Alexander wrote:

Obviously, the historical evidence alone is not sufficient to show that Christianity is correct. I do in fact believe that Christ is the only way to salvation, but I do not think that this entails Christianity is the only way to salvation, and in any case the historical evidence wouldn't even touch either of those claims.

Okay. That's fair enough. It can be rephrased more explicitly as a trilemma. Either the historical evidence is sufficient for (to entail that we ought to hold) the metaphysical commitments of only one religion, more than one religion, or less than one religion[1]. I hold the metaphysical commitments of one religion but, as you write, I don't think the historical evidence is sufficient to entail that we ought to have those metaphysical commitments.

As for the view that people of other religions will or at least can be saved, if you're saying what I think you're saying I think I agree (ie. the doctrine of invincible ignorance demands it). I'm hoping to go into this in more detail after I get a chance to reply (more directly) to Jeremy's three points. 

[1]All given theism, of course.

Alexander wrote:

A related note: A really detailed treatment of a philosophical approach to revelation is Menssen and Sullivan's "The Agnostic Inquirer". I don't agree with everything in it, but it goes into the much neglected topic of why we might accept revelation on grounds other than historical inquiry.

Much neglected. Thanks for the recommendation. I'll check it out. At the very least, I hope there are other means of demonstrating the truth of Christianity and would like to think there are.

John West wrote:

Hi Jeremy, 

Your post isn't off-topic at all[1]. I agree Platonists' response shouldn't be simply dismissed. 

Consider a scenario where we have five ideal scholars of five great religions: Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hindu, and Shinto respectively. They are all completely rational and have perfect knowledge of their respective religions. They are tasked with trying to find one real, unresovable conflict between any two of their religions. Are we really to believe the scholars wouldn't find even one real conflict? 

As you write, I think Platonists want to argue that all conflicts between true religions are only apparent conflicts[2], not real conflicts. For instance, the conflict between the second commandment and alleged elephant idol might be escaped by arguing the latter is really a symbol of God. Even if not, I suspect our council of scholars would find at least some merely apparent conflicts between the great religions. 

My own view is that some conflict is both apparent and real. For instance, I understand Islam is very strict that God is not triune. In contrast, for Catholics, it is de fide that God is a Trinity. God cannot be both non-triune and triune. Hence, the teachings of Islam and Catholicism cannot both be true. 

People with greater knowledge of the various religions are welcome to chime in with other examples. 

A final option is for Platonist universalists to abandon attempts at proving the great religions are compatible, and affirm that they are their own religion. I suppose, in its own way, that would be fine.  


[1]Anyway, I only care about threadjacking. Conversations don't happen in straight lines.
[2]I wrote this as prima facie conflict in my original post.
[3]As to your concerns about spatial and temporal reach, the short answer is that the Church teaches that the invincibly ignorant don't go to Hell. The longer answer will require a reply of its own.

Well, I will add a few more things to make the Platonic position more plausible.

I think the first thing that must be said is that any unity is not, in the final analysis, on the discursive and corporeal plane. If the Platonist holds religious traditions to be projections of God into our realm of being, for the purpose of spiritual guidance of individuals and collectivities, then they represent what is ultimatey beyond all thought, form, and being. Their total unity will only be in God. Though we may conclude much about their unity, there will always be a slight tension between them on the corporeal plane and in discursive reason.

The point of a religious tradition, especially when taken as a whole, is to guide people to God. It will, reflecting him, be based on profound truths, but its main purpose is not discursive expression of metaphysics, and we shouldn't be surprised if its presentation of metaphysics and philosophy, at least in the more general form of the religion, sometimes has lapses or doesn't express the the highest position of truth possible. Indeed, in Western Christianity, for example, I would consider Eriugena or the School of Chartres or Meister Eckhart to be closer than the more mainstream aspects of the faith to the ultimate truth, but that is understandable, given the fact that faith has to cater for all society, and all spiritual types and journeys. In fact, from a Platonic view (especially the more mystical, Iamblichus-inspired, Hermetic variety I represent), discursive philosophy, though it can serve a role in religion and spirituality, is far from essential or even the summit of such a path. Nous, sacramental symbolism, myth, and mystical transformation is at the centre of Platonism, at least my kind, and I consider the growing need for discursive reason a decline rather than a mark of progress. Though I am not an expert on it, my understanding is that a tribal religion like that of the Plains Indians was spiritually as profound and as useful a guide for their people (in the past at least, today their culture has largely been overwhelmed by the white man's) as any religion was for any people, despite it lack of discrusive dogma or dialectical expression or philosophy.

