I think people are missing the point here: Kant's theories of a priori knowledge and modality are based on Humean contentions that most philosophers recognize as outright wrong, or if correct then correct for completely different reasons (knowledge of necessity being a priori, the only necessary connections in nature being causal ones, the image theory of cognition). Further more there are noted problems with Kant's own system not least how it should be interpreted.

This alone does not rule out transcendental idealism but it at least casts doubt on Kant's arguments for it at least as he gave them. So the transcendetal idealist has to give arguments for their position (as do proponents of other ontologies), something few analytical philosophers engaging with philosophy of religion do. That is the reason there are so few direct responses.

There are anti-realists in Analytical philosophy (I think realists philosophers of religion have dialogued with Putnam at least) but few I know of whose non-theism is motivated by anti-realist concerns.

Last edited by DanielCC (7/01/2018 11:35 am)

DanielCC wrote:

I think people are missing the point here: Kant's theories of a priori knowledge and modality are based on Humean contentions that most philosophers recognize as outright wrong, or if correct then correct for completely different reasons (knowledge of necessity being a priori, the only necessary connections in nature being causal ones, the image theory of cognition). Further more there are noted problems with Kant's own system not least how it should be interpreted.

This alone does not rule out transcendental idealism but it at least casts doubt on Kant's arguments for it at least as he gave them. So the transcendetal idealist has to give arguments for their position (as do proponents of other ontologies), something few analytical philosophers engaging with philosophy of religion do. That is the reason there are so few direct responses.

There are anti-realists in Analytical philosophy (I think realists philosophers of religion have dialogued with Putnam at least) but few I know of whose non-theism is motivated by anti-realist concerns.

 
Pretty much.

Moving beyond Kant to a more general anti-realism; an atheist anti-realist would also have to deal with something like Michael Dummett's argument for God.

Ouros wrote:

Therefore, let me end on my original question: what are the best responses to Kant's transcendental idealist?

The more basic question, if you're primarily interested in Kant for philosophy of religion purposes, is whether Kant's replies to the objections you list really require transcendental idealism. Do we really need to affirm the whole Kantian apparatus to say that the PSR is nothing more than a transcendental presupposition? I'm not convinced we do.

In Ed's defense, “properly refuting” Kant requires a lot more space than he's usually willing to give any one philosopher in his books. (He also has to contend with at least a half dozen different interpretations of Kant.)

John West wrote:

Ouros wrote:

Therefore, let me end on my original question: what are the best responses to Kant's transcendental idealist?

The more basic question, if you're primarily interested in Kant for philosophy of religion purposes, is whether Kant's replies to the objections you list really require transcendental idealism. Do we really need to affirm the whole Kantian apparatus to say that the PSR is nothing more than a transcendental presupposition? I'm not convinced we do.

In Ed's defense, “properly refuting” Kant requires a lot more space than he's usually willing to give any one philosopher in his books. (He also has to contend with at least a half dozen different interpretations of Kant.)

 
Well it becomes a lot weaker when used against the positive arguments. It suffers from the added complexity of limiting the order of the world and our explanatory practices to a transcendental presupposition, and Kant's system at least gives us some ground for that (though not sufficient, pun intended, to rebut the arguments, I'd say). So I think the problems would remain largely the same and perhaps the gain in modesty (by abandoning the system) is offset by the lack of justification that the system itself could otherwise support.

The more basic question, if you're primarily interested in Kant for philosophy of religion purposes, is whether Kant's replies to the objections you list really require transcendental idealism. Do we really need to affirm the whole Kantian apparatus to say that the PSR is nothing more than a transcendental presupposition? I'm not convinced we do.

I'm not sure about PSR specifically, but I think it's interesting you mention this. Few philosophers today would embrace the entirety of Kant's transcendental idealism, but all the same, it seems that after Kant, philosophers typically haven't placed as much emphasis on studying the nature of substances, essences, etc.