- Ouros
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Re: A simple argument for the personhood of the first cause, by Lonergan
So, it's the idea of a complex yet necessary thing?
Well, I'm probably with you, from what I've read of you.
I would say that a necessary being can, in some sense, parts. But, I think that in that case, the parts will be formally different, in a scotist way.
Still, it would not be a problem for the theist: if the First Cause is infinite and "simple enough", it would still be God.
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Re: A simple argument for the personhood of the first cause, by Lonergan
Miguel wrote:
But, doesn't necessity simply means, in the broad sense, that its opposite is impossible?
So, why can't we simply explain necessary propositions by saying that its contrary is not possible?Because that would be explain necessary combinations of parts or necessary actions, precisely in virtue of their being necessary, something Miquel’s account seeks to rule out.
Yeah, because I don't think all necessary facts have the same type of explanation. Some may be fully explained by their nature and meaning, but some - like those involving parts - have to be explained by reference to somehing else which holds them together.
Even if we didn't have a good grasp on what the explanations are for many necessary facts, this shouldn't lead us to posit necessaryfacts as *brute facts*. Or any of them. I think that would be just as preposterous as contingent brute facts, if not more so (for instance my deductive argument against brute facts). With that in mind, and considering odd necessities which Pruss himself admits, it is perfectly sensible to demand an explanation for, say, a necessary being that somehow is composed of parts. Any ontological analysis of that without reference to an external explanation would be severely problematic.
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You know that if the PSR for contingent truths entails something as vague (maybe the vagueness if due to its being underdeveloped) and controversial as this requirement then a number of people will take it as reason to reject the contingent truths PSR.
Re parts, it helps to distinguish between mereological and metaphysical parts. The former are the honest detachable material parts most people think of when they use that term: the latter are properties or property instances (and perphaps some individuator like a bare particular or prime matter).
The former admit to a PSR explanation easily e.g. it makes sense to ask why does this bike of these handle bars, but the latter doesn’t appear to - who does one answer why all entities with a colour trope also have a spatiality trope or why all triangular objects are also trialateral?
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Re: A simple argument for the personhood of the first cause, by Lonergan
Sure but I don't see it as controversial at all. All things must be intelligible and have an explanation. This is self-evident to me; a thing's existing in all possible worlds does not automatically explain its existence in the actual world or even in all possible worlds. A thing's being modally necessary does not imply that it is independent and its existence would be in need of no explanation - if someone finds that controversial, or is led to reject a PSR for necessary truths simply because we may have a difficulty at finding explanations for many necessary facts, then I think they are wrong and, incidentally, I think we could use many of the same standard arguments for PSR for a PSR for necessary truths.
Re parts, things must be explained by being and unity. All things are ultimately explained by a prior simplicity in being. It is also profitable to distinguish between abstract and concrete beings. The existence of a concrete, modally necessary composite being would require the existence of a simple concrete being, if anything because it cannot be in the nature of an abstract part to bring about the existence of a concrete being - it makes no sense whatsoever. So if there is a modally necessary material being, which is ultimately composed by abstract parts of form and matter, both modally necessary, still there is nothing in the nature of these abstractions that could by itself make them operative to be conjoined into a substance. It would make no sense and we would be led into a concrete simple necessary being anyway.
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Re: A simple argument for the personhood of the first cause, by Lonergan
Could give examples of potential explaintions for some of the examples I have raised?
Re Simplicity, why must a necessary concrete substance be the result of a necessary simple one? The example you give relies on the Thomist account of form and matter, a very specific account with its own problems which is not going to commend itself to a lot of philosophers who lack an a priori commitment to Thomas. Also: technically speaking it can’t be the Thomist account since mater implies corporeality this ruling out its presence in the composition of immaterial necessary beings (which is why Thomas had to appeal to the dreaded Real Distinction to account for the contingency of the angels).
FWIW I think Vallicell provides an amending working version of the Neo-Platonic proof which fairs better against these objections and also captures the strengths of Thomist existential proofs without the awkward property-instance theory Miller and co appeal to.
