surroundx wrote:

If we take the Divine Simplicity model, then "Omniscience", "Omnipotence" etc. aren't really distinct in God. And yet it is useful to distinguish between them in our mind so that we can understand God's true nature. Likewise, we can talk about a (simple) particulars "existence" or "extension" or "body", even though they aren't really distinct. Ironically, it is easier for us to think about the complex than the truly simple.

There are composites (e.g. us humans), which necessitates the existence of simples/particulars. Which I'll leave as an assertion for now, since I'm still working on perfecting the syllogism. Parsimony demands that we only infer sub-quark particles if quarks are insufficient for the job of simples. At present I'm agnostic about whether the two are synonymous. I simply don't know enough about the physics.

I'm not sure what you mean by a 'daily life example'?

So, if I really get you right, a particular is "just" a "bit of matter", but lack anything else except being matter? How can particles like quarks be these simples, as they have a position, but you specifically said that your simples lack position ?

Well, about that comparison, the big difference between your view and mine, for example, is that God has properties (though, they're not distinct as He's perfectly simple), while in your view, there are no properties whatsoever. None. Zilch. You stated it multiple times. And you've been clear about that.
Another difference is the fact that God is one. One. So, divine simplicity works, but how can you have more than one simple with the same being... without them being the same?

Perhaps I'm having a bad reading, but I just can't see how we can have properties that our constituents don't, unless we invoke some magic somewhere. Like, a good ex nihilo. And you're using words as if we had properties.

But perhaps you found a solution without the use of properties, and in that case, I'm curious as to how, what and when. Remember that eliminativism (if it's your position) is baffingly incoherent.

Last edited by FrenchySkepticalCatholic (4/01/2018 4:55 pm)

surroundx wrote:

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

So, if I really get you right, a particular is "just" a "bit of matter", but lack anything else except being matter? How can particles like quarks be these simples, as they have a position, but you specifically said that your simples lack position?

Right. If a quark can be in two places at once then it doesn't have an unequivocal position. Even if when not in two places at once it does have an unequivocal position. So either quarks are not simples, or simples vacillate between position and non-position. I take the former to be the case, however, that is predicated upon a very basic understanding of physics. So I consider it probable enough to justify it tentatively (>c.55%), but insufficient to justify it with belief. So I'm agnostically leaning towards sub-quarks. But I state it as my position since, as not everybody knows as little as me, it is better to potentially take advantage of other people's knowledge and subject the notion of sub-quark particles/particulars to other people's arguments rather than simply let them gather dust.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

Well, about that comparison, the big difference between your view and mine, for example, is that God has properties (though, they're not distinct as He's perfectly simple), while in your view, there are no properties whatsoever. None. Zilch. You stated it multiple times. And you've been clear about that.
Another difference is the fact that God is one. One. So, divine simplicity works, but how can you have more than one simple with the same being... without them being the same?

I take it that you're a Trinitarian? If so, how can that be squared with Divine Simplicity?

Well I reject numerical identity, so perhaps that is a big difference between us. Which is why the quark that is in two places is neither the same individual, nor a different individual. I don't think there is a good analogy that I can use here. But I'll try. Imagine that simples are drops of water, where an ocean is in some sense more of the same thing. Nothing other than water is metaphysically possible, so in some sense everything that exists is water. And yet it is not the same because there isn't any similarity upon which to predicate usage of 'same'. Same is more being used in a sense to point to the restriction of metaphysical possibility than the things themselves.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

Perhaps I'm having a bad reading, but I just can't see how we can have properties that our constituents don't, unless we invoke some magic somewhere. Like, a good ex nihilo. And you're using words as if we had properties.

But perhaps you found a solution without the use of properties, and in that case, I'm curious as to how, what and when. Remember that eliminativism (if it's your position) is baffingly incoherent.

There are three basic (part) solutions/alterations: 

The impossibility of metaphysical diversity of simples. Which I have already described above.

Convergence. A tonne of bricks and a tonne of feathers converge in their weight.

The actuality of metaphysical diversity. This goes against my position, but someone might suppose that difference doesn't imply properties, unlike sameness.

Alright. So, if I try to sum up your position, your "simples" are "bits of matter", in such a way that you see "matter" as a whole as a huge amorphous blob which can be particularized at single particular points? Is it correct? You're trying to mix atomistic pluralism and materialistic monism, right?

surroundx wrote:

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

Alright. So, if I try to sum up your position, your "simples" are "bits of matter", in such a way that you see "matter" as a whole as a huge amorphous blob which can be particularized at single particular points? Is it correct? You're trying to mix atomistic pluralism and materialistic monism, right?

No, nothing like an amorphous blob. Quantum mechanics tells us that two particles can be in the same place at the same time. And one particle can be in two places at once. So below that level things are likely to be even stranger to us. Perhaps it's best described as an unparticularized 'field'. Or a field such that one can only give a minimum-maximum range of particularity.

No, I don't subscribe to atomistic pluralism. I talk about quarks etc. only in the proximal sense. Which I find dialectically sufficient, as otherwise I'd have to do too much setting up. On my actual view, quarks and other particles have, one might say, converged quasi-formally with each other.

One last try before I give up, for my sanity sake (denying numerical identity is a hard "no" for me) : it appears Thales and his water. Correct?

For me, the only "correct" "materialistic" view (and the only one I stand against) is atomism. Anything else sounds like "word dance" to avoid calling it a mix of matter and form; or can be reducted to a dynamic pantheism.

I have a couple other comments on the discussion, but I don't want to be bullish.

It's worth distinguishing “gross tonnage” (D. C. Williams) and economy of assumptions. I agree that your ontology is more economical than Thomists' in terms of “gross tonnage”; I'm, however, not convinced that it's more economical in terms of assumptions (e.g. the assumption of nonexistence isn't the nonexistence of an assumption). 

I suppose I'm looking for your preferred formulation of the principle of parsimony, and (if it's not obvious) an explanation of how the relevant views are therefore more parsimonious than Thomists like Frenchy's.