You've said that trope bundle theory is simpler than blob nominalism. In that case, there must be another alternative. Because my view is simpler than trope bundle theory.

Perhaps both trope bundle theory and blob nominalism are parsimonious par excellence. 

It's, however, not clear that blob nominalism is more parsimonious than trope bundle theory (and, when we get to the problem of universals, I think you're going to really dislike some of the moves non-ostrich blob nominalists have to make to avoid contradiction.)

But you've said that trope bundle theory is simpler than blob nominalism. And if I now say "minus the tropes" are you going to say that that is blob nominalism, and so blob nominalism is both more and less parsimonious than trope bundle theory?

Well, a couple things. First, a lot (a majority, I think) of trope bundle theorists reduce the bundling relation (e.g. Campbell, Simons). Second, if you adopt trope bundle theory, remove the bundling relation, and then remove the tropes, you're left with nothing. So, yes. It's more parsimonious, but, well, not in a good way.

surroundx wrote:

I'm more certain that only particulars exist, than I am that propositional content does not exist. In part because, not using the term myself, I leave it for others to define "propositional content". I don't want to define it as entailing universals, and then have some strict particularist come alone and say "I believe in propositional content, you have no right to define it as entailing universals".

surroundx wrote:

I'd say your thought is more of the form "abcxyz", where those letters represent more basic thoughts. Some or all of which may be innate to the brain through evolutionary selection. However, my intention is not so much to stake out any particular account of mentality, but rather to illustrate the significant number of particular-only possibilities around so that invoking universals is an unjustified leap past models that might be seen to rid one of some kind of significance. I have also raised the issue affecting UPC of explaining how people think fallaciously if valid inference is innate in the causal potency thoughts.

Something has propositional content if it is specified by a proposition. That's all it means. I'm thinking now that the Eiffel Tower is in France; the thought is picked out by reference to a proposition. (It is perhaps also possible simply to think of some object, say the Eiffel Tower.) The question of whether thoughts have propositional content is thus separable from any particular account of how thoughts or anything else can have propositional content. I would think that universals enter in at the second stage, if at all.

Denying that thoughts have propositional content seems tantamount to denying that there are thoughts (or, at least, that much of what we call thoughts are thoughts, if one thinks thoughts can simply have a singular object). I don't at all understand the suggestion that my thought has the form "abcxyz". I have no idea what that is supposed to mean. If that is supposed to be an alternative​ to saying that thoughts have propositional content (as your "more of" suggests), then I am not sure how it could be. For if the suggestion is that my thought that the Eiffel Tower is in France​ (the thought under discussion) has the form "abcxyz", then the theory is still picking out my thought by way of its propositional content, and it is hard to see how it could do otherwise, since otherwise you cannot say which thought has the form "abcxyz".

​Perhaps that wasn't your ambition, and you rather want to analyze or explain my thought that the Eiffel Tower is in France as "really" having the form "abcxyz", which in some sense is supposed to mean that it is composed (right?) out of more basic thoughts. That ambition would be more comprehensible to me, although the account in question is still entirely obscure and unmotivated. (Not to mention, I don't know what a basic thought is.)

Greg wrote:

Something has propositional content if it is specified by a proposition. That's all it means. I'm thinking now that the Eiffel Tower is in France; the thought is picked out by reference to a proposition. (It is perhaps also possible simply to think of some object, say the Eiffel Tower.) The question of whether thoughts have propositional content is thus separable from any particular account of how thoughts or anything else can have propositional content. I would think that universals enter in at the second stage, if at all.

Denying that thoughts have propositional content seems tantamount to denying that there are thoughts (or, at least, that much of what we call thoughts are thoughts, if one thinks thoughts can simply have a singular object). I don't at all understand the suggestion that my thought has the form "abcxyz". I have no idea what that is supposed to mean. If that is supposed to be an alternative​ to saying that thoughts have propositional content (as your "more of" suggests), then I am not sure how it could be. For if the suggestion is that my thought that the Eiffel Tower is in France​ (the thought under discussion) has the form "abcxyz", then the theory is still picking out my thought by way of its propositional content, and it is hard to see how it could do otherwise, since otherwise you cannot say which thought has the form "abcxyz".

​Perhaps that wasn't your ambition, and you rather want to analyze or explain my thought that the Eiffel Tower is in France as "really" having the form "abcxyz", which in some sense is supposed to mean that it is composed (right?) out of more basic thoughts. That ambition would be more comprehensible to me, although the account in question is still entirely obscure and unmotivated. (Not to mention, I don't know what a basic thought is.)

I was doing both things: proposing a simpler alternative (although I was extremely vague, sorry) and arguing for composition. Starting with the latter is a nice lead-in to the former.

For any mind there is going to be a minimum thought that it can have. A "smallest subject" (primitive subject?) if you like. Assuming that we take subjects to be primitive and not predicates, which seems rather obvious. So as an explanation for why we can think about things that don't exist (or have never encountered before etc.), and why we seem to have differentially sized thoughts ("Eiffel Tower" vs "the Eiffel Tower is in France"), it seems most parsimonious to suggest that there are basic or simple thoughts (i.e. smallest/primitive subject) and those which are composed of such basic/primitive thoughts.

Now, since all of the most basic thoughts are subjects, and non-basic thoughts are made up of basic thoughts, it seems to me that all thoughts have only subjects. And therefore, predicates are a post-thought tool for prioritising one subject over another. For example, "Eiffel Tower" and "France" can both serve as subjects. So that whatever propositional content sentences have, or post-thought brain activity, thoughts themselves lack such content.

surroundx wrote:

They're physically identical. Saying that they're different does not entail that they are completely different (although the two are compatible).

What do you mean by "physically identical"? They share the same _________ (feel free to fill in the blanks)?

surroundx wrote:

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

surroundx wrote:

They're physically identical. Saying that they're different does not entail that they are completely different (although the two are compatible).

What do you mean by "physically identical"? They share the same _________ (feel free to fill in the blanks)?

They share the same body.

If they share the same body, then we must be talking about one single thing with a multiple personality disorder. Surely you do not mean it this way.

They must be two different bodies, but bodies of the same kind. Or same species, or something.

Perhaps you meant to say "The same body, but at different locations at the same time". This won't hold long either, but it makes more sense than "They share the same body" full stop.