surroundx wrote:

They share the same body.

surroundx wrote:

Well, he merely asked what they share. He didn't ask me for a theory of particular individuation. So while "the same body" might in some contexts be construed as entailing them being numerically identitical, I think it was clear what I meant given the context.

As seigneur mentionned, I'm trying to see how you can make sense of "similar" and "different" without using universals, properties or trope. So far, I fail to see what these two words mean.

FSC

surroundx wrote:

Are you suggesting/claiming that quantity is predicated upon universals/properties/tropes, such that without at least one of these individuation is not possible? And therefore quantitative talk is meaningless?

You can't speak of "quantity" without saying, at least, "quantity of something".

surroundx wrote:

So in a possible world with un-individuated particularity there can be no change?

What does it mean?

surroundx wrote:

Universals, properties or tropes (or some combination) are a necessary condition for change?

I'd like to think it is, but according to what you appear to be saying, it's not. So I'm trying to figure how it could be, hence my question.

surroundx wrote:

Maybe if you could tell me why locomotion presupposes or requires universals/properties/tropes? I take locomotion to be the primitive kind of change, though I'm sure you'll disagree. But from my point of view you answering that question will get the heart of our disagreement.

Locomotion implies that the location of a particle changes, correct?