposal for rejecting 1 (since 1 includes metaphysical explanations, as it includes any kind of explicability).

7- The problem is that we do seem to accept explicability arguments as understood in 1; any kind of explicability. So the atheist strategy to divide between physical and metaphysical explanations will not work against the argument.

8- The bigger problem is that there is a reductio available for the rejection of explicability arguments as presented in 1. Namely, we all have to accept that we make rational inferences and accept different theses on the basis of explicability and intelligibility of the theses, concepts, propositions, etc. The explicability involved in these cases *just is* "unspecified" explicability, or better speaking, intelligibility, since what ultimately matters in rational inference is the intelligibility of the ideas and how certain propositions are explained by other propositions, and NOT whether the explanations are "physical" or not. In fact, if we made accidental specifications such as "physical" essential to the explicability/intelligibility of a certain rational inference in thought, the inference would be invalid, just like we reason and reach conclusions by virtue of the intelligibility of propositional content of our ideas, and not the neurons, salt and electricity involved in synapses. Why is Socrates mortal? Because Socrates is a man, and every man is mortal. Not because my neurons Z were activated at time t.

9- So the atheist cannot reject explicability arguments. He cannot retreat into a distinction between physical and metaphhsical explanations. It could be that he made such a distinction for no reason other than to feel good about himself, but regardless of that, surely he cannot accept a thesis which would imply he cannot ever make valid rational inferences. But that's what happens when one rejects explicability arguments, per 8. So the atheist cannot reject explicability arguments.

10- But then the atheist is back at having to accept explicability arguments (which naturally aren't limited to physical explanations, but rather include any type of explicability whatsoever, inasmuch as what is relevant is explicability itself) which would lead him to accept PSR.

11- So he needs to find another way to resist the argument. And one which does not beg the question.

12- The theist/psr supporter, by contrast, just accepts explicability arguments, and therefore follows them wherever they lead: including PSR. No question-beggig.

 

2/22/2018 4:43 pm  #39


Re: Assuming PSR is false, in what other ways can we still prove God??

Miguel wrote:

8- The bigger problem is that there is a reductio available for the rejection of explicability arguments as presented in 1. Namely, we all have to accept that we make rational inferences and accept different theses on the basis of explicability and intelligibility of the theses, concepts, propositions, etc. The explicability involved in these cases *just is* "unspecified" explicability, or better speaking, intelligibility, since what ultimately matters in rational inference is the intelligibility of the ideas and how certain propositions are explained by other propositions, and NOT whether the explanations are "physical" or not. In fact, if we made accidental specifications such as "physical" essential to the explicability/intelligibility of a certain rational inference in thought, the inference would be invalid, just like we reason and reach conclusions by virtue of the intelligibility of propositional content of our ideas, and not the neurons, salt and electricity involved in synapses. Why is Socrates mortal? Because Socrates is a man, and every man is mortal. Not because my neurons Z were activated at time t.

9- So the atheist cannot reject explicability arguments. He cannot retreat into a distinction between physical and metaphhsical explanations. It could be that he made such a distinction for no reason other than to feel good about himself, but regardless of that, surely he cannot accept a thesis which would imply he cannot ever make valid rational inferences. But that's what happens when one rejects explicability arguments, per 8. So the atheist cannot reject explicability arguments.

I've just read the paper by Della Rocca and you are making a far stronger claim than the one he makes. He doesn't say that, by rejecting the explicability argument (EA) concerning existence, the non-rationalist (as he calls the PSR opponent) "cannot ever make valid rational inferences".

Rather, Della Rocca's argument is that "to appeal to an arbitrary line [between acceptable and unacceptable EAs] is to appeal to a brute fact" (*), and that "to appeal to a brute fact in this dialectical context [i.e. a context where the issue under discussion is the principle that there are no brute facts] is simply to presuppose that the PSR is false," i.e. to beg the question, and that question-begging is not acceptable. He states it most forcefully on p. 10:

"rather the cost is that one has no non-question-begging response to an argument for the PSR that has been offered on intuitive grounds. Question-beggingness is not a bullet one can willingly bite in order to respond to an argument in favor of one's opponent's position."

He makes the point again when discussing the case of bold Joe and hairy Fabio on pp. 11-12, when he says that, in that case, drawing an unprincipled, arbitrary line delimiting boldness is acceptable because it begs no questions in that context, wheras in the case of arguing about the PSR, to draw an unprincipled line is to beg the question against the PSR, since the PSR amounts to the statement that there are no brute facts.


(*) which is obvious and, moreover, could not have been otherwise, since rejecting the EA concerning existence amounts to stating that existence is a brute fact, and it is evident that the statement that something is a brute fact cannot itself be the conclusion of an argument from premises which are not brute facts.

Last edited by Johannes (2/22/2018 4:55 pm)

 

2/22/2018 5:08 pm  #40


Re: Assuming PSR is false, in what other ways can we still prove God??

Yes, Johannes. That is what Della Rocca is saying; my point was to make it clear that, unlike the atheist in your example, the PSR supporter does not beg the question in accepting metaphysical explanations, since metaphysical explanations simply follow from explicability arguments in general (insofar as metaphysical explanations are explanations). So only the PSR denier would be begging the question in rejecting "metaphysical explanations".

And yes, I make a much stronger claim. The reductio I presented in 8 is not present in Della Rocca's paper. While Della Rocca concedes that to reject explicability arguments would be "extremely problematic", he doesn't make the reductio argument. When responding to the alternative that the PSR denier might insist that we qualify that we (or he) only accepts explicability arguments in which the explanation is of a certain kind (for instance, your example of the atheist who distinguishes between physical and metaphysical explanations), Della Rocca only states that this would not work because we do in fact accept explicability arguments (as stated in 1) etc and "explicability" itself is what seems to do the "heavylifting", as is written in the quote I pasted here. I do however think that, in addition to that, we can make the reductio I presented in 8, which would undermine the attempt to reject explicability by specifying "physical explanations" as the only candidates. Della Rocca doesn't make the reductio in 8; it is mine. But I think it's correct.

Last edited by Miguel (2/22/2018 5:09 pm)

 

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