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From what I understand, someone following Kant's notion of idealism will claim that the noumenon isn't knowable. Rather, it is informed and structured by a priori concepts. But what is the reason for believing that our concepts behave in this way, carving up reality?
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On what seems to be the most prevalent contemporary reading of Kant, he doesn't hold that the phenomenal realm is structured by our a priori concepts (at least, not if this is taken to mean our minds 'contribute something' to the phenomenal realm, as it is sometimes said), much less the noumenal realm. That view is typically associated with what is referred to as the 'two-world' interpretation of Kant, whereas the 'two-aspect' view, defended admirably by Henry Allison inĀ Kant's Transcendental Idealism, would reject the psychologism that is sometimes attributed to Kant (e.g. see Feser's criticisms of Kant in several of his works). As usual, the SEP has a nice introductory article.
Last edited by UGADawg (6/25/2018 11:01 am)