Another thing that must be said, is the Platonist can conclude that some aspects of a religion are closer to the ultimate metaphysical truth than others. I, for example, accept traditional Calvinism, if practiced faithfully, as a valid path to God, but I also consider it a far more limited expression of Christianity than the Roman Church or Orthodox Church. And philosophically speaking, I consider Aristotelianism to express importat truths about God and reality, but be inferior to Platonism, and I could mention other such divisions (the superiority of Shankara to Ramanuja, for example).

And, furthermore, the fact religions express God in corporeal and physic form for different times and places, does suggest there may be changes in nuance and emphasis. After all, they are expressing what is infinite. And besides, different cultures have different needs. The Platonist can suggest that although one viewpoint is emphasised particular faith, though this might expess and import and valid insight about God that the religion uses to good effect for the spiritual support of its members, this viewpoint is not the whole story. He can either take that viewpoi or belief largely as it is and just suggest there are other perspectives that don't conflict with it. Or he can alter it slightly, suggesting that it is fine for the spiritual role it is playing but suffers a few deficiencies from an ultimate metaphysical perspective. This is how a Platonist might deal with (it is how I do it) the apparent conflict between Christian trinitarianism and Muslim unitarianism, suggesting that trinity does expresses an important trth about God but it is not the only insightful perspective (even the Christian also believes God is also a unity) and explicit recognition of it is not necessary to a valid religious path (whethe the orthodox doctrine of the trinity can be accepted completely, perhaps with a little nuance, in this way, or whether it would have to be altered a little to fit with what the Platonist hold to be a truer metaphsics is debatable).  An attempt can be made to bridge  divisions between Buddhism and Taoism and theistic faiths in this way as well.

Now, I don't pretend the foregoing is likely to convince a exclusivist believer, but it does, I feel help to show how the Platonic universalist or perennialist can put forward a respectable case.

A little should perhaps be said about the accusation that often comes up when such views are expressed - the purported claims of superiority, and even the arrogance, of the Platonist. It is claimed that in suggesting the maintream believer is not entirely correct, and tampering with the foundations of faiths, that the Platonist holds himself more knowing and insightful than the ordinary believers of these faiths. Aside the fact the exclusivist believer presumably thinks all other faiths profoundly mistaken himself, it is not the case that all such Platonists wish to found a new religion. Many, like myself, believe you should practice one of the faiths properly, and not mix them or create a syncretic religion. And most would hold that spiritual virtue is in practicing of one's faith and the cultivation of virtue and spirituality, and that being more correct than the exclusivist about other faiths has nothing to do with it - it does not make one spiritually superior in any sense. I sometimes talk of my position, but I have little wish to preach it or see any need to (I mean the universalism - I do have a small interest in preaching other aspects of Platonism). I only tend to mention it in debates over proof for Christianity, as I think it offers a distinct perspective that the irreligious do not deal with, and because it may win over some to religion who have trouble committing to an exclusivist position (I myself would not have become a Christian without it and would have trouble staying one).

