aftermathemat wrote:

[...] I mean, if PSR is false, then [...]

There can be no principled reason for stating that PSR is false. It is a bet.
 

Miguel wrote:

Johannes wrote:

Miguel wrote:

Begging the question is not an option for any rational person; if we accept explicability arguments, then it is only natural for us to accept an explicability argument for why things exist - which therefore leads to PSR.

The atheist could base his position on distinguishing between physical and metaphysical explanations, and then accepting the necessity and correspondence with reality of the former while rejecting those of the latter.

That would clearly be question-begging, but the atheist could say that the theist's putting in the same bag both physical and metaphysical explanations is also question-begging, or more elegantly, a postulate.
 

 
Della Rocca discusses this option in his original paper and finds it insufficient - specifying that the explanans must be of a certain way or properties. I'll just mention it here since I've already written too much.

 
This is the part where Della Rocca discusses a proposal that seems similar to what you said. I quote:

That one needs to have such a principled line enables me not only to respond to van Inwagen and Bennett, but also to mount a response to another subtle version of (2), i.e., of the claim that no explicability argument is legitimate. On this view, the conclusions of some or even most explicability arguments are true, i.e., there are no brute disposi- tions, A is not identical to B in the Par t case, etc. But — so this view goes — the notion of explicability doesn’t do any work in reaching these conclusions. Rather, the conclusions are accepted because they cohere better with our commitments in general and have no major un- toward consequences. By contrast — so the proponent of this strategy argues — the conclusion of the explicability argument concerning ex- istence, viz., that existence itself is explicable, does not cohere with our overall commitments and does have signi cant untoward conse- quences. The conclusions of some of the explicability arguments other than the argument that concerns existence are accepted, not because one is antecedently committed to the explicability of a certain fact or feature, but because those conclusions don’t con ict with our overall views. By contrast, on this view, the conclusion of the explicability ar- gument concerning existence is rejected because it does not cohere with our overall views. Because this view sees explicability as not guid- ing our conclusions and does not see us as antecedently committed to explicability in any particular case, this view can be seen as a version of (2): while the conclusions of some explicability arguments may be acceptable, the explicability arguments themselves are not legitimate.

For this response to my position to work, an exceptionally strong claim is needed: explicability by itself provides no reason for the con- clusion that A is not identical to B in the Par t case, that there are no brute dispositions, etc. For if explicability did provide such a rea- son, then there would be analogous reason for the conclusion in the case of existence, viz., that existence must be explained in terms of some deeper feature. But if there is such reason, then there is, as I have pointed out, reason for the PSR, i.e., there is an argument for the PSR. Given that there is such an argument, one would again need to reject the argument in a non-question-begging way. But, as we’ve seen, this may not be able to be done. To respond to my argument for the PSR — once this argument gets started — one may have no choice but to appeal to the denial of the PSR, i.e., one may have no choice but to beg the question. And, once again, this is not a satisfactory posi- tion to be in. So according to this response to me, that is, according to this subtle version of (2), the consideration of explicability by itself provides no reason for the conclusions in the case of the “good” expli- cability arguments.

But this certainly seems not to be right. The conclusion that (in the Parfitt case) A is identical to B seems wrong, and at least one of the reasons it does so is that the identity of A and B would be an intolerably brute fact. It is this reason that shows that explicability is doing at least some of the philosophical heavy lifting in such cases. As long as explicability is doing some of the heavy lifting, my argument against the PSR can get o the ground, and the need to respond to it in a non-question-begging way becomes urgent. The moral once again is that one can’t let my argument for the PSR get o the ground: if it does, then one will need to be able to respond to it in a non-question- begging way, that is, one will need to draw a principled line between explicability arguments. And this is precisely what we have not yet been able to do.

The atheist you mention would be rejecting explicability arguments as such, because he would deny that explicability by itself gives us reason to accept X instead of Y. Rather, the atheist requires us to make a distinction between physical and metaphysical explanations; would (question-beggingly) accept only physical explanations; but would claim we also beg the question if we accept metaphysical explanations because we accept physical explanations.

But there is no question-begging on our part. The point is that explicability and lack of explicability full stop -- regardless of specifying physical or metaphysical explanations -- is what gives us a reason to accept (say) a hypothesis X instead of Y. This is what explicability arguments are all about. And in the cases provided by Della Rocca as examples of explicability arguments, which the atheist would accept, are cases in which explicability by itself -- not having to be specified as "physical" -- is doing the "heavylifting", is doing the work which leads us to accept a hypothesis X instead of Y. So on this basis it is evident that metaphysical explanations, insofar as they are explanations, will be acceptable so long as we accept explicability arguments. No question-begging.

