I think the second point is very important. If one accepts the resurrection occurred, it doesn't seem to me to bind one to exclusivist Christianity. 

I don't know if it will take us too far off-topic (let me know if you think so, John, and I will move or delete this section), but there are at least three (related) arguments the Platonist you describe can, and has summoned against such exclusivism.

1. Is that a genuine religious tradition is a revelation of God, ultimately. It is a distillation of his truth and a guide to him. It is highly questionable whether, to the Platonist, a single corporeal form (an en-formed corporeal entity) can universally express such truth. That is, can one religious tradition, with its rituals and sacraments, imaginal world, doctrines, authorities, and so on, truly express this truth exhaustively for all men and all times and cultures. Prima Facie it is hard to see how it could.

2. Is basically just an a posteriori version of number one: the great religions of the world seem to express a lot of spiritual truths (to the Platonist at least), so how do we conclude one is the true one.

3. Is, again, closely related to the above two, and is basically the question about the limited spatial and temporal reach of Christ's message. Would the divine not provide for all men and cultures? (this latter point is in many ways just another way of expressing, or any extension of number one).

You are certainly correct that such a Platonist has to face the question of the conflicting forms of the religious traditions. Certainly, some traditons he can more or less dismiss (Mormonism, Scientology, Ba'hai, etc). He shouldn't airily dismiss this question. I don't think it is though, a self-evident refutation of his position though. I do think that he can make a good go of arguing for some ultimate unity.

Sometimes the criticisms on this score seem to me to misfire significantly. For example I read one scholarly critique that questioned whether this perspective could integrate properly the differing spiritual approach offered by Pascal and Kierkegaard (who the author quite questionably links together) compared to more Platonic and Aristotelian Christianity. The author seemed to assume that such Platonic universalism or perennialism had to accord largely equal weight and dignity to all such perspectives, rather than considering the strong fideism that he was attributing to Pascal (which is not beyond question) and the existentialist Christianity of Kierkegaard as either inferior or even illegitimate. Certainly, such a Platonist will have to avoid butchering the rich religious traditions of the world, but I don't see why it is self-evidently the case he must do this if does make claims about one fundamental metaphysics to judge others, interpret conflicts in the light of this, claim certain doctrines or positions represent important truths but not all that can said on the matter (the prohibition on idols may well fit in here), and so on.

Hi Alexander,

If you reread my essay, I think you'll find that you're repeating something I already wrote. I included it as the first possible response.

Alexander wrote:

So what? We can still use existing historical evidence as evidence even if we can't know that it won't be superseded one day.

Alexander wrote:

I do not believe that the historical evidence is powerful enough to base a faith upon it but this is due more to the nature of historical investigation and of faith than any severe defect in the evidence itself.

Exactly. In the future, I ask that you address what I actually write.

It's clear that the Platonist can't maintain a simple universalism- the Trinity is not Allah and baptism is not Zazen. You would have to maintain that all the religious traditions, or at least the Abrahamic ones, have as their core object (whether they recognize this thematically or not) the truth of Being or the Platonic One. If Platonism is not simply false metaphysically, and religion is always concerned with the ultimate and highest things, this must be so in some respect.

The question for the Platonist then would likely be about degree of metaphysical compatibility. Just prima facie it seems to me that the three Abrahamic traditions are not only compatible with Platonism but they lend themselves to it (hence their core agreements in philosophical theological method in the middle ages). Some other religions seem compatible with Platonism but not straightforwardly: Confucianism and many polytheistic traditions, especially the Greco-Roman tradition Platonism grew up in response to, seem to be of this character insofar as they will admit that the plurality of gods isn't the ultimate truth of things and that there might be something more fundamental than these. Hinduism (which was actually subject to some Hellenic influence in its development as were many of the religious traditions that grew out of India) actually seems to outright suggest as much.

The remaining categories would be faiths straightforwardly hostile to Platonism (Mormonism seems to be like this because, amongst other reasons, nothing like the 5 ways could be compatible with Mormonism as I understand it) and those which seem contrary to Platonism in their theological tenor (Buddhism and Taoism inhabit a vague space and tribal religions are often of such a merely mythical character that it would be hard to say where they are metaphysically).

After that, the Platonist can simply remain philosophically to the side about the ultimate truth of each tradition's particular revelation/mythical/liturgical practices remarking merely on the effectiveness of these in bringing one to the right philosophical place about something like the Platonic One. Thus I might, for instance, give traditional Catholic theology and practice an A-, Protestantism as a whole a C+, and Wiccanism a D-.