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Re: A simple argument for the personhood of the first cause, by Lonergan
We may try to explain it by the plotinian view that oneness is prior to multiplicity; triangular objects are always trilateral because trilaterality is an inseparable part which is dependent on the whole (the triangular and trilateral object which unifies both). We can think of trilaterality without thinking of triangularity, but trilaterality is still dependent on a unity which takes it as an inseparable part. All things are explained by prior being and simplicity.
Though I accept hylemorphism, I was just giving it as an example to distinguish between abstract and concrete beings in the explanation of composites. A necessary concrete substance must be the result of a simple one because if it isn't already simple, then it is composite, but if it is composite, its existence is dependent upon the existence and unification of its parts. One way or another we get to a concrete necessary simple being. I rule out an infinite regress of composites because the existence of each composite would be dependent upon the existence and keeping-together of the previous composites, and without a first, noncomposite being, the existence of composites would be impossible and unintelligible. (I also used form and matter as examples because generally the most pressing explanandum is the material universe; angels etc don't often come up in discussions of God's existence through natural theology).
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Re: A simple argument for the personhood of the first cause, by Lonergan
But none of that even is necessary to accept that modal necessity does not automatically explain something. I take that to be self-evident. We may imagine a dependent being existing in every possible world and it will still require an explanation for its existence in that which it depends for its existence. And this has been quite standard historically, like in St Augustine's argument.
And I stand by what I said before; merely stating that the world exists because it is a necessary fact for it to exist exactly the way it is, with no purpose whatsoever, is not explanatory. And it could potentially open the door to ridiculous moves in explanation such as coming up with metaphysical principles for everything being exactly as it is, etc.
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Re: A simple argument for the personhood of the first cause, by Lonergan
We may try to explain it by the plotinian view that oneness is prior to multiplicity; triangular objects are always trilateral because trilaterality is an inseparable part which is dependent on the whole (the triangular and trilateral object which unifies both). We can think of trilaterality without thinking of triangularity, but trilaterality is still dependent on a unity which takes it as an inseparable part.
If they are an inseparable part you haven't given an explanation for their necessity co-extension (or strictly speaking you have shifted the problem to from two properties necessarily occurring together to their being necessarily unified together by an external unifier). Remember I was asking for a contrastive explanation - why is triangularity necessarily co-present with trilaterality as opposed to say mintyness or blueness?
But none of that even is necessary to accept that modal necessity does not automatically explain something. I take that to be self-evident. We may imagine a dependent being existing in every possible world and it will still require an explanation for its existence in that which it depends for its existence. And this has been quite standard historically, like in St Augustine's argument.
That is not the purpose of Augustine's argument (though Leibniz was the one who really developed it at any length) though, which was to account for worlds where universals were not instantiated given the alleged mind/particular dependence of universals e.g. it's possible all Red things go out of existence yet Red seems eternal so there must be a mind always contemplating it. In modern terms: universals truths e.g. Red is closer to Yellow than Blue appear to be necessary truths ergo there must be truth-makers for those truths (the universals themselves given realism) in every world, yet if they are dependent on particulars or minds then there must be either be a mind or a particular instance in every world. Since it being a necessary fact that a Red thing exists means either there is a necessary Red thing or necessarily there is some contingent being which is Red, both of which are problematic, people opt for the mind thus one get's the Proof from Eternal Truths.
Existence is all possible worlds being compatible with dependency came about in the context of theistic activism e.g. God creating universals, as a way of pacifying WLC type griefing about Divine aseity
And I stand by what I said before; merely stating that the world exists because it is a necessary fact for it to exist exactly the way it is, with no purpose whatsoever, is not explanatory. And it could potentially open the door to ridiculous moves in explanation such as coming up with metaphysical principles for everything being exactly as it is, etc.
