Hi natmain,

Using Hume's example, the important part to keep in mind is that, on scholasticism, the brick striking the window and the window shattering aren't two distinct events that occur separately. Rather, one thing, the brick, brings about the effect in the other thing, the window. As the brick pushes through the window, the window simultaneously shatters. The focus of Thomas's proofs is a bit different though:

natmain wrote:

I was wondering if someone could elaborate on the idea that Feser talks about in his book Aquinas on page 21 that causes and effects happen simultaneously.  This seems to be an extremely important idea, especially when looking at Aquinas' first and second way.

Thomists draw a distinction between per accidens causal series and per se causal series[1]. Per accidens causal series are linear series ordered in time. Consider, for instance, a cold cup of tea on a table. The coldness of the air cooled the tea; the air was cold because of the air conditioner; the air conditioner went on because you flicked a switch; you flicked a switch because you were annoyed by the summer heat; the sun generated this heat; and so on[2]. Time passes between each effect (but each cause and effect "pair" is simultaneous). This is a linear, per accidens causal series extending backwards in time.

In contrast, per se causal series are “hierarchical” series ordered in terms of logical primacy[3]. Consider once more the cold cup of tea on your table. What holds the table up? The floor. What holds the floor up? Your house's foundation. Your house's foundation is in turn held up by the earth[2]. Unlike the linear series, this “hierarchical” series does not extend backwards in time. Each cause in the series brings about its effect simultaneously, with the causes' order based on what holds what up. 

As another example, consider a lamp above your head, which is held up by a chain, which is in turn held up by a fixture in the ceiling. Both the downward cup series and this upward lamp series are hierarchical, per se causal series[2]. In Aquinas's proofs, he is writing about these simultaneous, hierarchical series.

There is more to write about the latter kind of causal series. I hope this is helpful as a start.


[1]Scotus had interesting things to say about the distinction.
[2]With thanks to Edward Feser's An Aristotelian Proof of the Existence of God for most of these examples.
[3]More properly, ontological primacy. The previous member in each series must exist to (in this case) hold up later members in the series, but the later members need not exist for the previous member.

Last edited by John West (7/31/2015 1:53 am)

seigneur wrote:

There is a type of causes identified by Aquinas, but never mentioned by Feser, as far as I am aware. They are so-called "exemplar causes", a kind of formal causes proceeding from God. Exemplar causes are responsible for the procession of creatures and entities in creation.

On some views, exemplar causes enable reconciliation of ID and Thomism.

Robert C. Koons and Logan Paul Gage wrote:

Moreover, this exaggerated focus on secondary causation is also seen in the utter absence of Thomas’s doctrine of exemplar causation—a crucial part of Thomistic metaphysics—in the critics’ writings.

This article, "St. Thomas Aquinas on Intelligent Design" published in Proceedings of the ACPA, Vol. 85, is a criticism of Feser.

This really deserves its own post but what good will bringing in the Divine Exemplars do for ID? The Exemplars are involved in all processes e.g. the random collision of sub-atomic particles in a solar storm leading to the appearance of a watch as much as a designer's carefully constructing one. The Exemplars are important but proofs involving them tend either to be the Firth Way or the proof from Eternal Truths.
 

John West wrote:

Using Hume's example, the important part to keep in mind is that, on scholasticism, the brick striking the window and the window shattering aren't two distinct events that occur separately.

I'll take this further: I doubt events exist in their capacity as events. "Event" is a word we sometimes use to talk about interactions between entities like things (which do exist) when we're not speaking carefully. But there are no special entities called "events" floating around.
 

Last edited by John West (7/31/2015 7:17 am)

seigneur wrote:

There is a type of causes identified by Aquinas, but never mentioned by Feser, as far as I am aware. They are so-called "exemplar causes", a kind of formal causes proceeding from God.

A quick search of Ed's blog will turn up his previous mentions of exemplar causes.