I note that Feser describes the disembodied rational human soul as an "impaired stub" w/o all the powers of which it is by nature the principle - it's an incomplete substance. 

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/03/what-is-soul.html

I'm digging for where Aquinas so describes the separated soul. In Aquinas p. 160, Feser says that Aq thinks of soul as a kind of incomplete substance, like a hand or foot. That's not a great analogy, since a hand or foot cannot persist separate from the body, as the soul does in Aquinas. Feser cites ST 1a 75.2, which comes close to saying that soul is an incomplete substance but instead uses different phrasing, sc. as something subsisting w/o the accidents and material form that it has when it subsists as complete in the nature of some species (75.2 ad 1). Aquinas says in this way, the soul is a part of the human species, though the human substance is a composite of soul and body. 

So the soul is a spiritual substance but not a substance qua human being? Still, performing operations and even appearing to people, but not being a human being (ST 1a 75.4 etc.) or a person (1a 29.1 ad 5, 75.4 ad 2), but still being the form of YOUR body, it isn't clear to me how it is and is not a substance. More to ponder.

It's basically like a little ghost, it floats around and leaves behind ectoplasm in the now abandoned machine/body, which is why bodies get heavier when a person dies

Then in the resurrection the little ghost goes back to the machine, got it?

Seriously tho, check out Feser's article in the blackwell companion to substance dualism; he discusses survivalism there. Also Gyula Klima has some articles on Aquinas's account of the subsistence of the human soul, it's pretty good.

Greg wrote:

There is a blog post where Feser is more transparent in saying that he is a survivalist but believes the textual evidence points toward corruptionism, in which case he would disagree with Aquinas.

Do you mean this one? http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2016/03/so-what-are-you-doing-after-your-funeral.html "In any event, on the substantive metaphysical question about what happens to the human being after death, I am definitely a survivalist.  On the exegetical question about what Aquinas himself thought, I am agnostic."
 
In my view, survivalists have to answer the reincarnation question. Survivalism implies reincarnation. Christians should reject reincarnation because it's not in the Bible. And if a survivalist philosopher rejects reincarnation, it would be interesting to know the metaphysical mechanics as to how the implication of reincarnation can be bypassed.

ficino wrote:

Ralph McInerny in his SEP article on Aquinas says that intellectual soul is not a substance but is something subsisting.

As far as I have understood, substance on Aristotelianism is form+matter. That is, substance is composite. When it comes to a human being, the soul is the form of human, just the form. Lacking matter, it is not a substance.

I disagree with this definition of substance, but it is what it is. Aristotelianism stands on it.

In case anyone is interested, here are my notes from Turner C. Nevitt, “Survivalism, Corruptionism, and Intermittent Existence in Aquinas,” HPhilQ 31.1 (2014) 1-19. Nevitt defends the Corruptionist option. Sorry both for the length and for leaving much out.