Also, I think we can go even further: remember I mentioned that the denial of explicability arguments is self-defeating, as it leads to a reductio since we reach conclusions because of explicability arguments also, so if we rejected them we could not justify this rejection, we could not explain it if we reject explicability, so it is invalidated (Feser defends this too). But here is what I'd add: keep in mind that what is relevant to explain a conclusion, or premisses, or other steps commonly involved in rational inference is intelligibility/explicability BY ITSELF, and not intelligibility or explicability in terms of "physical explanations". What does the relevant work in rational inference just is the intelligibility of a concept; the "physical" in a "physical explanation" would be completely accidental to what is relevant in actual explicability in rational inference. So the atheist's division as a way to avoid explicability arguments as such would be subjected to the same reductios as before.

The theist, by contrast, doesn't beg the question. Because the accepts that explicability as such is what is relevan in giving us reasons to accept X instead of Y, it is only natural that metaphysical explanations, insofar as they are explanations, would be part of explicability arguments. It is up to the atheist to reject metaphysical explanations without rejecting explicability arguments as such, and without begging the question.

Last edited by Miguel (2/21/2018 4:48 pm)

Miguel wrote:

The atheist you mention would be rejecting explicability arguments as such, because he would deny that explicability by itself gives us reason to accept X instead of Y.

Note that holding "that explicability by itself gives us reason to accept X instead of Y" implies the assumption that reality is rationally explainable at all levels, ultimately rationally explainable.

Miguel wrote:

The point is that explicability and lack of explicability full stop -- regardless of specifying physical or metaphysical explanations -- is what gives us a reason to accept (say) a hypothesis X instead of Y. This is what explicability arguments are all about.

Here the mentioned implicit assumption is even more clear.

Miguel wrote:

And in the cases provided by Della Rocca as examples of explicability arguments, which the atheist would accept, are cases in which explicability by itself -- not having to be specified as "physical" -- is doing the "heavylifting", is doing the work which leads us to accept a hypothesis X instead of Y.

Those cases of explicability arguments are accepted by the atheist because they belong to a level of reality which the atheist assumes to be rationally intelligible. Basically the atheist views reality this way:

Physical level: how the universe evolves. Reality at this level is rationally explainable.
Explanations of facts at this level can and need to be developed, and the smart ones (*) agree with reality.

Metaphysical level: why the universe exists. Reality at this level may or may not be rationally explainable.
Explanations of facts at this level can be developed but may not need to be, and they may or may not agree with reality.

(*) Instances of smart explanations: General Relativity, the Standard Model of QM.

Miguel wrote:

Also, I think we can go even further: remember I mentioned that the denial of explicability arguments is self-defeating, as it leads to a reductio since we reach conclusions because of explicability arguments also, so if we rejected them we could not justify this rejection, we could not explain it if we reject explicability, so it is invalidated (Feser defends this too).

As I said in previous posts, the denial of explicability at the metaphysical level is not, and cannot be, a conclusion. It is always an assumption (= question-begging = bet). So it does not lead to a reductio.

Miguel wrote:

But here is what I'd add: keep in mind that what is relevant to explain a conclusion, or premisses, or other steps commonly involved in rational inference is intelligibility/explicability BY ITSELF, and not intelligibility or explicability in terms of "physical explanations". What does the relevant work in rational inference just is the intelligibility of a concept;

Yes, but atheists posit (= beg the question = bet) that reality, at the metaphysical level, is not intelligible, not amenable to explanations, just a brute fact.

Miguel wrote:

It is up to the atheist to reject metaphysical explanations without rejecting explicability arguments as such, and without begging the question.

They reject "explicability arguments as such" because they posit (= beg the question = bet) that reality is not rationally explainable at some level.

It is interesting to examine how the atheist's position, at least as I understand it, relates to the well-known Pauline passage on the possibility of the natural knowledge of God:

"For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, both His eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen, being understood through the things made, so that they are without excuse." (Rom 1:20)

To Paul's statement that the invisible qualities (aorata) of God are understood (nooumena) through the things made (tois poiēmasin), the atheist would reply that Paul is assuming that the kosmos of visible things, which may or may not have been actually made, is ultimately intelligible (noētós), i.e. including at the metaphysical level, which may or may not be the actual case. Since it is clear where, or to Whom, that assumption leads, the atheist opts for assuming that reality is not intelligible at the metaphysical level.