We have those arguments e.g. if contingent beings require a necessary being then the universe is the necessary being, and whilst I don't think they work they can't be dismissed simply on the grounds one stipulates the being has to be simple (there's enough other grounds e.g. trashing modal intuitions, determinism and free will et cetera et cetera).
Last edited by DanielCC (3/16/2018 4:06 pm)
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Re: A simple argument for the personhood of the first cause, by Lonergan
"That is not the purpose of Augustine's argument (though Leibniz was the one who really developed it at any length) though, which was to account for worlds "
How is that significantly different from what I'm saying? I know Augustine didn't exactly frame his argument in terms of modality, but there was still a sense of the necessity of such truths (eternal truths) which nevertheless would have to be grounded. My point is it's an example of what I said. Merely stating something is modally necessary does not automatically explain it and deal away with brute facts.
"We have those arguments e.g. if contingent beings require a necessary being then the universe is the necessary being, and whilst I don't think they work they can't be dismissed simply on the grounds one stipulates the being has to be simple (there's enough other grounds e.g. trashing modal intuitions, determinism and free will et cetera et cetera)."
They obviously can, because if a being is not simple it is dependent upon the existence and conjunction of parts. Its bein existent in every possible world doesn't change the fact that it is dependent upon the existence and conjunction of parts. I don't see why you are saying that that is not enough, contra me and Pruss. Isn't it reasonable to ask what keeps a necessary being together if it is composed of parts? Or at least if its own parts are themselves conposed of further parts?
Is the objection here because we may not know how to give explanations to some necessary facts? If so, this is a very weak reason as I said; it's just self-evident that dependent beings will still require more than just modal necessity in order to be explained. It's what they are. Same for composite beings. We will invariably be able to pose the question "is this necessary being composed of parts?", and if it is composed of parts, we will want to know whether the parts themselves have further parts. This is a fact of the matter regardless whether or not the beings are modally necessary. We will have to reach a simple being one way or another; and then we may go ahead and ask what keeps necessary parts united.
I will answer the triangularity issue later.
Last edited by Miguel (3/16/2018 5:14 pm)
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Re: A simple argument for the personhood of the first cause, by Lonergan
"That is not the purpose of Augustine's argument (though Leibniz was the one who really developed it at any length) though, which was to account for worlds "
How is that significantly different from what I'm saying?
I know Augustine didn't exactly frame his argument in terms of modality, but there was still a sense of the necessity of such truths (eternal truths) which nevertheless would have to be grounded. My point is it's an example of what I said. Merely stating something is modally necessary does not automatically explain it and deal away with brute facts.
Augustine and co would a prior rule out independently existing Platonic abstracta on the grounds of their being incompatible with theism or the quasi-Aristotelian theory of universals they wished to endorse. Their reason for positing the Divine Mind was to preserve the eternal character of universal truths in the absence of Platonic abstracta not to serve as an additional explanatory element in universals necessary existence. You *can* argue it as such, but in order to do so people have to accept the PSR for necessary beings independently.
They obviously can, because if a being is not simple it is dependent upon the existence and conjunction of parts.
Again, I don't a priori grant this premise and since I am asking you to justify the PSR for necessary truths it won't help appealing to it (since that would beg the question against the kind of internal necessary connections I mentioned).
"Its bein existent in every possible world doesn't change the fact that it is dependent upon the existence and conjunction of parts. I don't see why you are saying that. Is it just because we may not know how to give explanations to some necessary facts? I
No, it's because it borders on the incoherent to claim that there could in principle be an explanation of the PSR kind for why necessary facts aren't otherwise. If you give such an explaintion and it relies on the action of an external *something* the same question rears its head (what explains the necessery truth that X simple being necesserily unifies these two properties - if you answer it's unifying is necessery we have the unexplained necessity again, if you answer it is contingent modal voluntarism looms)
We'll see more when you get back with the triangle example.
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Re: A simple argument for the personhood of the first cause, by Lonergan
Is it incoherent to seek an explanation for why a modally necessary being exists, if we have reasons to take it as a dependent being?
