None of them including contingency arguments would be affected. PSR arguments would have to be readapted. Theism is not contingent on the PSR.

RomanJoe wrote:

Noble_monkey wrote:

None of them including contingency arguments would be affected. PSR arguments would have to be readapted. Theism is not contingent on the PSR.

Can you elaborate more on this?

Sure. For one, only cosmological arguments could be affected by this. Ontological, moral and teleological arguments do not presuppose the PSR (most of them do not even rely on a causal premise).

For cosmological arguments, only contingency arguments employ the PSR. Other Cosmological arguments use other causal premises that are by no way dependent on "Every fact has a sufficient reason". Rather, "whatever begins to exist has a cause" or "whatever is moved is moved by another".


If  you look for a post called "A better argument from contingency" in theoretical phil by myself, I show that we can get to God through contingency arguments without the PSR.

RomanJoe wrote:

Noble_monkey wrote:

RomanJoe wrote:

Can you elaborate more on this?

Sure. For one, only cosmological arguments could be affected by this. Ontological, moral and teleological arguments do not presuppose the PSR (most of them do not even rely on a causal premise).

For cosmological arguments, only contingency arguments employ the PSR. Other Cosmological arguments use other causal premises that are by no way dependent on "Every fact has a sufficient reason". Rather, "whatever begins to exist has a cause" or "whatever is moved is moved by another".


If  you look for a post called "A better argument from contingency" in theoretical phil by myself, I show that we can get to God through contingency arguments without the PSR.

Wouldn't the possibility of brute facts, given a ~PSR world also render null any principles of causality? Potency may move to act for no reason, things may begin to exist for no reason, things may ultimately act towards an end for no reason. Unless of course you argue that a given principle of causality can still hold in a ~PSR world. But one could just ask why? If brute facts are possible then causal connections could be entirely unintelligible.

>Unless of course you argue that a given principle of causality can still hold in a ~PSR world.

Correct, for example, the proponent of the kalam argument would argue that the CP they give does not exclude brute facts with regards to contingent beings or natural ends.

>If brute facts are possible then causal connections could be entirely unintelligible.

Well that's the purpose of a CP. It's to show that the causal connections between an effect and its cause are an objective feature of reality and therefore the effect is not a brute fact.

In a world where brute facts are possible I don't think you can have a secure causal principle.

Noble_monkey wrote:

RomanJoe wrote:

In a world where brute facts are possible I don't think you can have a secure causal principle.

The purpose of a CP is to rule out only certain types of brute facts (coming to being without a cause for example). The purpose is not to rule out all brute facts.

What is the explanation for an ice cube melting on a hot day? The hot air, the sun's heat, the rapid molecular movement. All these causes are explanations for the melting of the ice cube. Causes fall into the category of explanations or reasons because they bestow intelligibility to an effect, providing a reason for why the effect came about.

Last edited by RomanJoe (12/12/2018 7:38 pm)