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A subject I’m interested in people’s thoughts on:
How closely do you think hylemorphism, the theory that objects are constituted by form and matter, how ever these two notions are cashed out, is related to powers theory, the theory that objects have irreducible dispositional properties?
As far as I can see neither entails the other. One can accept endorse a powers theory without accepting an analysis of objects as matter and form, and one could accept such an analysis whilst holding all dispositonal properties are ultimately reducible to categorical ones. What for instance would the powers theorist qua powers theorist lose by rejecting hylemorphism?
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Its very difficult to say anything about entailment because formulations and elements of both those theories vary heavily between different proponents of them but it seems some versions of hylemorphism does require an ontology of causal powers. For example see Robert Koons , among important elements of what he thinks is plausible version of hylemorphism he states:
3. An ontology of fundamental causal powers. The natures of substances confer fundamental causal powers on those substances, and those powers (both active and passive) are the ultimate grounds for explaining all change and activity.
Ignoring any of these three elements results in a collapse of the substance/accidental unity distinction and, therefore, a collapse of Aristotle’s hylomorphism into a form of mere materialism.
See his PASI Hylemorphism , it makes heavy use of powers ontology.
On the other hand if only substances can have causal powers then Hylemorphism too can be illuminating for powers theory.
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As a vague idea of where I stand. I'm suspicious of Divine Simplicity mainly from Aquinas' philosophy. However, I'm not sure Can I call myself a mere Aristotelian when I think Aquinas best develops his ideas? I think Aquinas' core concepts with regards to philosophy of mind and free will for example are essentially correct.
To make this post more relevant to this thread, the main areas of Aristotelianism I'm on board with are his irreducible, causal power theories. So can I have my cake without even describing myself as Aristotelian? The whole topic of Hylemorphism seems to be motivated by our theories of matter. If we can have all of the benefits of Hylemorphism (especially with regards to psychology and the ontological distinctions between vegetative and rational animals and realism about essences for example) without appealing to that theory of matter, I'd be happy.
Is there a non hylemorphic theory which takes essentialism and irreducible 'emergentism' on top of causal power theory that isn't basically Hylemorphism?