For example, is it incoherent to ask for an explanation for the parts of a necessary being? I not only don't see it as incoherent, but I find it natural and just self-evident that a thing's being modally necessary doesn't stop us from asking about whether it has parts. And this question is immediately relevant to the thread's issue.
So, do you think it's incoherent to ask whether a modally necessary being has parts? If you don't find it incoherent (and you shouldn't since it must be the case that either the being has parts or not) what you'll conclude is something relevant to that being's existential dependency which is NOT entirely dealt away with by modal necessity. In other words, if the necessary being has parts, then this necessary being owes its existence to its parts being conjoined, and it will be no good to just say "well, it is a necessary being! It exists in all possible worlds!"; the parts, by virtue of being parts, will be relevant to the existence of that being regardless of what would be the case with its modality. That's the point. If you grant that, then I can only ask you why you think we should *in principle* block all attempts to find explanations for dependent or composite beings merely because we don't have a perfect grasp on explanations for necessary facts.
Or take another example, that of augustinian arguments involving universals, possibilia etc. If we have reasons for both (1) rejecting platonism and (2) accepting realism and the fact that the eternal truths exist in every possible world, how is it illegitimate to inquire for an explanation as to how these eternal truths exist even though they are necessary (for example, by divine conceptualism)? "That presupposes PSR for necessary truhs" well as I said, these examples to me just provide cases in which it is self-evident that there must be an explanation even for necessary truths, at least these ones. If I have reasons to believe both 1 and 2 there has to be a fact of the matter as to how these eternal truths exist, and it is no good to say this "presupposes a PSR that hasn't been argued for". It *is* an example of necessary facts requiring explanations! It is just an example of when it definitely is reasonable to search for an explanation here. Which is why even Pruss who limita psr to contingent truths is willing to grant that "the fact that not all necessities need an explanation doesn't mean that odd necessities don't require an explanation".
(It needn't even be an appeal to PSR as such, but merely a local appeal to explicability, as Della Rocca would put it).
You wanna claim that we are in principle unjustified in seeking explanations for these cases merely because 1) there are some cases in which we don't know how explanations of necessary facts work or 2) these explanations will ultimately require explanations which we are not sure how would work??? So we can't even seek an explanation for these specific facts? If that's it, it's just preposterous to me and the cases I gave are counter-examples.
"what explains the necessery truth that X simple being necesserily unifies these two properties - if you answer it's unifying is necessery we have the unexplained necessity again, if you answer it is contingent modal voluntarism looms)"
Whatever is the explanation for why the simple being unifies these two properties, what IS clear is that it would be unintelligible for a necessary composite being to not depend on its parts to exist. There must therefore be a simple being involved. Modal necessity doesn't change that one bit, which is why a composite being, even if necessary, cannot be the ultimate explanation of the existence of anything else, since its own existence must be further explained in terms of parts. We have to go as far as we can go. If we find a barrier which seems too hard to comprehend we shouldn't suppose it is completely unexplainable and throw away attempts to explain other, more simple things. Rather we should just assume we may not be able of understanding all of this, but still we should go as far as we can with explanations.
(And the need for an ultimate explanation is part of what I first talked about in this thread, that the existence of conditioned beings must ultimately be given a purposeful explanation and not merely one in terms of necessity).
The arguments from motion, parts, essence/existence, and even the rationalist one which is seeking explanations for all whose existence is not a necessity of its own *nature* (independent of further parts, actualizations, acts of existence, etc), cannot be blocked by modal necessity alone. The issue is not modal necessity, the issue is that every mixture of act/potency must be actualized by a being already in act; every composite being must be unified by something else; every mixture of essence/existence must be caused by an external cause; etc. Whether they exist in all possible worlds or not doesn't do anything to stop the arguments. If a limitation on PSR is invoked, the arguments will work as immediate counter-examples.
Last edited by Miguel (3/16/2018 6:45 pm)
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