I will have to take another look at your latest response in the morning, for now:

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

And, furthermore, the fact religions express God in corporeal and physic form for different times and places, does suggest there may be changes in nuance and emphasis. After all, they are expressing what is infinite. And besides, different cultures have different needs. The Platonist can suggest that although one viewpoint is emphasised particular faith, though this might expess and import and valid insight about God that the religion uses to good effect for the spiritual support of its members, this viewpoint is not the whole story. He can either take that viewpoi or belief largely as it is and just suggest there are other perspectives that don't conflict with it. Or he can alter it slightly, suggesting that it is fine for the spiritual role it is playing but suffers a few deficiencies from an ultimate metaphysical perspective. This is how a Platonist might deal with (it is how I do it) the apparent conflict between Christian trinitarianism and Muslim unitarianism, suggesting that trinity does expresses an important trth about God but it is not the only insightful perspective (even the Christian also believes God is also a unity) and explicit recognition of it is not necessary to a valid religious path (whethe the orthodox doctrine of the trinity can be accepted completely, perhaps with a little nuance, in this way, or whether it would have to be altered a little to fit with what the Platonist hold to be a truer metaphsics is debatable).  An attempt can be made to bridge  divisions between Buddhism and Taoism and theistic faiths in this way as well.

This response reminds me of Cantor's view, which can be summarized and rephrased: God has no divisions and is the ontologically first Creator of everything else. If God has no divisions and is the ontologically first Creator of everything else, then God ontologically precedes all divisions. Hence, God ontologically precedes all divisions. 

The argument proceeds to contend that since all the problems so far mentioned result from divisions, in the ultimate, bottom-level analysis these problems are superficial and work themselves out[1]. 

The problem is that Christianity explicitly denies that other religions are in some Platonic, final analysis true. This means that as well as claiming that Christianity is in some sense true, Platonism claims that it's also in some sense—the sense Christians hold it true—false. This was my original concern.

I'm not sure this need worry the Platonist. I do, however, think it means that the Platonist isn't affirming more than one religion, but is instead presenting a wholly unique view that ultimately denies all religions and provides its own framework for historical evidence for miracle claims. 

Incidentally, if I correctly understand it, I would also be interested in a discussion of Platonic Non-Dualism at some future date.


[1]Those interested in learning more of Cantor's view can read more here, near the end of the volume.

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

On the first question - that about the non-exhaustive nature of any formal manifestation - the Catholic would have to explain a little more, though. He'd have to explain how the particular imaginal, doctrinal, saramental, and ritual matrix of Christianity, or Catholicism, are truly universal in the sense they can exhaustively be a truly be exhaustive, or at least throw doubt on the Platonic perspective on the matter.

Well, if Catholicism is correct, not only is it—almost from the meaning of that statement—exhaustive of the entire spiritual truth, the "extra exhaustiveness" of Platonism is actually misleading people.

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

The position you lay out seem to imply the Aristotelian position of a man who can be more or less naturally perfected through corporeal or earthly means alone, whose spiritual destiny is supernaturally distinct, as well as a position that downplays the role of higher levels of being and things like symbolism and the imaginal and sacramental.

Sorry. Could you unpack this? I didn't mean to suggest (and don't think) that man can be perfected through corporeal means alone. I have an idea why you think I meant to convey that, but it would be helpful to know precisely what you're saying before I reply.

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

Well, they'd have to properly analysis what the Platonist means by the exhaustive or inexhaustive nature of any particular religious tradition (ie., the inability of a corporeal form to entirely capture what is supraformal). They could then either, one, try to dispute the notion of exhaustiveness being used; or, two, try to show how the Christian tradition can meet this standard of exhaustiveness. I'd be sceptical of option two (well, obviously I 'm also sceptial of option one - but I think a better case can be made for it than two), given the fact the Christian tradition is obviously limited to a particular imaginal, doctrinal, ritual, and symbolic framework.

Okay. But before I can provide a proper analysis of exhaustiveness as you mean it, I'm going to need you to expose your flank a bit here and define it as you mean it for me. I'm also going to need some reason why the Catholic ought to accept that this is something he need do that doesn't implicitly presume the correctness of your Platonic metaphysic over the scholastic metaphysic (well, close enough).

For instance, does any of this rely on the Platonic Non-Dualism that you said is "essentially panentheist"? Since from what you've written in the past I think this Non-Dualism both runs into modal problems and falls foul of the First Way, I would heavily dispute that part of the Platonic metaphysic. In other words, if what you're writing is "If the Platonic (yours) metaphysic is correct, then A, B, and C.", then the Platonic metaphysic is precisely what we should be discussing. Though, at that point, it may be worth starting a new thread.