And initially at the physical level too, as established physics - as opposed to unfalsifiable speculations - strengthens the case that the universe had an absolute beginning in time.

Last edited by Johannes (2/21/2018 7:48 pm)

Miguel wrote:

How can an assumption not lead to a reductio? A reductio would show that the assumption is false.

I was not referring to any reductio, but to the specific reductio you had talked about:

"remember I mentioned that the denial of explicability arguments is self-defeating, as it leads to a reductio since we reach conclusions because of explicability arguments also, so if we rejected them we could not justify this rejection, we could not explain it if we reject explicability,"

First, the atheist's rejection of EAs at the metaphysical level is an assumption, not a conclusion.

Second, the atheist's making that assumption does have an obvious explanation, not at the metaphysical but at the psychological level: he feels better that way.

Miguel wrote:

The problem isn't just that the atheist would undermine possible reasons for supporting his own view (which is why you're calling it an assumption I guess, to show that since it's a baseless assumption it needed no explicit support), the problem is that he would undermine any explicability arguments that feature in any of his rational inferences, which would completely destroy reason.

No, because he is not rejecting EAs in toto, but just those of a particular level.

Miguel wrote:

So the point is that the whole argument hinges on whether or not someone accepts explicability arguments, understood as arguments in which explicability itself can lead us to accept X instead of Y.

The theist's acceptance of EAs is unrestricted, the atheist's acceptance is restricted to specific levels of reality.

Miguel wrote:

Della Rocca then shows that intuitively we all accept forms of explicability arguments, therefore we should accept an explicability argument for why things exist.

Not a particularly happy argument for the unrestricted acceptance of EAs, because intuitively we'd think that the sun revolves around the earth.
 

Miguel wrote:

8- The bigger problem is that there is a reductio available for the rejection of explicability arguments as presented in 1. Namely, we all have to accept that we make rational inferences and accept different theses on the basis of explicability and intelligibility of the theses, concepts, propositions, etc. The explicability involved in these cases *just is* "unspecified" explicability, or better speaking, intelligibility, since what ultimately matters in rational inference is the intelligibility of the ideas and how certain propositions are explained by other propositions, and NOT whether the explanations are "physical" or not. In fact, if we made accidental specifications such as "physical" essential to the explicability/intelligibility of a certain rational inference in thought, the inference would be invalid, just like we reason and reach conclusions by virtue of the intelligibility of propositional content of our ideas, and not the neurons, salt and electricity involved in synapses. Why is Socrates mortal? Because Socrates is a man, and every man is mortal. Not because my neurons Z were activated at time t.

9- So the atheist cannot reject explicability arguments. He cannot retreat into a distinction between physical and metaphhsical explanations. It could be that he made such a distinction for no reason other than to feel good about himself, but regardless of that, surely he cannot accept a thesis which would imply he cannot ever make valid rational inferences. But that's what happens when one rejects explicability arguments, per 8. So the atheist cannot reject explicability arguments.

I've just read the paper by Della Rocca and you are making a far stronger claim than the one he makes. He doesn't say that, by rejecting the explicability argument (EA) concerning existence, the non-rationalist (as he calls the PSR opponent) "cannot ever make valid rational inferences".

Rather, Della Rocca's argument is that "to appeal to an arbitrary line [between acceptable and unacceptable EAs] is to appeal to a brute fact" (*), and that "to appeal to a brute fact in this dialectical context [i.e. a context where the issue under discussion is the principle that there are no brute facts] is simply to presuppose that the PSR is false," i.e. to beg the question, and that question-begging is not acceptable. He states it most forcefully on p. 10:

"rather the cost is that one has no non-question-begging response to an argument for the PSR that has been offered on intuitive grounds. Question-beggingness is not a bullet one can willingly bite in order to respond to an argument in favor of one's opponent's position."

He makes the point again when discussing the case of bold Joe and hairy Fabio on pp. 11-12, when he says that, in that case, drawing an unprincipled, arbitrary line delimiting boldness is acceptable because it begs no questions in that context, wheras in the case of arguing about the PSR, to draw an unprincipled line is to beg the question against the PSR, since the PSR amounts to the statement that there are no brute facts.


(*) which is obvious and, moreover, could not have been otherwise, since rejecting the EA concerning existence amounts to stating that existence is a brute fact, and it is evident that the statement that something is a brute fact cannot itself be the conclusion of an argument from premises which are not brute facts.

Last edited by Johannes (2/22/2018 4:55 pm)