Miguel wrote:

I think technically one might be able to construct arguments without assuming PSR, at least on the surface, but I'm not entirely sure if there's no assumption of PSR behind everything (for instance, it could be that appeals to principle of indifference, so common in many arguments, actually presuppose PSR).

I thought (based on your comments over the last several months) that you might say this. I think the way you talk and argue often tacitly assumes it's the case.

Suppose it's true. Then by the same reasoning, you have to assume the PSR every time you argue for it and, so, your arguments implicitly presuppose what they're meant to prove.

John West wrote:

Miguel wrote:

I think technically one might be able to construct arguments without assuming PSR, at least on the surface, but I'm not entirely sure if there's no assumption of PSR behind everything (for instance, it could be that appeals to principle of indifference, so common in many arguments, actually presuppose PSR).

I thought (based on your comments over the last several months) that you might say this. I think the way you talk and argue often tacitly assumes it's the case.

Suppose it's true. Then by the same reasoning, you have to assume the PSR every time you argue for it and, so, your arguments implicitly presuppose what they're meant to prove.

 
I'm not entirely sure, I was just saying my impression (because even modal collapse objections, for instance, must assume contingency, and if PSR is false then maybe we have no grounds for assuming it - or maybe we do with something like phenomenal conservatism for it, but I'm not sure)t.

But anyway I don't really see any problem with your last point. it has been said before that it's hard to argue for PSR because it is hard to find theses more plausible than PSR itself with which to construct arguments.

This is not a problem; on the contrary, it would only show how fundamental PSR is. Besides self-evidence, the main reasons I accept PSR are 1- it is necessary to justify inferences to the best explanation and 2- it is itself the best explanation for why there isn't brute chaos (it is confirmed by all experience). 2 makes sense only if we can have IBE of course, but I take it that reasonable people accept IBE anyway. If it begs the question in the case IBE depends on PSR, then we should accept PSR because we need it for IBEs (argument 1), but if IBE doesn't depend on PSR then 2 still follows through.

Saying I must assume PSR every time I give an IBE or similar argument isn't a problem for the PSR defender, rather it is a powerful reason to accept PSR.

John West wrote:

I don't, by the way, think that the idea that the PSR is only a transcendental presupposition needs transcendental idealism for grounds. For instance, I might agree (with Ed) that it leads to the God of classical theism, but think that the accidental property objection indicates that classical theism is incoherent. I then have good reason to suspend judgment over both classical theism and the metaphysical significance of the PSR. You guys don't spend enough time considering indirect arguments like this.

So? If you *really* find the accidental property objection to be stronger than PSR, then you can have a reason to reject PSR and accept magic. But someone can still find PSR more plausible than such objections, thereby concluding instead that there must be something wrong with the objection (even if one can't directly tell what it is), or perhaps doubt the classical theism inference.
 

Last edited by Miguel (7/02/2018 1:16 am)

John West wrote:

Miguel wrote:

This is not a problem; on the contrary, it would only show how fundamental PSR is.

It's a problem if you want to prove that the PSR has a metaphysical significance. You can't prove a principle with a proof that presupposes it.

So? If you *really* find the accidental property objection to be stronger than PSR, then you can have a reason to reject PSR and accept magic.

But this is a straw man. The person who suspends judgment over the metaphysical significance of the PSR and accepts that it has a transcendental significance doesn't thereby “accept magic”.

(I do actually find the accidental property objection convincing. Every premise but one follows from the definition of classical theism, and the intrinsic theory of belief (or some equivalent) premise is as well grounded as anything.)

 
As I said, if we cannot argue for PSR (as a necessary metaphysical principle) as the best explanation for our experience because we'd be assuming PSR (as a necessary metaphysical principle) then that is only more reason to accept PSR. The argument is already about PSR as a necessary metaphysical principle and not merely as a transcendental presupposition; one would compare the two proposals and see how they fare with respect to simplicity, explanatory power, etc.

The person who suspends judgment over the metaphysical significance of the PSR is epistemically open to magic in a sense those who accept PSR aren't. Of course, the person is free to suspend judgment about magic. All I'm saying is it's legitimate to consider indirect arguments; but I think voodoo magic is less plausible than the accidental properties objection

John West wrote:

Miguel wrote:

As I said, if we cannot argue for PSR (as a necessary metaphysical principle) as the best explanation for our experience because we'd be assuming PSR (as a necessary metaphysical principle) then that is only more reason to accept PSR. The argument is already about PSR as a necessary metaphysical principle and not merely as a transcendental presupposition; one would compare the two proposals and see how they fare with respect to simplicity, explanatory power, etc.

I see. I don't consider circular proofs probative.

The person who suspends judgment over the metaphysical significance of the PSR is epistemically open to magic in a sense those who accept PSR aren't. Of course, the person is free to suspend judgment about magic. All I'm saying is it's legitimate to consider indirect arguments; but I think voodoo magic is less plausible than the accidental properties objection.

I don't. I'm reminded of Armstrong's discussion of how, after publishing his first couple books, he found some people found some of his arguments absolutely jaw dropping and others worthless, and other people the exact opposite.

Anyway, you already know what I think about this kind of cheap rhetoric. I have work I should be doing.

It's not the "circular" proof that is probative; the argument would stand on its own. It's an inference to the best explanation. What is assumed is that IBE is a legitimate form of argument. If, however, it turns out that IBE depends on PSR - and I think it does - then it would be circular. But then we'd have a different reason to accept PSR, one that I think is more powerful: without it, we wouldn't have IBE. If you can justify IBE the way we need it with only a "transcendental PSR", without begging the question, then we can go on to use the IBE argument for PSR as a metaphysical principle: the two proposed ideas would clash, transcendental PSR vs metaphysical PSR, and we'd see which one is simpler, has more explanatory power, and so on.

So it's not a matter of a circular argument, more like a dilemma: if (such and such kind of argument) is illegitimate without PSR, then because (such and such kind of argument) is legitimate, therefore PSR is true. If (such and such kind of argument) is legitimate without PSR, then (such and such kind of argument) can be used in support of PSR. The example being IBE x the order in the world.

And yeah, as I stated, the fact that I find magic to be self-evidently absurd doesn't mean much in a dialectic context. But I can't help it. My point is that even *if* we could not give independent positive arguments for PSR, and we had independent arguments against PSR, I'd still find them inherently suspect because PSR is self-evident to me. That may not be the case with everyone; so with your indirect argument, for instance, someone could accept it and thus suspend judgment about magic, but I can't. This may not help in a dialectical context, but it is very relevant with respect to whether someone accepts PSR or not, including taking into consideration objections like the one you mentioned.
 

Last edited by Miguel (7/02/2018 12:37 pm)

Miguel wrote:

It's not the "circular" proof that is probative; the argument would stand on its own. It's an inference to the best explanation. What is assumed is that IBE is a legitimate form of argument. If, however, it turns out that IBE depends on PSR - and I think it does - then it would be circular.

Inferences to the best explanation aren't probative by definition. I'm, however, talking about any argument that is circular, whether it's a proof or not, if the PSR has the status we're supposing it does for the sake of conversation.

And I don't mean to insult with the word "magic", just convey how it seems to me in the context of PSR's self-evidence. After all, magic is basically a rejection of PSR and PPC; that a small wooden wand can somehow produce huge thunders and fireballs, a surplus effect coming from nowhere, etc.

What you're doing, whether you realize it or not, is relying on caricatures and hyperbole to make your case seem more plausible than it is. Is it really so implausible that, in our universe, there might be freak happenings? (If we have to take the PSR as a transcendental presupposition, that more or less explains why we don't experience any.) I don't think it is.