P. 1 one arg in favor of survivalism is to say Aq denies that the same thing can cease to exist and then exist at another time – no intermittent or “gappy” existence.
2 Nevitt defends corruptionism against this obj. He will show textual ev that Aq held corr, and also that Aq is OK with intermittent existence, just denies that natural powers bring it about. He isn’t trying to prove survivalism false, just to contest the above arg in its favor.
3 Aq says “I am not my soul,” Comm on I Cor c. 15. Only a part of a person exists betw death and resurr so soul is not the person, say corruptionists. Nevitt thinks Aq unambiguously endorses corruptionism elsewhere (n. 7: he cites three articles by Patrick Toner for references).
  The survivalist believes that Aq makes a distinction betw identity and constitution. [Feser says the disembodied soul “constitutes” the human after death] Wholes are greater than the sum of their parts, are only constituted by their parts, and constitution is not identity. So Aq may say the soul “is” not the human, using “is” of identity, but leave it open that soul “is” the human on “is” of constitution.
  Nevitt attacks Christopher Brown’s defense of survivalism made by Brown in Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus: Solving Puzzles about Material Objects (2005) 120-124. Brown says corrup is wrong because it entails Intermittent Existence Thesis. Brown says Aq rejects IE (he cites six major texts). 4 Brown says surv agrees with all Aq says and does not entail IE.
   But, replies Nevitt, Aq does endorse IE at Quaestiones de Quolibet (QQ) IV, q. 3, aa.1-2. After arguing in a.1 that God could annihilate the universe, Aq argues in a. 2 that He could reconstitute it as numerically the same thing if He had annihilated it: a long quotation includes Aq saying that natural agents cannot do this but God can, since He can operate w/o intermediary causes.
5 Aq wrote Quodlibet IV in 1271, so it’s later than the texts cited by Brown and thus trumps them. And N argues that Brown’s texts do not entail Aq rejected IE. Also note that Aq only says natural agents cannot cause Intermittent Existence. N knows no place where Aq denies that God can cause IE.  6 God cannot annihilate and recreate things whose existence requires unbroken continuity of duration, like a single motion, 7 but He can annihilate and recreate as numerically the same those things that exist entire in a single moment – since continuity of duration is not part of their ratio.
  A problem: how is IE the existence of the same thing and not just annihilation and then creation of an exact duplicate? That’s why survivalists want the soul to stand in as persisting.
  SCG IV.80.1 and 81.5 show that the continuity lies in the continuity of God’s power. Since God can create P out of nothing, He can annihilate P and then create P again. It remains unclear how Aq would explain how such is metaphysically possible; Aq just doesn’t deny IE.
8 here follow Brown’s texts on which he bases his arg for survivalism. They are:
SCG IV.80.3 and 81.11;
              80.2 and 81.6-10
         II.83.37
In IV Sent. d.44 q. 1 a. 1, qc. 1, arg. 4 and ad 4;
                                          qc. 2 arg. 1 and ad 1
ST Suppl. q. 79 a. 2 obj. 4 and ad 4;
CT 154
In V Phys. l. 6, 6 and 8.
11 most of Brown’s texts show Aq denying that natural agents can cause IE. Nowhere does Aq reject IE, and twice seems to endorse it implicitly. At Quodlibert IV q. 3 a. 2 he explicitly endorses it.
12 Still, Brown has a point when he notes that Aq should enlist IE, if he endorses it, in a proof for the resurrection rather than pass over the issue in silence as he usually does. Why bother employing the surviving-part strategy if God can just annihilate and then recreate the same numerical thing?
     Nevitt’s answer is that Aq doesn’t invoke IE to defend the possibility of resurrection because Aq thinks in fact some part does survive, so he uses the surviving-part strategy. He identifies the soul with part of the person rather than with the whole person, but he doesn’t invoke IE as though nothing persists after death.
14 Nevitt distinguishes two senses of IE: 1) when the thing goes out of existence in every sense vs. 2) when it goes out of existence in some sense (his emphasis). The corruptionist holds 2), that the person ceases to exist actually at death, a part—the soul—persists, and the person continues to exist potentially. The sense of IE that does not apply in Aq’s eyes is the first sense; there’s never a time in which the human ceases to exist in every sense and then is recreated as numerically the same. Aq’s religious doctrines preclude a full-bore IE defense of resurrection, so that’s why Aq doesn’t use that defense, not because he denies that God could cause full-bore 1) IE.
15 we just do not know what Aq thought is metaphysically necessary for identity over time, except the continuity of divine power; Quodlibet IV shows he didn’t think something has to persist.
 

Last edited by ficino (6/02/2018 6:04 am)

Greg wrote:

That is not Aristotle's definition of substance, since he thinks the unmoved movers are immaterial substances.
 

A quote (from Aristotle) would be nice. As far as I have read Aristotle's Metaphysics, his examples of substances are a man and a horse, not unmoved movers.

When Feser discusses the same thing, he says, "That a human being is this unique, indeed very weird sort of substance -- corporeal in some respects and incorporeal in others -- is what makes us different from, on the one hand, non-human animals (which are entirely corporeal) and on the other hand, angels (which are entirely incorporeal)."

Substance very suspiciously looks like composite on the Aristotelian view. Maybe there is a way around it, but it would be a roundabout way.